Chapter 7-10<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When Moritz had first arrived at Sequoia, some of his colleagues had been skeptical. He was an Oxford history graduate<\/strong>, a magazine journalist<\/strong>, the author<\/strong> of two business books. He had no engineering or managerial background. Don Valentine had overruled these objections because he had seen in Moritz a versatile learner<\/strong>, and he preferred to hire a hungry upstart<\/strong> than someone who was coasting on experience. Now, serendipitously, Moritz\u2019s unconventional background was about to prove its value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Von\u8001\u5927\u8fd8\u662f\u6167\u773c\uff0c\u628a\u6ca1\u6709\u5de5\u7a0b\u548c\u7ba1\u7406\u80cc\u666f\u7684\u8bb0\u8005\u3001\u5386\u53f2\u4e13\u4e1a\u83ab\u91cc\u8328\u62db\u8fdb\u4e86\u7ea2\u6749\uff0c\u770b\u5230\u5176\u5feb\u901f\u5b66\u4e60\u80fd\u529b\u3001\u9965\u6e34\u7684\u5185\u9a71\u529b\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moritz could not recall a precedent for what Yahoo was intending: to raise money from venture capitalists while giving its product away for free. But a few seconds of lateral thinking told him that Yahoo\u2019s scheme could work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In April 1995, Sequoia duly invested $975,000 in Yahoo, taking 32 percent of its equity.The innovation of backing companies that charged little or nothing for products spread through the venture-capital business like wildfire. Startups came to be assessed not according to this year\u2019s revenues or even next year\u2019s, but rather according to their momentum<\/strong>, traction, audience<\/strong>, or brand\u2014things that could, in theory at least, be monetized in the future.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yahoo\u7684\u6a21\u5f0f\u5386\u53f2\u4e0a\u4ece\u672a\u6709\u8fc7\uff0c\u4f46\u83ab\u91cc\u8328\u8ba4\u4e3aok\u3002\u770b\u4f3c\u7b80\u5355\uff0c\u4e0d\u662f\u8d4c\uff0c\u662f\u9700\u8981\u5386\u53f2\u6d1e\u89c1\u7684\u3002\u4f30\u503c\u4f53\u7cfb\u4ece\u6536\u5165\u5229\u6da6\u5207\u6362\u5230\u8d8b\u52bf\u3001\u70b9\u51fb\u91cf\u5c31\u662f\u8fd9\u4e2a\u65f6\u5019\u5f00\u59cb\u7684\uff0c\u6ce1\u6cab\u5c31\u8fd9\u6837\u751f\u6210\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dirty secret was that Yahoo had no choice but to build a brand<\/strong>, because it was not much of a technology company. It boasted no patents<\/strong> and not much of an engineering edge<\/strong>: its directory was put together by surfing the web and classifying sites, and much of the work was done manually<\/strong>. As a result, it presented a negative illustration of Tom Perkins\u2019s dictum: because Yahoo entailed no technological risk<\/strong>, it involved a huge amount of market risk<\/strong>, because no technological moat<\/strong> protected it from competitors. What\u2019s more, competition was bound to be especially ferocious because of the winner-takes-all logic of Yahoo\u2019s business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yahoo\u7684\u6a21\u5f0f\u5728\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u773c\u91cc\u8fd8\u662f\u6e05\u9192\u7684\uff0c\u6ca1\u6709\u4ec0\u4e48\u6280\u672f\u58c1\u5792\uff0c\u5e02\u573a\u98ce\u9669\u5de8\u5927\uff0c\u53ea\u80fd\u53bb\u70e7\u94b1\u5efa\u7acb\u54c1\u724c\u3002\u8fd9\u79cd\u6a21\u5f0f\u5728\u56fd\u5185\u5f88\u591a\u4eba\u8fd8\u8ba4\u4e3a\u662f\u9ad8\u79d1\u6280\uff0c\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u5178\u578b\u7684\u8bef\u5224\u3002\u53ea\u662f\u6a21\u5f0f\u7ade\u4e89\u3001\u5e02\u573a\u7ade\u4e89\uff0c\u4e0d\u6d89\u53ca\u6280\u672f\u7ade\u4e89\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anticipating the dynamics of future internet companies, a precarious circular logic <\/strong>took hold: the key to Yahoo\u2019s growth was that it had to keep growing<\/strong>. As a result, Yahoo\u2019s early success in generating revenues did not translate into profits. Every dollar of advertising income had to be plowed back into marketing expenditures to keep expanding the busines<\/strong>s. Indeed, recycling advertising income soon proved not to be enough. Eight months after securing $1 million from Sequoia, Yahoo set out to raise another round of capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5faa\u73af\u903b\u8f91\u5f00\u59cb\u6210\u7acb\uff0c\u589e\u957f\u7684\u5173\u952e\u662f\u4fdd\u6301\u589e\u503c\u3001\u4fdd\u6301\u9886\u5148\uff0c\u6240\u4ee5\u6240\u6709\u7684\u6536\u5165\u90fd\u65e0\u6cd5\u6210\u4e3a\u5229\u6da6\uff0c\u53ea\u80fd\u4e0d\u65ad\u5730\u7528\u4e8e\u7ef4\u6301\u6210\u957f\u3002\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u70e7\u94b1\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Traditional venture capitalists, observing a cash-burning business<\/strong> with no technological moat and nothing more substantial than a brand, might have refused Yahoo the lifeline that it needed. But by late 1995, tradition was pass\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u8fd9\u4e5f\u662f\u4e2a\u8303\u5f0f\u8f6c\u6362\u7684\u65f6\u523b\uff0c\u8fc7\u53bb\u4fdd\u5b88\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u4f53\u7cfb\u6b63\u9762\u4e34\u8003\u9a8c\u3002\u4eca\u5929\u5b9e\u9645\u53c8\u5207\u6362\u56de\u6765\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Son invited Filo and Yang to say what they thought Yahoo might be worth. The founders tentatively suggested a valuation of $40 million, up from just $3 million when Sequoia had invested eight months earlier. Son said yes immediately, without hesitating. He was even readier to pay up than John Doerr at Kleiner Perkins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Son arrived at Yahoo\u2019s office looking as slight and uncommanding as ever. But he brought a bazooka. In a bid without precedent in the history of the Valley, he proposed to invest fully $100 million in Yahoo. In return he wanted an additional 30 percent of the company. Son\u2019s bid implied that Yahoo\u2019s value had shot up eight times since his investment four months earlier. