\u63a5\u4e0a\u7bc7\uff0c\u8ba1\u5212\u8ba4\u771f\u5730\u628a\u8fd9\u672c\u4e66\u505a\u4e9b\u6458\u5f55\uff0c\u4f9b\u4ee5\u540e\u5e38\u56de\u6765\u7ffb\u7ffb\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rather than merely identifying entrepreneurs<\/strong> and monitoring them, as Rock had done, the new venture capitalists actively shaped them<\/strong>: they told company founders whom to hire, how to sell, and how to structure their research. And to ensure that their instructions were implemented, the new venture capitalists came up with a second innovation: rather than organizing one large fundraising, they doled out capital in tranches<\/strong>, with each cautious infusion calibrated to support the company until it reached an agreed milestone. If the 1950s had revealed the power of liberation capital<\/strong>, and if the 1960s had brought the equity-only, time-limited venture fund<\/strong>, the advances of the 1970s were twofold: hands-on activism<\/strong> and stage-by-stage finance<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 50\u5e74\u4ee3-70\u5e74\u4ee3\u7684VC\u56db\u5927\u53d1\u660e\uff0c50\u5e74\u4ee3ARD\u548c\u4ed9\u7ae5\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u63ed\u793a\u4e86\u81ea\u7531\u8d44\u672c\u7684\u795e\u5947\uff0c60\u5e74\u4ee3Davis & Rock Fund\u6f14\u5316\u51fa\u4e86\u8bbe\u5b9a\u671f\u9650\u7684\u7eaf\u80a1\u6743VC\u57fa\u91d1\uff0c\u533a\u522b\u4e8eARD\u6700\u521d\u7684\u5f00\u653e\u5f0f\u57fa\u91d1\u8bbe\u7f6e\u4ee5\u53caSBIC\u5c1d\u8bd5\uff0c\u6a21\u5f0f\u4e0a\u53ea\u662f\u91cd\u70b9\u5173\u6ce8\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\uff1b70\u5e74\u4ee3\u5219\u662fVC\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u8fd0\u4f5c\u65b9\u5f0f\u8fdb\u5316\uff0c\u8fdb\u5316\u51fa\u4e86\u66f4\u52a0\u7ec6\u8282\u7684\u8f85\u5bfc\u516c\u53f8\u548c\u5206\u6279\u6ce8\u5165\u8d44\u91d1\u7684\u5c1d\u8bd5\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u505a\u6cd5\u867d\u7136\u4e00\u76f4\u5ef6\u7eed\u5230\u4e86\u4eca\u5929\uff0c\u4f46\u4e0d\u5c11\u4eba\u7528\u8d77\u6765\u8fd8\u975e\u5e38\u987e\u8651\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Valentine is said to have remarked that underperforming company founders should be put into a cell with Charlie Manson. He rose through the ranks at Fairchild Semiconductor and later at its rival National Semiconductor, developing a sideline investing his own money, including in the Rock-Palevsky bonanza, SDS. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Don \u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u548c\u5f88\u591aVC\u5927\u4f6c\u4e00\u6837\uff0c\u90fd\u662f\u81ea\u5df1\u6709\u4e86\u6210\u529f\u7ecf\u5386\uff0c\u75db\u6068\u5931\u8d25\u624d\u5f00\u59cb\u5c06VC\u4f5c\u4e3a\u4e8b\u4e1a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n It took Valentine a year and a half to raise $5 million for his first fund. But in the end he succeeded by tapping pools of capital that enjoyed charitable status: the universities and endowments that escaped not only regulation but also capital-gains tax. The Ford Foundation came in first, later to be joined by Yale, Vanderbilt, and eventually Harvard; ironically, the Ivy League investment bosses showed a greater open-mindedness about a gruff Fordham graduate than many alumni could muster. In so doing, the endowments set in motion one of the great virtuous cycles <\/strong>of the American system. Venture capitalists backed knowledge-intensive startups<\/strong>, and some of the profits flowed to research institutions<\/strong> that generated more knowledge. To this day, the conference rooms at Valentine\u2019s old firm are named after their main limited partners: Harvard, MIT, Stanford, and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Don\u7684\u52df\u8d44\u4e5f\u5e76\u4e0d\u987a\u5229\uff0c18\u4e2a\u6708\u624d\u52df\u5230\u4e86500w\u5200\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u7ea2\u6749\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u7b2c\u4e00\u671f\uff0c1974\u5e74\u3002\u5e78\u8fd0\u7684\u662f\u53d7\u76ca\u4e8e\u6350\u8d60\u548c\u6148\u5584\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u653f\u7b56\uff0c\u8fdb\u6765\u7684LP\u90fd\u662f\u8fd9\u4e2a\u7c7b\u578b\uff0c\u7279\u522b\u662f\u5927\u5b66\u7684\u6350\u8d60\u57fa\u91d1\u5176\u5b9e\u65e0\u610f\u542f\u52a8\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e2a\u4f1f\u5927\u7684\u5faa\u73af\uff1a\u6350\u8d60\u57fa\u91d1\u6295\u8d44\u4e8eVC\u2014\u2014> VC\u6295\u8d44\u5230\u77e5\u8bc6\u5bc6\u96c6\u7684\u521b\u4e1a\u516c\u53f8\u2014\u2014> \u5229\u6da6\u518d\u53cd\u54fa\u5b66\u6821\u7b49\u79d1\u7814\u90e8\u95e8\uff0c\u4ee5\u751f\u4ea7\u66f4\u597d\u7684\u77e5\u8bc6\u3002Don\u8fd8\u628a\u8fd9\u4e9bLP\u7684\u540d\u5b57\u6302\u5728\u4e86\u4f1a\u8bae\u5ba4\u7684\u95e8\u4e0a\uff0c\u975e\u5e38\u597d\u7684\u505a\u6cd5\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unlike Arthur Rock, he was a hands-on business<\/strong> operator by background, and in his years as a semiconductor salesman he had learned how to translate products into profits. You had to go with the version of your invention that would earn you the fattest margin<\/strong>, and you had to open sales channels<\/strong> to as many customers as possible. In the case of Atari, this meant capitalizing on one of Bushnell\u2019s many semi-formed epiphanies: if Pong could be sold to families<\/strong> rather than bars, the market could be expanded enormously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Von \u6bd4\u8f83Hands-on\u7684\u65b9\u6cd5\u8bba\u653e\u4eca\u5929\u4f9d\u7136\u5f88\u6709\u7528\uff0c\u8ffd\u6c42\u9ad8\u6bdb\u5229\u3001\u6253\u5f00\u9500\u552e\u6e20\u9053\uff0c\u5c3d\u91cfTo C\uff01\u591a\u4e48\u4f1f\u5927\u7684\u6d1e\u89c1\uff0c\u57fa\u672c\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u975e\u5e38\u6734\u7d20\u7684\u601d\u8def\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n In late 1974, a few weeks after his visit to Atari\u2019s factory, Valentine made a decision. He was not going to invest yet: Atari was too chaotic. But he was not going to walk away: the potential was too terrific. Instead, he would get involved cautiously, in stages<\/strong>, and he would start by rolling up his sleeves and writing an Atari business plan<\/strong>. If all went well\u2014if Bushnell embraced his strategy, and if the plan attracted interest from other venture capitalists\u2014then Valentine would invest. He would risk his money, in other words, only when Atari had been at least partially de-risked. Activism and gradualism<\/strong> would thus combine to make a hot tub culture backable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Atari\u9879\u76ee\u80fd\u770b\u51fa\u6765Von\u7684\u8c28\u614e\u548c\u8fdc\u89c1\uff0c\u592a\u4e71\u4e86\u6682\u65f6\u4e0d\u6295\uff0c\u53c8\u80fd\u770b\u5230\u672a\u6765\u7684\u5de8\u5927\u524d\u666f\uff0c\u5e76\u4e0d\u8d70\u5f00\uff0c\u76f8\u53cdVon\u91c7\u53d6\u9010\u6b65\u6295\u8d44\u3001\u64b8\u8d77\u8896\u5b50\u4eb2\u81ea\u4e0b\u573a\u5e2e\u5fd9\u5199BP\u3001\u627e\u4eba\u4e00\u8d77\u8ddf\u6295\u7684\u7b56\u7565\u3002\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u505a\u6cd5\u4e0d\u6210\u529f\u90fd\u6ca1\u6709\u9053\u7406\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The tally of initial public offerings plummeted from more than one thousand in 1969 to just fifteen in 1974,<\/strong> and the S&P 500 returned more or less nothing over this period.The collapse all but wiped out the nascent hedge-fund business, and likewise a headline in Forbes wondered, \u201cHas the bear market killed venture capital?\u201d After attracting $171 million in new funds in 1969, venture capitalists raised only $57 million in 1974 and a mere $10 million the year after.