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Asking Son to excuse them, the Yahoo team went off to speak privately among themselves. When they were alone, Moritz counseled the two founders that Son\u2019s threat to back a rival had to be taken seriously. No Silicon Valley veteran would turn against a startup in which he had already invested: venture capital was a repeat game, and in order to earn trust, you had to honor your relationships. But Son was an interloper, ignorant of the unwritten rules. Silicon Valley convention was not going to constrain him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5b59\u6b63\u4e49\u5728yahoo\u4e0a\u7684\u52c7\u731b\u51e0\u4e4e\u6539\u53d8\u4e86\u5386\u53f2\u3002Yahoo\u7684\u4f30\u503c\u4eceA\u5230B\u8f6e8\u4e2a\u6708\u7ffb\u4e8613\u500d\uff0cSon\u6ca1\u8bb2\u4ef7\u76f4\u63a5ok\uff1b\u4e0d\u5230\u4e00\u5e74\u53c8\u63d0\u51fa10x\u7684\u4ef7\u683c\u4e0b\u91cd\u6ce8\uff0c\u4e0d\u670d\u4e0d\u884c\u3002\u4e3a\u4e86\u786e\u4fdd\u6295\u8d44\u6210\u529f\uff0c\u751a\u81f3\u5a01\u80c1\u516c\u53f8\u8bf4\u4f60\u4e0d\u8981\u6211\u5c31\u652f\u6301\u7ade\u4e89\u5bf9\u624b\uff0c\u5b8c\u5168\u4e0d\u662f\u7845\u8c37\u7684\u5957\u8def\uff0c\u4f46\u7ba1\u7528\u4e86\u3002\u4e5f\u5f00\u542f\u4e86\u4e00\u4e2a\u6210\u957f\u671f\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u65b0\u7c7b\u522b\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n On April 12, 1996, Yahoo went public. Son had made an instant profit of more than $150 million. Years later, Moritz recalled the psychological impact of this spectacle. Until the Yahoo flotation, no single deal had earned Sequoia more than $100 million<\/strong>, the record set by Don Valentine\u2019s bet on Cisco. But by buying into Yahoo on the eve of its flotation, Son had blown past the $100 million mark in a matter of weeks, and without any of the heartache of building a management team from nothing. The business of venture capital was forever altered. The alteration took two forms, the first flashy and obvious, the second slow-burning and subtle. The obvious transformation was in Son himself: he was famous now not just in Japan but everywhere. Leveraging his new reputation as a digital Midas, he followed the Yahoo bonanza with a dizzying investment blitz, barely pausing to sort gems from rubbish. To borrow the language of hedge funds, he didn\u2019t care about alpha\u2014the reward a skilled investor earns by selecting the right stock. He cared only about beta<\/strong>\u2014the profits to be had by just being in the market. One young investor who managed Son\u2019s funds recalls betting on at least 250 internet startups between 1996 and 2000, meaning that he had kept up an insane rate of around one per week, ten or maybe even twenty times as many as a normal venture operator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Son raised a new kind of venture fund: a $1 billion war chest exclusively for late-stage stakes<\/strong>, or what became known as \u201cgrowth investing<\/strong>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yahoo\u9879\u76ee\u4e0aSon\u4e00\u4e0b\u5b50\u8d5a\u4e861.5\u4ebf\uff0c\u8fd9\u662f\u8fc7\u5f80\u90fd\u5b8c\u5168\u6ca1\u6709\u8fc7\u7684\uff0c\u7ed9\u7ea2\u6749\u4ee5\u5de8\u5927\u7684\u5fc3\u7406\u51b2\u51fb\u3002\u5173\u952e\u662fSon\u4e00\u70b9\u6295\u540e\u90fd\u6ca1\u6709\uff01Son\u8fd8\u5229\u7528\u8fd9\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\u7684\u540d\u6c14\u75af\u72c2\u6295\u8d44\uff0c\u6bcf\u54681\u4e2a\u7684\u901f\u5ea6\u6295\u8d44\uff0c\u6536\u5272\u5e02\u573a\uff0c\u4e0d\u8ffd\u6c42alpha\uff0c\u53ea\u8ffd\u6c42beta\uff01\u52df\u96c6\u4e8610\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u7684\u6210\u957f\u57fa\u91d1\uff0c\u6709\u8fd9\u6bb5\u6545\u4e8b\u4e4b\u540e\u518d\u770b\u613f\u666f\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u4e8b\u60c5\uff0c\u5c31\u6beb\u4e0d\u610f\u5916\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n As we shall see presently, growth investing became a Silicon Valley staple from around 2009, and venture partnerships transformed \u201cthemselves from hyper-local businesses to more globally minded operations<\/strong>. It all followed logically from the shift that Yahoo marked. Branded internet companies faced an imperative to grow, creating an opportunity for investors to provide growth capital. Branded internet companies<\/strong> were not built on cutting-edge technology, so they could flourish far away from the tech hub in Silicon Valley. As often happens in finance, the player who first sees a shift in the landscape, and who has the ready capital to match the novel need, can make bumper profits before competitors wake up. By one reckoning, Son expanded his personal fortune by $15 billion between 1996 and 2000. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Moritz came to see the Yahoo experience as a tipping point <\/strong>for Sequoia. It coincided with Don Valentine\u2019s retirement and Moritz\u2019s emergence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u6210\u957f\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u5f00\u542f\uff0c\u7ea2\u6749\u4e5f\u8d76\u4e0aVon\u9000\u4f11\uff0c\u5f00\u59cb\u8f6c\u5411\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the case of Cisco, he reminded them, the biggest gains had come after a few years: at its flotation in 1990, Cisco had been worth $224 million; by 1994, it had shot up to $10 billion. By winning this argument and cementing his authority within the firm, Moritz saw to it that the last distribution of Yahoo was put off until November 1999, when the company was trading at $182 per share, fully fourteen times more than the price at the flotation. Thanks to masterful procrastination, Yahoo generated more gains for Sequoia than all its prior investments, combined, and more than ten times <\/strong>as much as Sequoia had earned from Cisco. The secret, Moritz said laconically, \u201cwas just learning to be a little patient<\/strong>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u9000\u51fa\u662f\u95e8\u827a\u672f\u3002\u7ea2\u6749\u5728yahoo\u4e0a\u8d5a\u4e86\u8d85\u8fc7Cisco\u9879\u76ee\u768410x\u5229\u6da6\uff0c\u5e02\u573a\u5411\u4e0a\u7684\u65f6\u5019\u8fd8\u662f\u8981\u6709\u70b9\u8010\u5fc3\uff0c\u4f46\u4e5f\u8981\u8dd1\u5f97\u5feb\uff0c\u5426\u5219\u5c31\u51fa\u4e0d\u6765\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Benchmark\u2019s strength was local rather than global: it was the anti-Softbank<\/strong>. Further, the Benchmark model was about being nimble<\/strong> rather than large: the partnership made a virtue of the deliberately small size of its first fund, which weighed in at $85 million, or less than a single check that Son might write to one company. \u201cGod is not on the side of the big arsenals, but on the side of those who shoot best<\/strong>,\u201d Benchmark\u2019s prospectus insisted. Benchmark\u2019s founding partners believed that by staying lean and focused<\/strong>, they had developed a \u201cfundamentally better architecture.\u201d The small fund size meant that they would carefully evaluate each deal<\/strong>: they aimed for alph<\/strong>a, not beta. Small would also ensure that each partner sat on just a handful of boards, and so added value to each portfolio company<\/strong>. Small would promote camaraderie among the four partners: the venture industry was masculine and monocultural, but the Benchmark team exhibited an especially intense case of jocular male uniformity. Finally, small was emphatically not a sign of weakness. Benchmark could have raised more capital if it had wanted to, and to underscore their strength, the Benchmark guys announced that they would keep an aggressive share of their fund\u2019s profits<\/strong>, more than the 20 percent industry standard.Benchmark also charged a relatively low management fee<\/strong> on the capital in its care. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Benchmark\u662f\u548c\u5b59\u6b63\u4e49\u622a\u7136\u76f8\u53cd\u7684\u505a\u6cd5\uff0c\u8ffd\u6c42alpha\uff0c\u5c0f\u800c\u7cbe\uff0c\u8981\u7ed9\u4f01\u4e1a\u5e26\u6765\u4ef7\u503c\uff0c\u800c\u4e0d\u662f\u62ff\u5e02\u573a\u6536\u76ca\u3002\u8fd9\u79cd\u65b9\u6cd5\u53ef\u80fd\u53ea\u662f\u5e02\u573a\u9ad8\u6da8\u7684\u65f6\u5019\u8868\u73b0\u5dee\u4e00\u70b9\uff0c\u957f\u671f\u770b\u8fd8\u662f\u6bd4\u8f83\u597d\u7684\u3002VC\u8fd8\u662f\u827a\u672f\uff0c\u89c4\u6a21\u5316\u672a\u5fc5\u597d\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kagle was happy to back companies that had no connection to either. Before co-founding Benchmark, he had tried to persuade his previous partnership to invest in a Seattle-based coffee chain called Starbucks. After the launch of Benchmark, Kagle oscillated between technology bets and consumer ventures<\/strong>. Unlike Accel-type specialists, he refused to stay in a single industry lane; if there was a theme to his approach, it was that thing about humanity.<\/strong> In 1997, Kagle chanced upon a hybrid that combined all his interests. It was a technology firm that was simultaneously a consumer firm. It involved the human element, big-time. It was also the first illustration of what VCs would later call ownable network effects<\/strong>. Kagle offered to invest $6.7 million in eBay, valuing the company at about $20 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kagle\u5173\u6ce8\u6280\u672f\u548c\u6d88\u8d39\uff0c\u6838\u5fc3\u5728\u4eba\u6027\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u5f88\u6709\u610f\u601d\uff0c\u8fd9\u8ba9\u4ed6\u53d1\u73b0\u4e86\u201c\u53ef\u6301\u6709\u7684\u7f51\u7edc\u6548\u5e94\u201d\uff0c\u5e76\u6295\u4e86ebay\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n If Omidyar\u2019s goal had been solely to get rich, he might have rejected Kagle. He had received a rival offer from a newspaper chain that proposed to buy him out for $50 million. But Omidyar had come to like Kagle as much as he had liked Dunlevie, and, rather like the Yahoo founders, he went with the venture guy who seemed to understand him. When the investment was concluded and Benchmark wired over the funds, Omidyar left them in the bank untouched. He wanted Kagle\u2019s connections and counsel<\/strong>. He didn\u2019t need his capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In September 1998<\/strong>, eBay duly went public, pricing its shares at $18. At the close of the first day of trading, they hit $47. Then, after some unnerving bumps, they hit $73 in late October. It was a more dramatic upward spiral even than Yahoo\u2019s. Hype or not, Benchmark was making venture history<\/strong>. As far as anybody knew, Sequoia\u2019s Yahoo deal and Kleiner\u2019s investment in a cable startup called @Home were the biggest venture home runs to date, each delivering a profit for the VCs of between $600 million and $700 million. But Benchmark was on track to make well over $1 billion <\/strong>from eBay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Later that month, Benchmark finally distributed part of its winnings. eBay\u2019s share price gave it a market value of $21 billion; Benchmark\u2019s stake was worth an astonishing $5.1 billion. This bonanza not only dwarfed the records at Sequoia and Kleiner; it far exceeded even Son\u2019s biggest wins, and it had been achieved by risking a mere $6.7 million worth of capital. Benchmark\u2019s cottage-industry style of venture capital suddenly looked inspired.