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u4ece\u77f3\u6cb9\u5371\u673a\u5f00\u59cb\u7684\u8fd9\u4e94\u5e74\u7684\u52a8\u8361\u582a\u6bd4\u5f53\u4e0b\u4e86\u3002\u6ca1\u60f3\u5230\u7f8e\u56fd\u5f53\u5e74\u4e5f\u662f69\u5e74\u524d\u540e\u6bcf\u5e74\u80fd\u67091000\u4e2aIPO\uff0c\u76f8\u6bd4\u4e4b\u4e0b\u4e2d\u56fd\u51e0\u767e\u4e2a\u5e76\u4e0d\u7b97\u591a\uff1b\u4f46\u52301974\u5e74\u5c31\u8dcc\u523015\u4e2a\u4e86\uff0c\u8dcc\u6389\u4e8698.5%… VC\u7684\u52df\u8d44\u91d1\u989d\u4e5f\u4ece1.7\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u8dcc\u5230\u4e861000w\uff0c\u8dcc\u6389\u4e8694%\u3002\u8fd9\u6837\u5de8\u5927\u7684\u6536\u7f29\u6bd4\u56fd\u5185\u7684\u8fd1\u51e0\u5e74\u4e25\u91cd\u591a\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n By the middle of March, Sears had placed an order for seventy-five thousand Home Pong machines. Atari now had what Valentine had been waiting for: a promising new product and a powerful distributor.At the beginning of June 1975<\/strong>, Valentine duly invested. He bought 62,500 shares for $62,500, making what would now be termed a \u201cseed investment\u201d in Atari. But it was only the start. Twelve months later, in the summer of 1976,<\/strong> Valentine confronted his next challenge. Atari\u2019s bell-bottomed engineers had come up with a fresh idea: a console that could play not only Pong but multiple games of the owner\u2019s choosing. To capitalize on this breakthrough, Atari was going to need a far larger capital infusion\u2014perhaps as much as $50 million. There was no way the venture capitalists of the era could mobilize that kind of cash, and the stock market was all but closed; in 1976 only thirty-four companies managed to go public.For Atari to develop its multi-game console, Valentine would have to come up with another way of raising capital.By the end of the day, a starstruck Bushnell had agreed to sell Atari for $28 million. For Valentine and his fledgling fund, it was a satisfying exit. Sequoia notched up a useful 3x return, demonstrating the value of the new investment methods. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 1974\u5e74\u8bbe\u7acb\u7684\u7ea2\u6749\u57fa\u91d1\u4e00\u671f\uff0cAtari\u51e0\u4e4e\u662f\u7b2c\u4e00\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u4e86\uff0cVon\u8ddf\u7740\u7b49\u4e86\u534a\u5e74\u591a\u523075\u5e746\u6708\u624d\u6295\u4e86\u4e2a6w\u7684\u79cd\u5b50\uff0c\u4ec5\u662f\u57fa\u91d1\u89c4\u6a21\u76841%\uff0c\u4e00\u5e74\u540e\u53c8\u653e\u4e86\u8fd1100w\u8fdb\u53bb\uff0c\u57fa\u91d1\u768420%\u89c4\u6a21\u4e86\u3002\u518d\u8fc7\u4e00\u5e74\u9762\u4e34\u516c\u53f8\u9700\u8981\u7684\u5de8\u5927\u6295\u5165\u6295\u4e0d\u8d77\uff0c\u53ea\u597d\u5356\u6389\u4e86\uff0c2800w\u7684\u4ef7\u683c\u521b\u9020\u4e863\u500d\u7684\u56de\u62a5\u3002\u8003\u8651\u5f53\u65f6\u7684\u6781\u7aef\u5e02\u573a\u73af\u5883\uff0c\u5df2\u7ecf\u76f8\u5f53\u4e0d\u9519\u4e86\u300275\u5e74\u5168\u5e02\u573a\u624d\u52df\u5230\u4e861000w\uff0c\u653e100w\u8fdb\u53bb\u5fc5\u7136\u662f\u5f53\u65f6\u6700\u5927\u7684VC\u9879\u76ee\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1973, Bill Draper\u2019s Sutter Hill Ventures struck a landmark deal with Qume. What made the deal special was that Sutter Hill imposed a condition: Qume\u2019s founding engineer had to dump his underpowered chief executive<\/strong> and allow the venture guys to bring in a star graduate of Harvard Business School. When the company took off, the CEO\u2019s stock options<\/strong> generated a huge payout. Sutter Hill went on to repeat the Qume formula<\/strong> over and over, liberating up-and-coming big-company executives and distinguishing West Coast venture capital from the tamer version in the East. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Sutter Hill\u521b\u9020\u7684Qume\u516c\u5f0f\u540e\u6765\u975e\u5e38\u5e38\u7528\uff1a\u6362\u4e2a\u66f4\u6709\u80fd\u529b\u7684CEO\uff0c\u7ed9\u4e00\u5927\u7b14\u80a1\u7968\u671f\u6743\uff0c\u66f4\u5feb\u6210\u529f\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hillman committed up to $5 million, provided that the partners could raise a matching sum from others. Kleiner and Perkins proceeded to raise $1 million from Rockefeller University, nearly that much from two insurance companies, and a bit more from wealthy individuals and trusts. By the first week of December 1972, they had put together a fund of $8.4 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n KPCB\u7684\u8d77\u6b65\u6bd4\u7ea2\u6749\u8981\u65e9\u4e24\u5e74\uff0c1972\u5e74\u7684\u52df\u8d44\u73af\u5883\u8fd8\u6ca1\u5b8c\u5168\u6076\u5316\uff0cKP\u4e00\u671f\u52df\u5230\u4e86840w\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kleiner and Perkins set up shop in a new low-slung office park at 3000 Sand Hill Road, becoming the first partnership to occupy what was to be the epicenter of the venture industry. Their timing was poor: they were launching their fund on the eve of the first oil shock, and their first few investments performed as poorly as the economy<\/strong>. They backed a plausible semiconductor startup, but it was run into the ground by inexperienced managers<\/strong>. By the end of 1974, Kleiner Perkins had shelled out $2.5 million for nine investments<\/strong>. Kleiner and Perkins felt sufficiently glum to rethink their strategy<\/strong>. The new Kleiner Perkins formula doubled down on activism<\/strong>. Rather than funding outside entrepreneurs, the partners would incubate startups in-house<\/strong>, kicking ideas around with junior associates. <\/p>\n\n\n\n KP\u867d\u52df\u8d44\u4e0d\u9519\uff0c\u4e5f\u9009\u4e86\u4e2a\u597d\u529e\u516c\u5730\uff0c\u65e0\u610f\u95f4\u6210\u4e3a\u4e86\u6c99\u4e18\u8def\u4e0a\u7684\u7b2c\u4e00\u5bb6VC\u3002\u4f46\u8d76\u4e0a\u5e02\u573a\u73af\u5883\u6076\u5316\uff0c\u8fd8\u662f\u51fa\u5e08\u4e0d\u5229\uff0c72\u5e74\u5e95\u8bbe\u7acb\u7684\u57fa\u91d1\u523074\u5e74\u5e95\u76842\u5e74\u6295\u8d44\u671f\uff0c\u4ec5\u6295\u51fa\u53bb250w\uff0c\u4e0d\u5230\u57fa\u91d1\u76841\/3\uff0c9\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u51e0\u4e4e\u6b7b\u4e865\u4e2a\u3002\u8fd9\u8ba9\u4ed6\u4eec\u91cd\u65b0\u601d\u8003\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u7b56\u7565\uff0c\u5f62\u6210\u4e86\u65b0\u6a21\u5f0f\uff1a\u4ece\u6295\u8d44\u5916\u90e8\u4f01\u4e1a\u8f6c\u5411\u66f4\u591a\u7684\u5185\u90e8\u5b75\u5316\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u66f4\u52a0\u79ef\u6781\u53c2\u4e0e\u4f01\u4e1a\u8fd0\u4f5c\uff0c\u624d\u6709\u540e\u6765\u7684\u5de8\u5927\u6210\u529f\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n In an inversion of Atari, the technical risks were daunting, but the market risks were negligible<\/strong>. Then, having cleared that hurdle, Perkins invested $50,000 in the project. It was a token amount, roughly equivalent to Valentine\u2019s initial seed investment in Atari. If the project hit a wall, the Kleiner Perkins fund would lose less than 1 percent of its capital. Brook Byers, who joined Kleiner Perkins a few years later as a young partner, reflected on the lessons that KP drew from this experience. By focusing exclusively on the \u201cwhite-hot\u201d risks in a project<\/strong>, you could find out whether the venture was likely to work while risking as little capital as possible. With that, Perkins resolved to finance Tandem\u2019s Series A round without sharing the risk with other partnerships. Shoveling his chips onto the table, he invested $1 million in Tandem in early 1975, receiving 40 percent of the equity. If Tandem had not worked out, there might never have been a second Kleiner Perkins fund.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tom\u5bf9\u98ce\u9669\u7684\u770b\u6cd5\u6700\u503c\u5f97\u5b66\u4e60\u4e5f\u6781\u5176\u7ecf\u5178\uff0c\u4ec5\u4ec5\u5173\u6ce8\u5176\u6700\u7d27\u8981\u7684\u98ce\u9669\u201cWhite-hot \u201drisk\u5c31\u53ef\u505a\u6295\u8d44\u5224\u65ad\u3002Atari\u4e3b\u8981\u662f\u6280\u672f\u98ce\u9669\uff0c\u5e02\u573a\u98ce\u9669\u53ef\u5ffd\u7565\u4e0d\u8ba1\uff0c5w\u6295\u8d44\u867d\u7136\u4e0d\u591a\uff0c\u4f46\u7ecf\u9a8c\u5f88\u5173\u952e\u300274\u5e74\u5e95\u7684\u53cd\u601d\u540e\uff0c75\u5e74\u521d\u5bf9Tandem A\u8f6e\u8fd9\u7b14100w\/40%\u80a1\u4efd\u5c31\u662f\u7528\u65b0\u65b9\u6cd5\u5b64\u6ce8\u4e00\u63b7\u4e86\uff0c\u5982\u679c\u5931\u8d25\u5c31Game Over\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perkins\u2019s law: \u201cmarket risk is inversely proportional to technical risk<\/strong>,\u201d because if you solve a truly difficult technical problem, you will face minimal competition. Thanks to the high barrier to entry, Tandem\u2019s profit margin remained juicy even as its sales soared. By 1984, Tandem had generated a bit over 100x on KP\u2019s $1.45 million investment. The $150 million profit dwarfed the combined $10 million return that KP made on all of its first nine investments. But precisely because the technical challenges<\/strong> were