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ebay\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u94b1\uff0c\u6709\u4eba5000w\u6536\u4ed6\u90fd\u6ca1\u52a8\u5fc3\uff0c\u62ff\u5230\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u7684\u94b1\u4e5f\u5206\u6587\u672a\u52a8\uff0c\u4eba\u683c\u9b45\u529b\u662f\u5173\u952e\u3002ebay\u7ed9Benchmark\u5e26\u6765\u4e86\u8d85\u8fc750\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u7684\u56de\u62a5, \u8fd11000x\uff0c\u521b\u4e0b\u4e86\u7845\u8c37\u7684\u65b0\u7eaa\u5f55\uff0c\u4e5f\u8bc1\u660e\u4e86\u65b9\u6cd5\u8bba\uff01<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the summer of 1999, Dave Beirne broached the issue at a partners\u2019 meeting. \u201cI think we should raise a billion dollars. Seriously.\u201cRachleff sympathized. \u201cSoftBank is raising more money,\u201d he noted. \u201cIf we\u2019re not prepared to fight, we\u2019re going to get our clocks cleaned. You don\u2019t go on the lacrosse field without a fuckin\u2019 stick,\u201d Beirne carried on. \u201cYou\u2019ll get killed.\u201d Kagle wasn\u2019t sure. A big fund could cause trouble: if you gave founders too much money, they would lose focus, attempt too many things, and the resources would be wasted<\/strong>. \u201cWe might overcapitalize companies<\/strong>,\u201d he said. \u201cI don\u2019t want to follow everyone else into big-check-dom.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the end, Benchmark went ahead and raised $1 billion for its 1999 fund, more than ten times as much as it had accepted for its first fund four years earlier. The partnership also experimented unsuccessfully with offices in London and Israel, and attempted a Son-style pre-IPO bet of $19 million on an e-tailer called 1-800-Flowers.com, quickly losing money. But while Benchmark could close its foreign satellites and give up on pre-IPO wagers, the dilemma about sizing persisted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bechmark\u6700\u7ec8\u4e5f\u52df\u96c6\u4e8610\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u7684\u5927\u57fa\u91d1\uff0c\u6ca1\u62b5\u6321\u4f4f\u8bf1\u60d1\uff0c\u8fd8\u8bbe\u4e86\u5916\u5730\u529e\u516c\u5ba4\uff0c\u7ed3\u679c\u662f\u60e8\u8d25\u3002\u6700\u7ec8\u4e0d\u5f97\u4e0d\u653e\u5f03\u4e86\u6d77\u5916\u57fa\u91d1\u3001pre-IPO\u7b56\u7565\u3002\u662f\u6ce1\u6cab\u7834\u88c2\u7684\u539f\u56e0\uff0c\u4e5f\u6709\u5176\u5185\u5728\u56e0\u7d20\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1998, the year that Bechtolsheim backed Google, a prolific angel named Ron Conway<\/strong> went so far as to raise a $30 million fund<\/strong> to amplify his personal investing, and the \u201cinstitutional angel<\/strong>,\u201d or \u201csuper angel,\u201d became the newest cylinder in the Valley\u2019s startup engine<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conway\u5f00\u521b\u4e86\u673a\u6784\u5929\u4f7f\u7684\u65b0\u7c7b\u522b\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the Googlers avoided the VCs<\/strong>, the venture business was booming. In 1998 venture capitalists raised the record sum of $30 billion, triple the commitments they received in 1995, the year that Son met Yahoo. In 1999, the boom turned wild: venture partnerships filled their war chests with $56 billion. The number of venture partnerships in the United States hit 750, up from 400 a decade earlier. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In ordinary times, the bubbly bias of the venture crowd is balanced by the stock market. VCs know that when startups seek to go public, they will face a tougher audience, less willing to pay up for dreams, freer to denounce a company or bet that its stock will tumble. This prospect disciplines venture behavior: it deters VCs from bidding private valuations up so high that public exits won\u2019t be profitable. But in the late 1990s, the stock market stopped performing this disciplinary function<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 90\u5e74\u4ee3\u7684\u80a1\u5e02\u75af\u72c2\u5e26\u6765\u4e86VC\u52df\u8d44\u548c\u673a\u6784\u7684\u72c2\u6da8\u3002560\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u7684\u52df\u8d44\u989d\u548c750\u5bb6\u673a\u6784\u6bd4\u7167\u56fd\u5185\u5f53\u4e0b\u7684\u6570\u91cf\uff0c\u663e\u5f97\u5fae\u4e0d\u8db3\u9053\u3002\u53ef\u89c1\u56fd\u5185\u7684\u8fc7\u5269\u7a0b\u5ea6\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The greatest mark of Doerr\u2019s prowess was his investment in Amazon. In 1996, Doerr had snagged 13 percent of Bezos\u2019s startup for $8 million<\/strong>; by the spring of 1999, Amazon was a public company with a valuation of more than $20 billion. But far from chasing after Amazon, Doerr himself became the object of a chase<\/strong>: his reputation was such that Amazon came after him. At first, Doerr was too busy to notice<\/strong>; the pager and the cell phone on his belt buzzed constantly. Eventually, after a CEO at a Kleiner portfolio company persuaded him to have dinner with Amazon\u2019s marketing chief, the penny dropped: Doerr flew to Seattle, bonded instantly with Jeff Bezos, and stole the deal from under General Atlantic<\/strong>\u2019s nose, even while offering a less generous valuation. Asked why he had accepted the lower bid, Bezos explained, Kleiner and John are the gravitational center of a huge piece of the Internet world. Being with them is like being on prime real estate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u4e9a\u9a6c\u900a\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u8ba9Doerr3\u5e74\u5c31\u7ffb\u4e86N\u500d\uff0cDoerr\u6210\u4e86\u88ab\u8ffd\u9010\u7684\u5bf9\u8c61\uff0c\u8f7b\u677e\u5077\u8d70GA\u7684\u4ea4\u6613\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Googlers did not strain themselves too hard: they showed up to see Doerr with a PowerPoint presentation consisting of just seventeen slides<\/strong>, three of which displayed cartoons and only two of which had actual numbers<\/strong>. Primed by Shriram, they had boiled their mission statement down to just eight words: \u201cWe deliver the world\u2019s information in one click\u201d.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Doerr loved nothing more than a bold, high-concept<\/strong> presentation. He was an engineer by background; he was a dreamer by vocation<\/strong>. Besides, Google had used the time afforded by the angel financing to develop traction: it was now handling half a million searches daily<\/strong>. Doerr privately calculated that if Google muscled its way into the top tier of search firms, it could attain a market capitalization of as much as $1 billion<\/strong>. Seeking to gauge the founders\u2019 ambition, Doerr asked, \u201cHow big do you think this could be?\u201d\u201cTen billion,\u201d Page answered. \u201cYou mean market cap, right?\u201d\u201cNo, I don\u2019t mean market cap. I mean revenue,\u201d Page declared confidently. He pulled out a laptop and demonstrated how much faster and more relevant Google\u2019s search results were compared with those of its rivals. Doerr was flabbergasted and delighted. Revenue of $10 billion implied a market capitalization of at least $100 billion<\/strong>. This was fully one hundred times more than Doerr\u2019s estimate of Google\u2019s potential; it implied a company as big as Microsoft and much bigger than Amazon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Doerr\u5728Google\u4e0a\u6545\u4e8b\u8fd8\u662f\u86ee\u6709\u610f\u601d\u7684\uff0c\u539f\u6765\u4ee5\u4e3a10\u4ebf\u6f5c\u529b\u7684\u9879\u76ee\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u8ba4\u4e3a\u6709\u5343\u4ebf\u6f5c\u529b\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n By now, Moritz and Doerr were both hooked on the idea of investing in Google. But their logic was subtly distinct. In the unscientific world of venture, when two investors share an enthusiasm for the same deal, it\u2019s not necessarily for the same reasons. For Doerr, an engineer who backed engineers, Google\u2019s technical edge<\/strong> was the main attraction. Plenty of skeptics argued that with eighteen rivals jostling for position, search would be a low-margin commodity business. But Doerr had enough faith in technological advance to believe that a latecomer with a better algorithm could stand out from its competitors<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Using their angel investors as intermediaries, they let it be known that they would sell 12.5 percent of their equity to Kleiner and the same amount to Sequoia. If the VCs refused, Google would sell nothing to either of them. Kleiner and Sequoia huffed and puffed<\/strong>: neither Amazon nor Yahoo had treated them like this. But amid the euphoria of the bull market, it was evident that if they declined to come to terms, somebody else would provide Google with the capital it needed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On June 7, 1999, the three parties signed a deal. For Doerr, the $12 million investment was the biggest bet of his career<\/strong>. Thanks to the emergence of angel investors, and thanks to the sheer amount of money that had flooded into the business, the balance of power between entrepreneurs and VCs had shifted<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Google\u662fDoerr\u7684\u6700\u5927\u4e00\u7b14\u6295\u8d44\uff0c\u4e5f\u5c311200w\u3002VC\u548c\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u53d1\u751f\u4e86\u53d8\u5316\uff0c\u4e0d\u518d\u90a3\u4e48\u542cVC\u7684\u4e86\uff0c\u4e3b\u8981\u8fd8\u662fVC\u591a\u4e86\uff0c\u673a\u6784\u5929\u4f7f\u3001Angel\u4e5f\u591a\u4e86\uff0c\u7ade\u4e89\u52a0\u5267\u4e86\u3002\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u53d8\u5f97\u66f4\u52a0tough\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the time of the venture financing, Brin and Page had agreed that a new CEO should be hired at an unspecified time in the future.A few months later, they informed Doerr, \u201cWe\u2019ve changed our minds<\/strong>. You know, we actually think we can run the company between the two of us.\u201dDoerr hustled for an alternative. He sometimes described himself as a \u201cglorified recruiter.\u201d \u201cWe\u2019re not investing in business plans, we\u2019re not investing in discounted cash flows, it\u2019s the people<\/strong>,\u201d he insisted, revealing how the essence of the venture craft remained unchanged since the days of Arthur Rock and Tommy Davis. <\/p>\n\n\n\n With the recruitment of Schmidt in 2001, the Googlers taught the venture-capital tribe the second of three lessons. The first had concerned the pricing of the deal: as Doerr had said, it was the most Kleiner had ever paid for a modest share in a startup. The second concerned the revolt against the Qume model<\/strong>: Schmidt was hired only after a long period of foot-dragging, and even then he functioned as just one voice in the triumvirate<\/strong> that led the company. The third lesson came in 2004, as Google prepared to go public. Defying Valley tradition, and ignoring protests from Doerr and Moritz, Brin and Page insisted on maintaining their power even after they sold shares to the public<\/strong>. Following a precedent set mainly by family-owned media firms, they decreed that Google would issue two classes of shares<\/strong>. The first, to be held by the founders and the early investors, conferred ten votes <\/strong>on big company decisions. The second, to be held by outside stock market investors, conferred only one vote. Collectively, outside investors would receive shares bestowing only a fifth of all votes. Insiders, chief among them Brin and Page, would retain control over the company<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Google\u4e5f\u662fVC\u53f2\u4e0a\u5f88\u7279\u522b\u7684\u6848\u4f8b\uff0c\u4e0d\u5728\u63a5\u53d7VC\u6d3e\u51fa\u5927CEO\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u5c0fCEO\uff0c\u670d\u4ece\u4e8e\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\uff0c\u6539\u53d8\u4e86Qume\u516c\u5f0f\uff1b\u4e5f\u521b\u65b0\u4e86\u80a1\u6743\u7ed3\u6784\uff0c\u7ed9\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u8d85\u5f3a\u7684\u63a7\u5236\u6743\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n