so formidable, the barriers to entry in this business would be high, and Genentech would be able to extract fat margins if it succeeded. It was another illustration of Perkins\u2019s law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5e02\u573a\u98ce\u9669\u548c\u6280\u672f\u98ce\u9669\u6210\u53cd\u6bd4\uff0c\u6280\u672f\u96be\u5ea6\u8d8a\u9ad8\/\u6280\u672f\u98ce\u9669\u8d8a\u5927\u7684\uff0c\u5c31\u6ca1\u6709\u7ade\u4e89\uff0c\u5e02\u573a\u98ce\u9669\u53cd\u800c\u5c0f\uff0c\u8fd8\u80fd\u6536\u83b7\u9ad8\u6bdb\u5229\uff0c\u5b9e\u73b0\u5927\u6210\u3002\u53cd\u4e4b\u6280\u672f\u6ca1\u95e8\u69db\u7684\uff0c\u7ade\u4e89\u6fc0\u70c8\u5e02\u573a\u98ce\u9669\u5c31\u5f88\u5927\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u89c2\u5bdf\u548c\u603b\u7ed3\u975e\u5e38\u5230\u4f4d\u3002KP\u628a\u91cd\u70b9\u6295\u5165\u5230\u9ad8\u6280\u672f\u98ce\u9669\u7684\u9879\u76ee\u7684\u5b75\u5316\u4e0a\uff0cTendem\u548cGrentech\u90fd\u662f\u5982\u6b64\uff0c\u7c7b\u4f3c\u4e8e\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u786c\u79d1\u6280\u3002Tendem\u8fd9\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u5728\u5341\u5e74\u540e\u9000\u51fa\u7684\u65f6\u5019\u5b9e\u73b0\u4e86100x\u56de\u62a5\uff0c\u6536\u76ca\u8fbe1.5\u4ebf\uff0c\u800c\u6b64\u524d\u76849\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u624d\u5b9e\u73b0\u4e861000w\u7684\u5229\u6da6\u3002\u6240\u4ee5Perkins Law\u7684\u8981\u4e49\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\uff1a\u91cd\u70b9\u5173\u6ce8\u9ad8\u6280\u672f\u98ce\u9669\u4f9d\u7136\u503c\u5f97\u6295\u5165\u7684\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u641e\u5b9a\u4e86\u5c31\u6539\u53d8\u4e16\u754c\u90a3\u79cd\uff01<\/p>\n\n\n\n The next day Perkins met Swanson again and laid out a suggestion. The science was captivating, but the $500,000 cost of proving it was prohibitively high, given the uncertainty. So Perkins proposed to repeat the formula he had developed for Tandem: identify the white-hot risks<\/strong>, then find the cheapest way<\/strong> of going after them. Swanson should cut the cost of his experiments by not hiring scientists or setting up a lab. Instead, he should contract the early work to existing laboratories. Perkins agreed to invest the new sum that Swanson needed: a mere $100,000. In exchange for this modest commitment, representing just over 1 percent of the Kleiner Perkins fund, he acquired fully one-quarter of Genentech\u2019s stock<\/strong>. There was nothing unfair about this: Swanson had tried to shop the deal elsewhere and had found no takers. Having parted with a quarter of their company for a mere $100,000 in 1976, Boyer and Swanson sold a 26 percent stake the next year for $850,000, and in 1978 they sold just 8.9 percent for $950,000. As of 1984, the fourteen investments in the first fund showed a combined profit of $208 million; of that, fully 95 percent came from Tandem and Genentech. <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u57fa\u56e0\u6cf0\u514b\u7684\u6848\u4f8b\u4e5f\u662fKP\u5173\u6ce8\u6700\u7d27\u8981\u98ce\u9669\u7684\u6210\u529f\u5b9e\u8df5\uff0c\u4e0d\u53ea\u662f\u627e\u5230\u6838\u5fc3\u7684\u6280\u672f\u98ce\u9669\uff0c\u8fd8\u8981\u627e\u5230\u6700\u4fbf\u5b9c\u7684\u89e3\u51b3\u65b9\u6848\uff0c\u7136\u540e\u6295\u4e00\u5c0f\u7b14\u94b1\u8fdb\u53bb\u8bd5\u6c34\uff0c1-2%\u7684\u57fa\u91d1\u89c4\u6a21\u8bd5\u6c34\uff0c\u6210\u529f\u4e86\u5c31\u7ee7\u7eed\u4e0b\u6ce8\uff0c\u5931\u8d25\u4e86\u635f\u5931\u4e5f\u975e\u5e38\u53ef\u63a7\u3002\u8fd9\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u6781\u597d\u7684\u7b56\u7565\u3002\u6700\u521d\u57281976\u5e74\u8fd9\u7b1410w\/25%\u80a1\u4efd\u7684\u4ea4\u6613\u4f30\u503c\u7ea640w\uff0c\u76f8\u5f53\u4e8e\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u4eba\u6c11\u5e012000w\u4f30\u503c\u6295\u4e86500w\u8fdb\u53bb\uff0c2\u5e74\u4e4b\u540e\u516c\u53f8\u4f30\u503c\u5c31\u7ffb\u4e8625\u500d\uff0c\u8fbe\u5230\u4e861000w\uff0c\u76f8\u5f53\u4e8e5\u4ebfRMB\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u7b56\u7565\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u975e\u5e38\u503c\u5f97\u6211\u4eec\u501f\u9274\u7684\u7b56\u7565\u3002KP\u7b2c\u4e00\u671f\u57fa\u91d1\u52301984\u5e74\u7ed3\u675f\uff0c\u5927\u7ea612\u5e74\u4e4b\u540e\uff0c\u5df2\u7ecf\u5b9e\u73b0\u4e86\u6574\u4f53\u8d85\u8fc720x\u7684\u57fa\u91d1\u56de\u62a5\uff0c2\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u7684\u767e\u500d\u56de\u62a5\u8d21\u732e\u4e86\u57fa\u91d1\u6574\u4f53\u56de\u62a5\u768495%\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even though Valentine was perfectly suited to be Apple\u2019s first investor, his initial reaction to Jobs and Wozniak was skeptical. Jobs \u201cwas trying to be the embodiment of the counterculture<\/strong>,\u201d Still, Bushnell and McKenna had told him that these guys were worth an audience. Because he valued his network<\/strong>, Valentine went through the motions of asking what Apple was up to. Markkula decided to put his energy behind Apple. He became an adviser to the Steves, writing their business plan, serving as marketing chief and company chairman, arranging a bank credit line, and ultimately investing $91,000 of his own capital in exchange for 26 percent of the company.And so, almost on a whim, Venrock committed $300,000 for 10 percent of Apple. By valuing the company at $3 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Apple\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u8fd8\u662f\u86ee\u4ee4\u4eba\u6df1\u601d\u7684\uff0c\u4eca\u5929\u76843w\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u5de8\u517d\u7684\u79cd\u5b50\u8f6e\u878d\u8d44\u4f30\u503c\u4ec530w\uff0c\u589e\u503c\u4e861000w\u500d\u3002Von\u867d\u7136\u7ecf\u9a8c\u4e30\u5bcc\uff0c\u7279\u522b\u662f\u9605\u4eba\u4e0a\uff0c\u8fd8\u662f\u5bf9Jobs\u7684\u53cd\u6587\u5316\u4e2a\u6027\u4e0d\u591f\u8ba4\u540c\uff0c\u51b3\u5b9a\u7b49\u7b49\u770b\uff1b\u8fd9\u4e5f\u6210\u5c31\u4e86Markula\uff0c\u4ed6\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u5f53\u65f6\u540c\u6837\u7684\u64b8\u8d77\u8896\u5b50\u4e0b\u573a\u5e72\u7684\u5957\u8def\uff0c\u4eb2\u81ea\u5199BP\u3001\u5e2e\u5fd9\u878d\u8d44\uff0c\u4e00\u5e74\u540e\u516c\u53f8A\u8f6e\u4f30\u503c\u5c31\u7ffb\u4e8610\u500d\uff0c\u878d\u5230\u4e86\u6d1b\u514b\u83f2\u52d2\u5bb6\u65cfVenrock\u768430w\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The image of the moving train represented a new gloss on stage-by-stage investing<\/strong>. In the case of Atari or Genentech, follow-on venture capitalists wrote checks once the white-hot risks had been neutralized. In the case of Apple, VCs were being told that they should invest simply because others were investing. However circular this logic, it was by no means crazy. The whispering grapevine was sending a message: Apple would be a winner. In the face of that social proof, the objective truth about the skills of Apple\u2019s managers or the quality of its products might be secondary. If Apple was attracting funding, and if its reputation was soaring thanks to well-connected backers, its chances of hiring the best people and securing the best distribution channels were improving, too. Circular logic could be sound logic<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n At a quarter to seven that evening, Mike Scott appeared again. \u201cMr. Montagu, you are really a fortunate guy,\u201d he said. Steve Wozniak had decided to buy a house. To raise the cash, he wanted to sell some of his own equity. Montagu asked how much stock Wozniak was selling.\u201cFour hundred and fifty thousand dollars,\u201d came the answer. It was more stock by far than Venrock or Valentine had laid hands on. A giddy Montagu called Kramlich again. \u201cDick, I wouldn\u2019t be here without you!