But whereas Google\u2019s experimental pricing mechanism<\/strong> did not become the model for later Valley IPOs, the dual-class, ten-votes-versus-one share structure<\/strong> was copied by companies such as Facebook. Google\u2019s extraordinary growth after its flotation\u2014over the next three years, the stock price quintupled\u2014made the VCs\u2019 objections to the dual-class structure look irrelevant. Evidently, investors were only too delighted to buy so-called second-class stock<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u53cc\u91cd\u80a1\u7968\u7ed3\u6784\u5c45\u7136\u662f\u4e2a\u5de7\u5408\uff0c\u4e5f\u662f\u53cc\u65b9\u7684\u9009\u62e9\uff0c\u53d1\u660e\u4e5f\u6ca1\u591a\u4e45\u3002Google\u521b\u65b0\u4e86\u80a1\u6743\u7ed3\u6784\u3001\u4e5f\u521b\u65b0\u4e86IPO\u5b9a\u4ef7\u673a\u5236\uff0c\u4f46\u53ea\u6709\u8fd9\u4e2a\u80a1\u6743\u7ed3\u6784\u7559\u4e0b\u6765\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n As of 2003, Sequoia was struggling to prop up a venture fund that had lost around 50 percent<\/strong> of its value; the partners felt honor-bound to plow their fees back into the pot to eke out a return of 1.3x<\/strong>.The equivalent Kleiner Perkins fund performed even worse, never making it into the black. Masayoshi Son, who had briefly become the richest person in the world, lost more than 90 percent of his fortune<\/strong>. At the peak in 2000, new capital commitments to VC firms had hit $104 billion. By 2002, they were down to around $9 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u6ce1\u6cab\u7834\u88c2\u7ed9VC\u7684\u51b2\u51fb\u662f\u5de8\u5927\u7684\uff0c\u7ea2\u6749\u7684\u57fa\u91d1\u4e00\u5ea6\u8dcc\u4e8650%\uff0c2003\u5e74\u8fd8\u662f\u56de\u52301.3x\uff0c\u76f8\u5f53\u4e0d\u6613\u3002KP\u5c31\u53ea\u80fd\u4e8f\u4e86\u8fd9\u671f\u4e86\u3002Son\u635f\u593190%\u7684\u8eab\u4ef7\u3002VC\u52df\u8d44\u9ad8\u5cf0\u4ece1000\u4ebf\u8dcc\u5230\u4e8690\u4ebf\uff0c\u8dcc\u53bb90%\u3002\u76f8\u6bd4\u56fd\u5185\u7684\u8fd9\u51e0\u6ce2\u6ce1\u6cab\u7834\u88c2\uff0c\u5c45\u7136\u6ca1\u6709\u8fd9\u4e48\u4e25\u91cd\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n But as animal spirits roared back to life, the venture industry woke up to the echoes and extensions of the Brin-Page challenge. Young entrepreneurs no longer deferred to experienced investors. In fact, they often regarded them contemptuously.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Google\u4e4b\u540e\u7684\u5e74\u8f7b\u4eba\u5df2\u7ecf\u53d8\u4e86\uff0c\u4e00\u65b9\u9762\u8f6f\u4ef6\u4e1a\u52a1\u4e0d\u518d\u9700\u8981\u5927\u91cf\u6295\u8d44\u4e86\uff0c\u53e6\u4e00\u65b9\u9762\u4e5f\u6709\u4e86\u5404\u79cdAngel\uff0c\u4e0d\u518d\u63a5\u7eb3\u4f20\u7edfVC\u7684Hands-on\u6307\u5bfc\u4e86\u3002VC\u786e\u5b9e\u4e5f\u5230\u4e86\u6539\u671d\u6362\u4ee3\u7684\u65f6\u5019\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Toward the end of 2004, Sequoia\u2019s investment team assembled for an intriguing meeting. Roelof Botha, a thirty-one-year-old partner, had arranged for a visit from an even younger entrepreneur, a Harvard sophomore named Mark Zuckerberg. These days, Sequoia realized, startup founders could be very young; this Zuckerberg was only twenty. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Roelof 31\u5c81\u51fa\u9053\u65f6\u5c31\u5f88\u4e0d\u9519\uff0c\u76f4\u63a5\u62dc\u8bbf\u4e86Facebook\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Zuckerberg\u2019s pajama prank marked a watershed for venture capital. By the time of his stunt, in late 2004, Google had gone public, and other young entrepreneurs were playing hard to get, following the Brin-Page playbook.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Zuck\u7a7f\u7740\u7761\u8863\u53bb\u7ea2\u6749\u6807\u5fd7\u7740\u4e00\u4e2aVC\u53f2\u4e0a\u7684\u5206\u6c34\u5cad\u3002VC\u4e0d\u518d\u662f\u4e00\u7ea7\u5e02\u573a\u91cc\u7684\u5355\u4e00\u73a9\u5bb6\u4e86\uff0c\u66f4\u65e9\u671f\u7684\u5929\u4f7f\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u51fa\u73b0\u4e86\uff0c\u540e\u9762\u7684\u6210\u957f\u671f\u6295\u8d44\u4e5f\u5373\u5c06\u51fa\u73b0\uff0c\u5929\u5e73\u5728\u5411\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u65b9\u5411\u503e\u659c\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n He wanted to raise capital from angels<\/strong>. His first port of call was an entrepreneur named Reid Hoffman, who had coached him through the Plaxo denouement. Hoffman declined to lead an investment in Facebook; he had himself founded a social network called LinkedIn, and there might be some rivalry. So Hoffman put Parker in touch with a Stanford friend named Peter Thiel<\/strong>, the co-founder of an online payments company called PayPal. Pretty soon, Thiel agreed to kick in $500,000 in exchange for 10.2 percent of the firm<\/strong>, with Hoffman providing a further $38,000<\/p>\n\n\n\n FB\u7684\u5929\u4f7f\u8d77\u6b65\u5c31\u662f500w\u7684\u62a5\u4ef7\u3002\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u5df2\u7ecf\u4e0d\u60f3\u8981VC\u4e86\uff0c\u5929\u4f7f\u7684\u94b1\u5c11\u70b9\uff0c\u80a1\u4efd\u8bc9\u6c42\u4e5f\u5c11\uff0c\u8fd8\u4e0d\u5e72\u9884\u516c\u53f8\u7ba1\u7406\uff0c\u786e\u5b9e\u662f\u6709\u4f18\u52bf\u7684\u3002\u7279\u522b\u662f\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u80cc\u666f\u7684\u5929\u4f7f\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\uff0c\u66f4\u597d\u7406\u89e3\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u7684\u60f3\u6cd5\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Given the currents of the times, this new cluster of entrepreneur-angels <\/strong>was naturally skeptical of the traditional venture community. The Googlers had shown how to stand up to