\u201d he said, offering to split the allocation. Kramlich never told Rock that he had acquired a large slice of Apple through this roundabout route, and for years he kept quiet about it. Two of the biggest winners in this saga were the improbable duo of Anthony Montagu and Dick Kramlich, proving that sheer luck can sometimes matter more than anything<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Apple\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u4e2d\u8ddf\u98ce\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u73b0\u8c61\u5df2\u7ecf\u51fa\u73b0\u4e86\uff0c\u5e76\u4e14\u8fd9\u79cd\u5faa\u73af\u903b\u8f91\u5b9e\u9645\u5341\u5206\u6709\u9053\u7406\uff0c\u628a\u5e02\u573a\u4e0a\u7684\u94b1\u62ff\u5b8c\uff0c\u4e70\u6765\u5404\u79cd\u8d44\u6e90\uff0c\u5fc5\u7136\u80fd\u6210\u529f\u3002\u8fd9\u5df2\u7ecf\u662f\u5f53\u4e0b\u72ec\u5bb6\u517d\u7684\u7ade\u4e89\u7b56\u7565\u4e4b\u4e00\u4e86\u2014\u2014\u624e\u5806\u513f\u6295\u3002Montagu\u7684\u575a\u6301\u548c\u6267\u7740\u4e5f\u5341\u5206\u96be\u5f97\uff0c\u529f\u592b\u4e0d\u8d1f\u6709\u5fc3\u4eba\uff0c\u6700\u7ec8\u8fd8\u662f\u6295\u4e86\u8fdb\u53bb\uff0c\u4e5f\u8fd8\u6ca1\u5fd8\u628a\u670b\u53cb\u5e26\u4e0a\u3002\u6c83\u5179\u5c3c\u4e9a\u5f53\u5e7445w\u7684\u623f\u5b50\u653e\u4eca\u5929\u662f2000w\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01\uff0c\u4e5f\u4e0d\u4fbf\u5b9c\uff0c\u4f4615%\u7684\u80a1\u4efd\u662f3\u4e07\u4ebf\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The low capital-gains tax and the change to the prudent-man rule rounded out a policy mix that was extraordinarily favorable to venture investors. Venture-backed firms could go public without showing a history of profits. Employee stock options were taxed only when they were finally exercised, not when they were initially granted. Limited partnerships were exempt from tax, and they protected investing partners from lawsuits. No other country was so friendly to the venture industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the five years from 1973 to 1977, the venture industry had raised an average of $42 million annually. In the next five years, it averaged more than twenty times that\u2014fully $940 million annually. With the return of the hot IPO market following Apple\u2019s debut, established VC operators began to generate extraordinary profits: annual returns of between 30 and 50 percent became commonplace. Having drummed up $5 million for his first fund, Don Valentine raised a second fund of $21 million in 1979, followed by a $44 million fund in 1981. <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u7f8e\u56fd\u7684VC\u653f\u7b56\u5f88\u65e9\u5c31\u7406\u987a\u4e86\uff0c\u8d44\u672c\u5229\u5f97\u7a0e\u3001LP\u7ed3\u6784\u3001\u671f\u6743\u5728\u6267\u884c\u65f6\u624d\u7eb3\u7a0e\u3001\u6ca1\u5229\u6da6\u4e5f\u80fdIPO\u8fd9\u51e0\u70b9\u7ed3\u5408\u4e00\u8d77\u8ba9\u884c\u4e1a\u53d1\u626c\u5149\u5927\u3002\u56fd\u5185\u5176\u4ed6\u90fd\u5dee\u4e0d\u591a\u4e86\uff0c\u552f\u4e00\u7f3a\u4e4f\u7684\u662f\u4e0a\u5e02\u5236\u5ea6\u8fd9\u6761\uff0c\u4f9d\u7136\u8fc7\u4e8e\u4e25\u683c\u548c\u975e\u5e02\u573a\u5316\u3002\u77f3\u6cb9\u5371\u673a\u4e4b\u540e\u7684\u4e94\u5e74\uff0c\u6062\u590d\u8fd8\u662f\u975e\u5e38\u5feb\u7684\uff0cVC\u52df\u8d44\u7ffb\u4e86\u8fd120\u500d\u8fbe\u5230\u5feb10\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\uff0c\u4e5f\u662f\u4e4b\u524d69\u5e74\u9ad8\u70b9\u76845\u500d\u4e86\u3002\u540c\u65f6\u7684\u7ea2\u674974\u5e74\u7684\u4e00\u671f\u57fa\u91d1500w\uff0c5\u5e74\u540e\u7684\u4e8c\u671f\u57fa\u91d12100w\uff0c7\u5e74\u540e\u7684\u4e09\u671f\u57fa\u91d1\u8fbe\u5230\u4e864400w\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n But Silicon Valley\u2019s venture-capital machine, now equipped with a full tool kit<\/strong> as well as a dense network<\/strong> of players, was about to deliver two simultaneous lessons. First, that it could fight off the challenge of Japan, whose formidable semiconductor manufacturers threatened the Valley\u2019s core industry. Second, that it could at last eclipse its long-standing American rival, the technology hub centered on Boston.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 80\u5e74\u4ee3\u7684VC\u53d1\u5c55\u58ee\u5927\uff0c\u4e0d\u4ec5\u53d7\u76ca\u4e8e\u524d\u8f88\u4eec\u572870\u5e74\u4ee3\u53d1\u5c55\u51fa\u6765\u7684\u6280\u672f\u5de5\u5177\uff1a\u9605\u4eba\u3001\u4e0b\u573a\u5e72\u6d3b\u3001\u5206\u9636\u6bb5\u6295\u8d44\u7b49\uff0c\u4e5f\u5f00\u59cb\u53d7\u76ca\u4e8e\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u548c\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u8fbe\u6210\u7684\u7f51\u7edc\u6548\u5e94\uff0c\u4e00\u65b9\u9762\u5171\u540c\u5bf9\u6297\u5f53\u65f6\u6765\u81ea\u65e5\u672c\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u4ea7\u4e1a\u7684\u5a01\u80c1\uff0c\u53e6\u4e00\u65b9\u9762\u4e5f\u5bf9\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u5927\u4f01\u4e1a\u6784\u6210\u5a01\u80c1\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hierarchical organizations can be good at coordinating people when the objectives are clear: think of an army. But when it comes to commercializing applied science, the Valley\u2019s culture of \u201ccoopetition<\/strong>\u201d has proved more creative<\/strong> than the self-contained, vertically integrated corporations of Boston or Japan. Large companies bottle up ideas and often waste them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5408\u4f5c\u662f\u8fd9\u4e9b\u7f51\u7edc\u6548\u5e94\u4ea7\u751f\u7684\u6e90\u6cc9\u548c\u57fa\u7840\u3002\u516c\u53f8\u95f4\u7684\u5408\u4f5c\u6bd4\u4f01\u4e1a\u5185\u90e8\u7684\u5782\u76f4\u7f51\u7edc\u8981\u66f4\u7075\u6d3b\uff0c\u66f4\u6709\u4f18\u52bf\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n By emphasizing the porous boundaries between Valley startups, she was probing the quality of the relationships within a cluster and suggesting why some clusters pull ahead of others. A cluster that is dominated by large, self-contained, secretive companies will be characterized by tight relationships<\/strong> among insiders at each firm, but few links between professionals at one firm and similar professionals at another one. In contrast, a cluster that consists of transient startups will feature fewer deep bonds among colleagues, but it will be enriched by myriad, looser external connections.<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n What created these conditions in the Valley? There are two familiar answers. First, California law prevents employers from tying up employees in non-compete agreements<\/strong>; talent is free to go where it pleases, unlike in most states, including Massachusetts. Second, Stanford has been generous in allowing professors to take sabbaticals to work on startups<\/strong>, and this permissiveness has fostered ties between academia and business; in contrast, MIT professors have risked losing tenure if they spent too much time on side projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u4ea7\u4e1a\u96c6\u7fa4\u662f\u677e\u5173\u7cfb\u8fd8\u662f\u7d27\u5173\u7cfb\u8fd8\u975e\u5e38\u5173\u952e\u3002\u7d27\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u56f4\u7ed5\u5927\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\uff0c\u677e\u5173\u7cfb\u5219\u662f\u5c0f\u4f01\u4e1a\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\uff0c\u7845\u8c37\u7684\u6210\u529f\u4e3b\u8981\u662f\u4f9d\u8d56\u677e\u5173\u7cfb\u7c7b\u578b\u7684\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Without Tom Perkins\u2019s loose ties<\/strong> to his old friends at Hewlett-Packard, Tandem Computer would never have been conjured into being. Without Nolan Bushnell\u2019s loose ties<\/strong> to Don Valentine, and without Valentine\u2019s loose ties<\/strong> to Mike Markkula, Apple might never have become a real business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For many of these venture novices, building their networks<\/strong> was not just one thing that they did. Rather, it was the thing\u2014the key <\/strong>to getting established in business. Bill Younger, who joined Sutter Hill in 1981, set himself the task of taking the smartest people in his Rolodex to lunch; at the end of every meal he\u2019d ask, \u201cWho is the absolutely best guy you\u2019ve worked with?\u201d Younger then made it his mission to meet that best guy\u2014it was almost never a woman\u2014and toward the end of the meeting he would repeat the question: \u201cWho is the absolutely best guy out there?\u201dAfter a year of moving from one best guy to the next one, Younger had a list of about eighty superstars, and he cultivated each of them methodically. He would send one luminary a technical article that might be relevant to his research; he would call another to mention that an old colleague was asking after him. In this way, Younger spun a web of loose connections that would form the basis for productive startups when the right opportunities beckoned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u677e\u5173\u7cfb\u5e26\u6765\u4e86Tendem\u3001Atrai\u3001Apple\u7684\u6210\u529f\uff0c\u5171\u540c\u6210\u5c31\u4e86\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u548c\u5176\u80cc\u540e\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u3002\u6b64\u540e\uff0c\u5efa\u7acb\u548c\u878d\u5165\u8fd9\u79cd\u7f51\u7edc\u5176\u5b9e\u6210\u4e86VC\u6700\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u5de5\u4f5c\u4e86\uff0cBill\u7684\u5c1d\u8bd5\u4eca\u5929\u90fd\u4f9d\u7136\u503c\u5f97\u5b66\u4e60\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n One Friday in 1981, Fairchild\u2019s former chief executive Wilfred Corrigan circulated a business plan for a new semiconductor company, LSI Logic. By the following Tuesday, Kleiner Perkins and two co-investors had stumped up $2.3 million; the only reason it took so long was because Monday was a holiday.<\/p>\n\n\n\n LSI\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u770b\u8d77\u6765\u592a\u795e\u5947\u4e86\uff0c\u5468\u4e94\u53d1\u51faBP\uff0c\u5468\u4e8c\u5c31\u5230\u4f4d\u4e86230w\u3002\u8981\u4e0d\u662f\u56e0\u4e3a\u5468\u4e00\u662f\u5047\u671f\uff0c\u5c31\u5468\u4e00\u5230\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Seeking to reduce risk, Boston VCs often provided \u201cdevelopmental capital<\/strong>\u201d to businesses that already had a proven product and some early sales<\/strong>; this was a whole lot safer than betting on fledgling startups. Howard Cox, who embarked on a career at Greylock in 1971, boasted that he lost money on only two of his forty investments. \u201cI did not back companies where the product might fail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u4e0d\u540c\u4e8e\u7845\u8c37\u7684\u5957\u8def\uff0c\u6ce2\u58eb\u987f\u7684VC\u66f4\u4fdd\u5b88\uff0c\u4ec5\u652f\u6301\u5df2\u7ecf\u6709\u4ea7\u54c1\u548c\u521d\u6b65\u9500\u552e\u7684\u53d1\u5c55\u9636\u6bb5\u7684\u516c\u53f8\uff0c\u800c\u4e0d\u662f\u521d\u521b\u9636\u6bb5\u7684\u516c\u53f8\uff0c\u8fd9\u5176\u5b9e\u4e5f\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e0d\u9519\u7684\u7b56\u7565\uff0c\u53ea\u662f\u6ca1\u6709\u90a3\u4e48\u5927\u7684\u6536\u76ca\u30021971\u5e74\u6210\u7acb\u7684Greylock\u5c31\u662f\u8fd9\u4e2a\u98ce\u683c\uff0c40\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u53ea\u5931\u8d25\u4e862\u4e2a\uff0c\u80dc\u7387\u4e0d\u9519\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Metcalfe set out to raise money for 3Com in September 1980. He attracted offers in no time. The Mayfield Fund, set up by Rock\u2019s former partner Tommy Davis, proposed to value 3Com at $2 million, or $7 per share. Dick Kramlich of New Enterprise Associates, another former Rock partner, put together a syndicate willing to pay a valuation of $3.7 million, or $13 per share; this was before 3Com had done anything. But Metcalfe was determined to get more. Declaring that his company was worth $6 million and that his shares should fetch $20 a piece, he set out to beat the venture guys at their own game. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 3Com\u7684\u878d\u8d44\u770b\u8d77\u6765\u76f8\u5f53\u987a\u5229\uff0c80\u5e74\u4ee3\u5df2\u7ecf\u5f88\u591a\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u4e86\uff0c\u8e0a\u8dc3\u62a5\u4ef7\uff0c\u516c\u53f8\u4f30\u503c\u4ece200w\u5c45\u7136\u4e00\u8def\u63d0\u5230\u4e86600w\uff0c\u6309\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u4eba\u6c11\u5e01\u770b\u5dee\u4e0d\u591a3\u4ebf\u4f30\u503c\u7684\u5929\u4f7f\u8f6e\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n At some point in each conversation, the venture guy would launch into a lecture on the three reasons startups failed: the excessive ego of the founder, too little focus on the most promising products, and too little capital. Having recognized this mantra, Metcalfe started to preempt it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Metcalfe\u7684\u7406\u7531\u5176\u5b9e\u633a\u5145\u8db3\uff0c\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u3001\u4ea7\u54c1\u548c\u8d44\u91d1\u662f\u516c\u53f8\u6302\u6389\u7684\u4e09\u5927\u539f\u56e0\uff0c\u4ed6\u73b0\u5728\u53ea\u7f3a\u8d44\u91d1\u4e86\u3002\u516c\u53f8\u6210\u529f\u4f3c\u4e4e\u4e0d\u5728\u8bdd\u4e0b\uff0c\u4e8e\u662f\u4f30\u503c\u5c31\u4e0d\u65ad\u6da8\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The good news for Metcalfe was that Boston venture capitalists were properly impressed by the hiring of Krause. They liked to invest in ready-made teams. 3Com now had a top-flight inventor and a top-flight manager. Pretty soon, Fidelity Ventures, the VC branch of the storied Boston money house, announced that it would finance 3Com at $21 per share. At last, Metcalfe had a valuation that exceeded his $20 target. Eventually, after a month of frustration, Metcalfe concluded that the promised $21 investment was a mirage: it vanished every time he neared it. A startup\u2019s scarcest asset is time. Venture capitalists in Boston turned out to be champions at wasting it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With that, Silicon Valley\u2019s network delivered the deal in a matter of minutes. Melchor picked up the phone and spoke with Mayfield and Kramlich, and soon it was agreed that Melchor\u2019s fund would commit $450,000, Mayfield and Dick Kramlich would be in for $300,000 each, and another $50,000 would come from small investors with connections to 3Com. There were no futile protection clauses in the fine print, no eleventh-hour conditions, and no need for Metcalfe to hustle for dollars at the expense of time with his company. On Friday, February 27, 1981, 3Com received a check for $1.1 million in exchange for a third of its equity. If the cash had not arrived that day, 3Com would have missed payroll. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Metcalfe had failed to get the $20 per share that he had wanted. But he did have the pleasure of calling his Boston tormentors one last time. They would not be investing in 3Com, he informed them.\u201cWhy?\u201d came the aggrieved response. \u201cWe supported you when no one else would.\u201d \u201cNo,\u201d Metcalfe shot back. \u201cYou lied to me when no one else would.\u201d 3Com went public in 1984, generating a 15x return for its early investors. But this success was a small part of a larger phenomenon<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3Com\u878d\u8d44\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u5176\u5b9e\u975e\u5e38\u7ecf\u5178\uff0c\u6ce2\u58eb\u987fVC\u7ed9\u51fa\u4e86\u975e\u5e38\u6177\u6168\u7684\u4ef7\u683c\uff0c\u5374\u4e5f\u8981\u6c42\u975e\u5e38\u7ec6\u8282\u7684\u5c3d\u8c03\uff0c\u6761\u4ef6\u4e0d\u65ad\u52a0\u7801\uff0c\u4ea4\u6613\u8fdf\u8fdf\u4e0d\u80fd\u5b8c\u6210\u3002\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u53ca\u65f6\u6b62\u635f\uff0c\u6ca1\u6709\u88ab\u62d6\u4e0b\u53bb\uff0c\u8f6c\u800c\u56de\u5230\u7845\u8c37VC\uff0c\u63a5\u53d7\u4e86\u7565\u4f4e\u7684\u4ef7\u683c\uff0c\u8fc5\u901f\u5b8c\u6210\u4ea4\u6613\u3002\u8d44\u91d1\u5982\u679c\u665a\u5230\u4e00\u5929\uff0c\u516c\u53f8\u5c31\u53d1\u4e0d\u51fa\u6765\u5de5\u8d44\u4e86\u3002\u8fd9\u6b21\u878d\u8d44\u4ece80\u5e749\u6708\u4e00\u76f4\u523081\u5e742\u6708\u624d\u505a\u5b8c\uff0c\u8017\u65f6\u8fd1\u534a\u5e74\u3002\u878d\u8d44\u5b8c\u6210\u65f6\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u8fd8\u4e0d\u5fd8diss\u4e0b\u6ce2\u58eb\u987f\u7684VC\u4eec\u30023\u5e74\u540e\u516c\u53f8\u5c31\u4e0a\u5e02\u4e86\uff0c\u65e9\u671f\u6295\u8d44\u8005\u4eec\u56de\u62a515x\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1986, Lerner and Bosack quit Stanford to work full time on Cisco. They were joined by three other former Stanford employees, and they began to sell homemade versions of the multi-protocol router. Money was tight, and the founders sought out venture capital, showing up at networking events and pitching dozens of investors. But their efforts came to naught. For one thing, the venture boom had cooled<\/strong>. A surfeit of capital had depressed returns, and the previous year private venture partnerships had raised $2.4 billion, down from a bit over $3 billion in each of the two previous years. For another thing, the multi-protocol router could not be protected by patent<\/strong>: Stanford claimed ownership