VCs, and Paul Graham had emphasized the tensions between ever larger venture funds <\/strong>and the limited need for capital at software startups<\/strong>. There was a generational factor at work, too. The extraordinary VC profits of the 1990s had encouraged senior venture partners to stay on<\/strong>, and because the boom made everyone look good, nobody was forced into retirement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u4e0b\u573a\u641e\u5929\u4f7f\u4e5f\u6709\u5176\u7279\u522b\u7684\u65f6\u4ee3\u80cc\u666f\uff0c\u4e00\u662fVC\u57fa\u91d1\u8d8a\u6765\u8d8a\u5927\uff0c\u4f46\u8f6f\u4ef6\u7c7b\u4f01\u4e1a\u9700\u8981\u7684\u542f\u52a8\u8d44\u91d1\u8d8a\u6765\u8d8a\u5c11\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u4e0d\u5e73\u8861\u5728\u52a0\u5267\uff1b\u4e8c\u662f\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u6ce1\u6cab\u8ba9\u57fa\u91d1\u4e1a\u7ee9\u8868\u73b0\u90fd\u633a\u597d\uff0cVC\u7684\u8001\u4eba\u90fd\u4e0d\u613f\u610f\u9000\u4e0b\u6765\uff0c\u65b0\u4eba\u53ea\u80fd\u91cd\u65b0\u641e\u4e00\u644a\u7684\u3002\u6211\u731c\u7684\u53ef\u80fd\u56e0\u7d20\u8fd8\u6709\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u548cVC\u8001\u4eba\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u5e74\u9f84\u4ee3\u6c9f\u4e5f\u5728\u62c9\u5927\uff0c\u4e0d\u597d\u6c9f\u901a\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u53cd\u89c2\u56fd\u51852015\u5e74\u524d\u540e\u7684\u5929\u4f7f\u6d6a\u6f6e\u5219\u4e0d\u592a\u4e00\u6837\uff0c\u4ec5\u4ec5\u662f\u56e0\u4e3a\u8ffd\u9010\u9ad8\u5229\u6da6\uff0c\u89c9\u5f97\u5929\u4f7f\u95e8\u69db\u4f4e\u5c31\u8fdb\u6765\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Partly by coincidence, and partly because <\/strong>success comes at a price, this general hostility to venture capital was concentrated on Sequoia<\/strong>. Sean Parker, as we have seen, had a particular resentment of Michael Moritz: Zuckerberg\u2019s strange pajama act was Parker\u2019s elaborate way of getting even after Plaxo. But Parker was not alone. Peter Thiel, the angel who had backed Zuckerberg, also held a grudge against Moritz.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u7ea2\u6749\u7684\u6210\u5c31\u4e5f\u5f00\u59cb\u53cd\u566c\u81ea\u5df1\u4e86\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u6210\u529f\u7684\u4ee3\u4ef7\uff0c\u8fd8\u597d\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u4e8b\u60c5\u5f71\u54cd\u6ca1\u90a3\u4e48\u5927\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thiel took a second and a half to respond. Though only thirty years old, he had a grave, deliberate manner. \u201cWell, I\u2019d like to invest,\u201d he said finally. Thiel promised Levchin $300,000<\/strong>\u2014three times more than Bechtolsheim had risked on the Googlers. Then he told Levchin to find more capital elsewhere to launch his new company. If Thiel and Levchin had sailed onward to success, the history of Silicon Valley might have been different. But at the end of 1999, Confinity found itself battling a rival called X.com<\/strong>, led by an entrepreneur named Elon Musk. The two companies were close equivalents in many ways. Both had around fifty employees and 300,000 users. Both were growing fast, and for a while both had offices in the same building on University Avenue in Palo Alto. But X.com had one distinguishing advantage. Whereas Confinity had secured capital from Nokia<\/strong>, X.com had been anointed by Sequoia.<\/strong> None other than Michael Moritz had pumped $25 million into X.com<\/strong>, five times more than Confinity had raised<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Thiel \u5176\u5b9e\u662fPaypal\u7684\u5929\u4f7f\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u4e86\uff0c30w\u76f8\u5f53\u4e8e\u5f53\u5e74\u82f9\u679c\u5929\u4f7f\u76843\u500d\u3002\u516c\u53f8\u53d1\u5c55\u4e0d\u9519\uff0c\u53ea\u662f\u906d\u9047\u4e86Musk\u4f5c\u4e3a\u7ade\u4e89\u5bf9\u624b\u7684X.com, Musk\u878d\u4e862500w\uff0cPaypal\u53ea\u6709500w\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Musk informed the Confinity founders over dinner that if a merger were to go ahead, X.com\u2019s shareholders should own fully 92 percent<\/strong> of the resulting company. That\u2019s great, Levchin growled to himself. We\u2019ll see you at the barricades. Thiel was less hotheaded than Levchin. \u201cWe\u2019ll give it some thought,\u201d he told Musk and Harris evenly. Over the next days, Thiel began to haggle. He pushed Musk until he agreed to cut the X shareholders\u2019 share of the merged firm from 92 percent to 60 percent<\/strong>. On these terms, Thiel was tempted to settle. On a weekend in February 2000, Moritz showed up at the Palo Alto block where X and Confinity had offices. Finding Levchin, Moritz sat down in front of him. He leaned forward, placed his elbows on his knees, threaded his fingers together, and rested his chin on top of them. Years later, Levchin vividly remembered that Moritz had not removed his theatrical dark coat. Their faces were barely a meter from each other. Moritz told Levchin, \u201cIf you go forward with this merger, I\u2019ll never sell a single share<\/strong>\u201d\u2014the implication being that a merged company would grow and grow forever. It was one of those classic VC call-to-greatness challenges. Levchin was suitably impressed. He dropped his objections to a sixty-forty deal, subordinating his coding pride to Moritz\u2019s grand vision. The path to a merger was now clear. The bloodshed would be over. A day or so later, Levchin saw Musk. \u201cThis sixty-forty is too good for you,\u201d Musk taunted him. \u201cJust so you know, you\u2019re getting a great deal. This merger of unequals is a steal for you guys.