of Cisco\u2019s inter-networking breakthrough. Then there was the question of the founders themselves. Bosack was by turns silent and given to relentless logical soliloquies; Lerner developed a habit of saying \u201cControl-D\u201d when she tired of his algorithmic monologues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By the start of 1987, Cisco had made enough progress to recruit a couple of extra people. But without venture backing, the company could not attain escape velocity. In the absence of experienced guidance, Lerner and Bosack hired cheaply and eccentrically<\/strong>. A former naval officer with no startup experience arrived to serve as vice president for finance. A new chief executive took it upon himself to veto a sale of routers to a lab with military ties, explaining that if Cisco\u2019s gear malfunctioned, it might trigger World War III, which was more responsibility than he could handle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Spurned by investors, the Cisco team soldiered on tenaciously. They kept the lights on by maxing out credit cards and deferring salaries<\/strong>; Lerner took a side job<\/strong> to help pay the bills, and one co-founder made a personal loan<\/strong> to the company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u601d\u79d1\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u4e5f\u5f88\u7cbe\u5f69\u300286\u5e74\u521b\u4e1a\u8d76\u4e0a\u8d44\u672c\u6709\u70b9\u964d\u6e29\u4e86\uff0c\u867d\u7136\u516c\u53f8\u5df2\u7ecf\u5f00\u59cb\u5356\u8def\u7531\u5668\u4e86\uff0c\u878d\u8d44\u8fd8\u662f\u5f88\u96be\uff0c\u4e5f\u548c\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u7684\u53e4\u602a\u6027\u683c\u6709\u5173\u7cfb\u3002\u4e24\u4f4d\u53ea\u80fd\u80e1\u4e71\u8bf7\u4eba\u8fdb\u6765\uff0c\u7528\u4eba\u4e0d\u614e\u771f\u662f\u6700\u5927\u7684\u6559\u8bad\u4e86\uff0c\u51e0\u4e4e\u4e00\u7247\u6df7\u4e71\u3002\u53ea\u80fd\u4e0d\u65ad\u7684\u5237\u4fe1\u7528\u5361\u3001\u8fdf\u4ed8\u5de5\u8d44\u751a\u81f3\u6253\u96f6\u5de5\u6765\u652f\u6301\u516c\u53f8\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n But then Cisco\u2019s fortunes turned\u2014in classic Silicon Valley fashion. The antimilitary chief executive knew a lawyer, and the lawyer had a partner named Ed Leonard, and Leonard happened to work with people in the venture industry. In a different corner of the world economy, this might have been irrelevant: a lawyer like Leonard would not have bothered senior venture guys on behalf of some random half acquaintance. But Silicon Valley rainmakers were unlike rainmakers elsewhere: they positively wanted to be bothered. Making and taking introductions was their stock-in-trade. If Leonard introduced them to a long-shot entrepreneur, it could only boost his standing. However, the way Valentine saw things, none of this mattered. Hewlett-Packard had testified that engineers were \u201ctearing the hinges off the doors to get the products,\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u601d\u79d1\u7684\u878d\u8d44\u6545\u4e8b\u662f\u6700\u597d\u7684\u201c\u677e\u6563\u94fe\u63a5\u201d\u7684\u5178\u578b\uff0c\u4e0d\u9760\u8c31\u7684CEO\u78b0\u5de7\u8ba4\u8bc6\u4e2a\u5f8b\u5e08\uff0c\u5f8b\u5e08\u6b63\u597d\u6709\u4e2a\u540c\u4e8b\uff0c\u540c\u4e8b\u6b63\u597d\u548cVC\u884c\u4e1a\u7684\u4eba\u5171\u8fc7\u4e8b\u3002VC\u8fd9\u8fb9Don\u8fd8\u633a\u91cd\u89c6\uff0c\u901a\u8fc7HP\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u53d1\u73b0\u5ba2\u6237\u771f\u662f\u975e\u5e38\u8ba4\u53ef\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the end of 1987, Sequoia duly invested $2.5 million for a third of Cisco. On the face of it, these terms were fairly generous: six years earlier, 3Com had sold a third of itself for just $1.1 million, although it had been at an earlier stage in its development. But Valentine had understood Cisco\u2019s weaknesses and structured the deal accordingly. Fully one-third of Cisco\u2019s stock was set aside for existing managers and future employees, enabling Valentine to recruit a clean slate of executives who would take over the leadership from the founders.Lerner and Bosack retained the remaining third, but the majority of their stake was converted into nonvoting stock options<\/strong>, giving Valentine control of board decisions.To make a success out of Morgridge, Valentine gave him founder-type incentives. He loaded him up with stock options so that he would pocket around 6 percent<\/strong> of Cisco\u2019s success; this gave him more skin in the game than some CEO-founders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 87\u5e74\u672b\u7684\u601d\u79d1\u7ec8\u4e8e\u6210\u529f\u878d\u8d44250w\uff0c\u7ed9\u4e86\u7ea2\u674933%\u7684\u80a1\u4efd\uff0c\u516c\u53f8\u8fd8\u9884\u7559\u4e8633%\u80a1\u4efd\u7ed9\u672a\u6765\u56e2\u961f\uff0c\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u53ea\u62ff\u8d70\u4e8633%\u8fd8\u4e0d\u5e26\u6295\u7968\u6743\u3002\u627e\u4e86\u4e2aCEO\u7684\u671f\u6743\u4ee3\u4ef7\u5927\u7ea6\u662f6%\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most thoughtful new entrant was Accel Capital, the first venture partnership to position itself as a specialist in particular technologies<\/strong>. By accumulating deep expertise in software and telecoms<\/strong>, Accel aimed to have the inside track on which entrepreneurs to back and how to guide them to a healthy exit. At the same time, Accel embraced an approach that it came to call \u201cthe prepared mind<\/strong>.\u201d Rather than looking anywhere and everywhere for the next big thing, the partnership carried out management-consultant-style studies on the technologies and business models that seemed to hold promise. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Accel\u662f\u9996\u4e2a\u4e13\u6ce8\u884c\u4e1a\u7684VC\u57fa\u91d1\uff0c\u4e3b\u8981\u53c2\u4e0e\u8f6f\u4ef6\u548c\u7535\u4fe1\u9879\u76ee\u3002Prepared Mind \u4e5f\u662f\u5176\u6838\u5fc3\u7684\u903b\u8f91\u65b9\u6cd5\uff0c\u5c31\u662f\u8981\u6709\u7814\u7a76\u9a71\u52a8\u7684\u6df1\u523b\u6d1e\u89c1\uff0c\u57fa\u91d1\u96c7\u4e86\u4e00\u6279\u7ba1\u7406\u987e\u95ee\u6765\u652f\u6301\u7814\u7a76\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n This tension between the planners and the improvisers tested the industry\u2019s identity, as we shall see presently. To raise money for their pen-computer plan<\/strong>, Kapor took Kaplan to meet John Doerr, the high priest of the Valley\u2019s improvisers. Doerr and his friend Vinod Khosla set the pace at KP, and they were out to back truly revolutionary startups that could spawn entirely new industries. Magnetic and messianic, Doerr in particular became the go-to investor for fearless founders, who loved him for championing their visions even more passionately than they did. He had \u201cthe emotional commitment of a priest and the energy of a racehorse,\u201d one entrepreneur marveled. \u201cThe number of different things about which John Doerr has said, this is the greatest thing ever, is a big number,\u201d a rival investor noted, with a mixture of respect and cynicism. Both men were traveling over the next days, but they juggled their schedules to arrange a layover at St. Louis airport. Doerr met Kaplan at the gate<\/strong>, and they hammered out a deal: together, Kleiner Perkins, Mitch Kapor, and Vinod Khosla would purchase a third of Kaplan\u2019s project for $1.5 million<\/strong>. Doerr would become chairman. Kapor and Khosla would serve as board directors. What would he call his company? Doerr asked him.\u201cGO, all caps. As in GO forth, GO for it, GO for the gold.\u201d\u201cAfter Doerr\u2019s intervention, Kaplan was able to raise $6 million in a matter of days; it was more than the $5 million he had targeted. He soldiered on until 1993, raising money periodically with Doerr\u2019s help but failing to realize his vision of building a pen-operated computer. In the end he sold GO at a fire-sale price to a division of AT&T. His backers were left with almost nothing. GO showed me the downside for entrepreneurs of Kleiner\u2019s approach. If it couldn\u2019t be a home run, Kleiner did not care if the company struck out. It was like, go big or go home<\/strong>. . . . There is an arrogance to the KP approach. All that ego about changing the world. Kapor was correct that Doerr\u2019s style invited trouble. Around the same time as the GO fiasco, Doerr and Khosla launched a next-generation laptop company called Dynabook Technologies<\/strong> that burned through $37 million of investors\u2019 capital before closing. Doerr also trumpeted a string of technological prospects that turned out to be busts: human gene screening, anti-aging drugs, designer chemicals<\/strong>.He seemed to have forgotten the old Tom Perkins dictum<\/strong>: when you invest in a company facing a technical challenge, the first thing you do is take the white-hot risks off the table.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n KPCB\u548cGO\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u5f88\u6709\u610f\u4e49\uff0c\u660e\u661f\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u548c\u660e\u661f\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u4e5f\u65e0\u6cd5\u907f\u514d\u7684\u5931\u8d25\u3002\u4ece\u6784\u601d\u51faGO\u7684\u601d\u8def\uff0c\u5230\u878d\u8d44\uff0c\u90fd\u6ca1\u90a3\u4e48\u96be\uff0cKPCB\u751a\u81f3\u662f\u5728\u673a\u573a\u548c\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u89c1\u9762\uff0c\u8fbe\u6210\u4e86150w\u4e701\/3\u80a1\u4efd\u7684\u5b89\u6392\uff0c\u8d77\u6b65\u5c31\u878d\u4e86500w\uff0c\u8fd9\u5df2\u7ecf\u662f\u5f53\u5e74KP\u7b2c\u4e00\u671f\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u89c4\u6a21\u4e86\u3002\u540e\u7eed\u878d\u8d44\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u4e5f\u9887\u4e3a\u4f20\u5947\uff0c\u51e0\u6b21\u4e0d\u884c\uff0c\u6700\u7ec8\u8fd8\u662f\u5927\u4f6cDoerr\u51fa\u9762\u8f7b\u677e\u89e3\u51b3\u95ee\u9898\uff0c\u4f46\u6700\u7ec8\u8fd8\u662f\u5356\u6389\u4e86\uff0c\u51e0\u4e4e\u6240\u6709\u4eba\u90fd\u9897\u7c92\u65e0\u6536\u3002\u8fd9\u4e5f\u662fKP\u7684\u7b56\u7565\uff0c\u8981\u4e48\u505a\u5927\uff0c\u8981\u4e48\u4f5c\u6b7b\u3002\u7c7b\u4f3c\u7684\u5931\u8d25\u7ecf\u5386\u8fd8\u6709\u51e0\u6b21\uff0c\u4e0d\u53ea\u662f\u5728\u7535\u8111\u9886\u57df\uff0c\u8fd8\u6709\u57fa\u56e0\u68c0\u67e5\u3001\u6297\u8870\u8001\u836f\u548c\u5316\u5408\u7269\u8bbe\u8ba1\u7b49\u9886\u57df\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5931\u8d25\uff0c\u56de\u987e\u8d77\u6765\u4e3b\u8981\u662f\u80cc\u79bb\u4e86Tom\u5728\u521b\u529eKP\u65f6\u575a\u6301\u7684\u539f\u5219\uff1a\u5148\u628a\u6700\u7d27\u8981\u7684\u98ce\u9669\u641e\u5b9a\uff01<\/p>\n\n\n\n To underscore its strategy of specialization<\/strong>, Accel\u2019s second fund, raised in 1985, was aimed exclusively at telecoms<\/strong>. The offering document proclaimed that \u201cin an information-based economy virtually every electronic system will communicate with other systems\u201d; the market for modems, networking, video sharing, and other telecom applications would be enormous. Incumbent VC rivals were impressed. Kleiner Perkins invested $2 million in Accel Telecom. Around the partnership\u2019s tenth birthday, a tally showed that of the forty-five<\/strong> Accel investments that had experienced an exit, only seven<\/strong> had lost money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accel\u2019s specialist approach made it particularly adept at identifying what venture capitalists call \u201cadjacent possibilities<\/strong>.\u201d By embedding themselves in their respective sectors, sitting on boards of portfolio companies, and blending their direct observations with management-consultant-style analyses, Accel partners could anticipate the next logical advance in a technology. \u201cEvery deal should lead to the next deal<\/strong>,\u201d was another Accel saying. Swartz in particular liked to invest in successive iterations in a single product.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accel\u2019s performance in its first few funds left no doubt that it was onto something.The specialist telecom fund multiplied its capital 3.7 times<\/strong>, generating an annualized return that was more than twice as high as the median venture fund of its vintage. Taking the first five funds together, Accel generated an even better performance: the average multiple was 8 times<\/strong> capital. And yet the striking thing about Accel was that despite the partners\u2019 firm intention not to chase hubristic grand slams, it was grand slams that dominated performance. Accel Telecom more than conformed to the so-called 80\/20 rule: a whopping 95 percent of its profits came from the top 20 percent of its investments<\/strong>. Other early Accel funds exhibited similar power-law effects. In the firm\u2019s first five funds, the top 20 percent of the investments accounted for never less than 85 percent of the profits, and the average was 92 percent. In short, the power law was inexorable. Even a methodical, anti-Kleiner, prepared-mind partnership could not escape it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accel\u662f\u4e13\u4e1a\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u5f00\u62d3\u8005\uff0c\u7b2c\u4e8c\u671f\u57fa\u91d1\u4e13\u95e8\u6295\u7535\u4fe1\uff0c\u8fde\u5f53\u65f6\u5f88\u725b\u7684KP\u4e5f\u505a\u4e86LP\u53c2\u4e0e\u8fdb\u6765\u3002\u8fd9\u671f\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u8868\u73b0\u4e5f\u76f8\u5f53\u4e0d\u9519\uff0c10\u5468\u5e74\u7684\u65f6\u501952\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u4ec5\u67097\u4e2a\u4e8f\u94b1\uff0c45\u4e2a\u8d5a\u94b1\uff0c\u771f\u662f\u975e\u5e38\u7a33\u7684\u8868\u73b0\u3002Accel\u4e5f\u8bc1\u660e\u4e86\u201c\u4ea7\u4e1a\u8fde\u63a5\u578b\u6295\u8d44\u201d\u7684\u53ef\u80fd\u6027\uff0c\u4e00\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u81ea\u7136\u5730\u5ef6\u4f38\u5230\u4e0b\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u4e00\u6295\u4e00\u4e32\uff0c\u975e\u5e38\u597d\u3002Accel\u4e5f\u518d\u6b21\u5b9e\u8df5\u4e86\u5e42\u5f8b\u5b9a\u5f8b\uff0c20%\u6700\u597d\u7684\u9879\u76ee\u4ea7\u751f\u4e86\u6574\u4e2a\u57fa\u91d190%\u4ee5\u4e0a\u7684\u56de\u62a5\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n VCs as individuals can stumble sideways into lucky fortunes: chance and serendipity and the mere fact of being in the venture game can matter more than diligence or foresight. At the same time, venture capital as a system is a formidable engine of progress<\/strong>\u2014more so than is frequently acknowledged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In July 1990 a young Tennessee senator named Al Gore laid out a public-sector vision for an \u201cinformation superhighway.\u201d Rather than operating on existing telephone lines, as the internet did, Gore\u2019s superhighway envisioned brand-new fiber-optic pipes<\/strong> that would turn household TVs into<\/strong> interactive terminals<\/strong>. Kapor experienced another one of his epiphanies. Gore\u2019s government-led fiber-optic superhighway was still dominating the headlines. But the way Kapor saw things, it would be prohibitively disruptive and expensive<\/strong>. Rather than ripping up the ground to lay fiber-optic cable, it would be cheaper by far to build out the copper-wire-based internet<\/strong>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Adams wrestled with his dual instincts. If Kapor had been a standard investor, he would have turned him away. But, in his idealism and political outlook, Kapor felt like a kindred spirit. After some further thought, Adams accepted Kapor\u2019s offer. If Kapor\u2019s call was a stroke of luck, Accel\u2019s deliberative, prepared-mind process was grinding along in the background. By now Accel had gotten wind of the internet\u2019s potential through three different channels<\/strong>. Kapor had called; Gooding was following the scent; McLean had caught a glimpse of the voracious demand for online connections. The question was whether Accel would convert these hints into an investment. Luck and a good telecom team had put the opportunity of UUNET clearly in view. But Accel was still not seeing it. As often happens in the venture world, it took a nudge from a competitor to change Accel\u2019s attitude<\/strong>. In February 1993, a telecom company called Metropolitan Fiber Systems made a play for UUNET. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Barris realized he was onto something. Because of his GE background, he knew what sorts of online services big customers would pay for<\/strong>. Because of his internet background, Adams knew how to provide them efficiently. By combining their knowledge, the pair of them could mint money<\/p>\n\n\n\n At NEA, Barris was by now keen to work with Adams, so he quickly agreed to match Jarve\u2019s higher valuation. Delighted, Adams told Barris that he would do the deal exclusively with NEA; after all, Barris was the investor best positioned to help UUNET. But, in an example of VCs acting to protect their reputations and networks, Barris declined the opportunity to squeeze his rivals out<\/strong>. He had been brought to the dance by Arthur Patterson, and he refused to double-cross him. Eventually Accel agreed to the new price. In October 1993, the three partnerships stumped up a total of $1.5 million<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the course of straightening out UUNET\u2019s accounting, a bookkeeper came across a box of unpaid invoices. UUNET had lost track of debts for routers <\/strong>and other gear that amounted to a horrifying $750,000. The sum canceled out half of the capital that UUNET had just raised. Weeks after its $1.5 million Series A, the company was almost out of money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n UUNET\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u4e5f\u5f88\u6709\u610f\u601d\u3002Kapor\u5e76\u6ca1\u6709\u56e0\u4e3aGO\u7684\u5931\u8d25\u53d7\u592a\u5927\u5f71\u54cd\uff0c\u4f9d\u7136\u5728\u5bfb\u627e\u673a\u4f1a\u300290\u5e74\u6208\u5c14\u526f\u603b\u7edf\u63d0\u51fa\u4e86\u4fe1\u606f\u9ad8\u901f\u516c\u8def\u7684\u8ba1\u5212\uff0c\u8981\u7528\u5149\u7ea4\uff0c\u4f46Kapor\u7684\u76f4\u89c9\u662f\u5149\u7ea4\u592a\u8d35\u4e86\uff0c\u94dc\u7f06\u624dOK\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u5224\u65ad\u8ba9\u4ed6\u8bf4\u670d\u4e86UUNET\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u5f97\u4ee5\u6295\u8d44\u548c\u52a0\u5165\u8fdb\u53bb\u3002\u4e4b\u540eA\u8f6e\u878d\u8d44\u7684\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e5f\u662f\u4e00\u7cfb\u5217\u7684\u5de7\u5408\uff1a\u5de7\u5408\u7684\u7535\u8bdd\u3001\u8d1f\u8d23\u4eba\u6b63\u597d\u770b\u8fd9\u4e2a\u9886\u57df\uff0c\u5373\u4fbf\u5982\u6b64\u4e13\u4e1a\u57fa\u91d1Accel\u90fd\u6ca1\u770b\u660e\u767d\uff0c\u76f4\u5230\u7ade\u4e89\u5bf9\u624b\u51fa\u73b0\u3002NEA\u672c\u6765\u53ef\u4ee5\u72ec\u541e\u7684\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u4e5f\u4fdd\u6301\u4e86\u5176\u98ce\u5ea6\uff0c\u91c7\u53d6\u4e86\u5408\u6295\u3002\u5373\u4fbf\u5982\u6b64\uff0c\u878d\u8d44\u4e00\u641e\u5b8c\u5c31\u53d1\u73b0\u6b20\u4e86\u522b\u4eba75w\uff0c150w\u7684\u878d\u8d44\u77ac\u95f4\u53ea\u5269\u4e00\u534a\u4e86…<\/p>\n\n\n\n Back in 1993, a coin toss might have decided who backed UUNET: the corporate capitalists at Metropolitan Fiber or Accel\u2019s venture capitalists. Now Accel stood to be fabulously rewarded. UUNET\u2019s flotation gave the company a valuation of $900 million, and then, in a wonderful full-circle ending, Metropolitan Fiber made its second appearance, buying control of UUNET at a valuation of $2 billion. Through luck more than brilliance, Accel found itself pocketing 54 times its original stake, a profit of $188 million. Menlo received a similar return. NEA made even more because it held on to its position longer. Venture capitalists as individuals had made plenty of errors. But venture capital as a system helped UUNET to spread the internet to millions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3\u5e74\u540eUUNET\u548c\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u5c31\u8fce\u6765\u4e86\u6536\u83b7\u300220\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u7684\u6536\u8d2d\u5bf9\u4ef7\u8ba9Accel\u8d5a\u4e8654\u500d\uff0cKapor\u66f4\u662f\u5de8\u989d\u56de\u62a5\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n When Mosaic Communications, by then renamed Netscape, went public the following year, the young Marc Andreessen owned just 3 percent\u2014the same share that Clark had owned in Silicon Graphics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u90a3\u4e2a\u65f6\u4ee3\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u771f\u4e0d\u5bb9\u6613\uff0cMarc\u5c45\u7136\u53ea\u67093%\u7684\u80a1\u4efd\uff0c\u4f30\u8ba1\u8fd8\u4e0d\u5982CEO\u76846%\u628a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mosaic also marked a new stage in the evolution of the power law. Venture-capital returns are dominated by grand slams partly because of the dynamics of startups: most young businesses fail, but the ones that gain traction can grow exponentially. This is true of fashion brands or hotel chains as well as technology companies<\/strong>. But tech-focused venture portfolios are dominated by the power law for an additional reason: tech startups are founded upon technologies that may themselves progress exponentially<\/strong>. With that sort of wind at a tech startup\u2019s back, no wonder profits could grow exponentially.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Khosla duly visited the founders at their office on the corner of El Camino and Castro in Mountain View. He liked to think of venture bets as financial options<\/strong>. You could never lose more than your initial stake<\/strong>, but the upside was unbounded<\/strong>. Given what the power law meant for startups, what Moore\u2019s law meant for computing power, and what Metcalfe\u2019s law meant for networks\u2014and given how each law compounded the effect of the others\u2014Mosaic Communications was one of those options you just had to have<\/strong>. After the meeting, Khosla called Doerr. \u201cWe should just do it,\u201d he told him. A few days later, Clark and Andreessen returned to pitch to the full Kleiner Perkins investment committee. There had been no Accel-style prepared-mind planning, but that did not matter: it took the Kleiner Perkins partners all of forty-five minutes to approve the investment. \u201cWe knew it was a high price,\u201d said one partner, \u201cespecially with what seemed like a twelve-year-old as the technology guru behind it.\u201d But everybody around the table remembered another one of Tom Perkins\u2019s dictums: you succeed in venture capital by backing the right deals, not by haggling over valuations.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u7f51\u666f\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u771f\u662f\u5e42\u5f8b\u5b9a\u5f8b\u7684\u6700\u597d\u9610\u8ff0\uff0c\u53d7\u76ca\u4e8e\u6469\u5c14\u5b9a\u5f8b\u3001Metcalfe\u5b9a\u5f8b\uff0c\u7f51\u666f\u662f\u53cc\u91cd\u52a0\u6210\uff0c\u6240\u4ee5\u5373\u4fbfKP\u6ca1\u6709Accel\u90a3\u6837\u6df1\u5ea6\u7684\u7814\u7a76\uff0c\u4f46\u8fd8\u662f\u975e\u5e38\u8fc5\u901f\u7ed9\u51fa\u4e86\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u5efa\u8bae\uff0c\u4ec5\u4ec5\u5c31\u662f\u65e0\u6cd5\u62d2\u7edd\u3002\u5373\u4fbf\u4ef7\u683c\u5f88\u9ad8\uff0cDoerr\u8fd8\u662f\u975e\u5e38\u6e05\u695a\uff0c\u597d\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u5173\u952e\u662f\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u4e0d\u662f\u4ef7\u683c\u3002<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u63a5\u4e0a\u7bc7\uff0c\u8ba1\u5212\u8ba4\u771f\u5730\u628a\u8fd9\u672c\u4e66\u505a\u4e9b\u6458\u5f55\uff0c\u4f9b\u4ee5\u540e\u5e38\u56de\u6765\u7ffb\u7ffb\u3002 3 Von Sequoia & Tom KPC […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1221","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-book"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p6VzCl-jH","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":1230,"url":"https:\/\/www.yizhayan.org\/wp\/?p=1230","url_meta":{"origin":1221,"position":0},"title":"The Power Law 2214-3","author":"yizhayanorg@126.com","date":"2022 \u5e74 4 \u6708 11 \u65e5","format":false,"excerpt":"Chapter 7-10 7 Growth Investing Softbank & Ben\u2026","rel":"","context":"\u5728\u201cBook\u201d\u4e2d","block_context":{"text":"Book","link":"https:\/\/www.yizhayan.org\/wp\/?cat=5"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":1203,"url":"https:\/\/www.yizhayan.org\/wp\/?p=1203","url_meta":{"origin":1221,"position":1},"title":"The Power Law 2214-1","author":"yizhayanorg@126.com","date":"2022 \u5e74 4 \u6708 8 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Apple, Angels Markkula & Montagu<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
5 3Com & Cisco<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
6 Accel & GO, UUNET <\/h2>\n\n\n\n