<\/strong>” Harris helped Levchin fold clothes and reconsider his decision. Ignore Musk\u2019s sixty-forty insult, Harris pleaded; he and the X board had nothing but respect for Levchin. Indeed, to show it was sincere, X was prepared to sweeten its offer. It would do the deal at fifty-fifty. At last, Levchin swallowed his objections and the merger went forward. Musk\u2019s gratuitous taunting of his adversary had cost him serious money<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u8fd9\u6bb5\u5408\u5e76\u7684\u5386\u53f2\u975e\u5e38\u6709\u8da3\uff0c\u5982\u679c\u4e0d\u662fThiel\uff0c\u4f30\u8ba192%-8%\u7684\u5408\u5e76\u90fd\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\uff0c\u662fPeter\u4e89\u53d6\u5230\u4e8660-40\uff0c\u9a6c\u65af\u514b\u4e0d\u9760\u8c31\u7684\u5f00\u73a9\u7b11\u53c8\u8ba9\u8fd9\u4e2a\u6570\u5b57\u53d8\u6210\u4e865-5\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n A decade later, when Thiel reflected on the startup lessons he had learned in the Valley, avoidance of competition was a key one.<\/strong>\u201cAll failed companies are the same,\u201d he reflected. \u201cThey failed to escape competition<\/strong>\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Peter\u7684\u53cd\u601d\u8fd8\u662f\u5f88\u6709\u4ef7\u503c\u7684\uff0c\u80fd\u591f\u907f\u514d\u7ade\u4e89\u5f88\u5173\u952e\uff0c\u5f88\u591a\u516c\u53f8\u6b7b\u6389\u7684\u539f\u56e0\u5c31\u662f\u9003\u4e0d\u51fa\u7ade\u4e89\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n When eBay bought PayPal in 2002, Thiel negotiated secret terms that allowed him to leave the company. The conditions of the acquisition required others on his management team to stay at their posts, but Thiel sprang himself loose and cashed out to the tune of $55 million<\/strong>.Now in his mid-thirties, he quit Palo Alto and set himself up in San Francisco. He relaunched and rechristened his hedge fund<\/strong>, calling it Clarium Capital,<\/strong> bulking it up with $10 million <\/strong>of his own wealth, and pursuing the thesis that a global scarcity of oil would drive energy prices higher. Meanwhile, he hatched a series of projects<\/strong> that built on the relationships he had forged at Stanford and PayPal. In 2004 he recruited a PayPal engineer to develop national-intelligence software, Palantir<\/strong>. In July 2008, right after SpaceX\u2019s third attempted rocket launch had failed, Nosek persuaded Thiel to bet fully $20 million on Musk, receiving in exchange about 4 percent of his company. One decade later, SpaceX had achieved a heady valuation of $26 billion.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ebay\u7684\u6536\u8d2d\u8ba935\u5c81\u5de6\u53f3\u7684Peter\u83b7\u5f97\u4e865500w\u73b0\u91d1\uff0c\u4ed6\u9000\u51fa\u4e86\u7845\u8c37\uff0c\u56de\u5230\u65e7\u91d1\u5c71\u7ee7\u7eed\u641e\u5bf9\u51b2\u57fa\u91d1\uff0c\u6295\u4e861000w\uff0c\u5269\u4f59\u8fd8\u4e0d\u65ad\u5730\u5b75\u5316\u5404\u79cd\u516c\u53f8\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982Palantir\u3002\u540e\u6765\u4ed62008\u57285\u4ebf\u4f30\u503c\u65f6\u6295\u4e86SpaceX\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Naturally, given the fights that Thiel and Parker had been through with Moritz, Founders Fund<\/strong> explicitly ruled out the Qume formula<\/strong> of bringing in an outside CEO. Entrepreneurs should control their own companies<\/strong>, period. The Googlers had pioneered this path, accepting Eric Schmidt as one member of a triumvirate rather than as the outright boss. Facebook had gone further: Zuckerberg reigned unchallenged. Now Founders Fund set out to spread this kingly model to every startup that it backed. Thiel felt that all great startups had a \u201cmonarchy aspect,\u201d as one of his lieutenants put it. \u201cIt\u2019s not the libertarian part of Peter that made Founders Fund. It\u2019s the monarchist part.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Founders Fund\u65d7\u5e1c\u9c9c\u660e\u5730\u652f\u6301\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u638c\u6743\u7684\u541b\u4e3b\u5236\u5b89\u6392\uff0c\u800c\u4e0d\u662fQume\u516c\u5f0f\u7684\u5e26\u4e2a\u5916\u90e8CEO\u8fdb\u6765\uff0c\u8fd9\u70b9\u4e0a\u4eceGoogle\u5f00\u59cb\u6539\u53d8\uff0cFackbook\u5145\u5206\u8bc1\u660e\u3002\u53ea\u662f\u540e\u6765\u7684Uber\u548cWework\u4e0a\u5e26\u6765\u4e86\u4e9b\u53cd\u601d\uff0c\u4f46\u5386\u53f2\u5c31\u662f\u8fd9\u6837\u6eda\u6eda\u5411\u524d\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thiel was the first VC to speak explicitly about the power law. Past venture investors, going back to Arthur Rock, had understood full well that a handful of winners would dominate their performance<\/strong>. But Thiel went further in recognizing this as part of a broader phenomenon. Citing Vilfredo Pareto, the father of the \u201cPareto principle\u201d\u2014or 80\/20 rule\u2014he observed that radically unequal outcomes were common in the natural and social world. It was a sort of natural law<\/strong>; indeed, it was the law to which venture capitalists were <\/p>\n\n\n\n One survey in 2000 found that coaching and advising were growing more important<\/strong>, not less so: a venture partnership called Mohr Davidow retained five operating partners whose full-time job was to parachute into portfolio companies to provide managerial support<\/strong>, and Charles River Ventures in Boston retained no fewer than a dozen staff to help startups with executive search, equipment leasing, contract law, and other functions<\/strong>. Paul Gompers of the Harvard Business School described these developments as progress. \u201cIt\u2019s the evolution of venture capital from an art into a business,\u201d he suggested. The way Thiel saw things, this evolution was misguided. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The power law dictated that the companies that mattered would have to be exceptional outliers: in all of Silicon Valley in any given year, there were just a handful of ventures that were truly worth backing<\/strong>. The founders of these outstanding startups were necessarily so gifted that a bit of VC coaching would barely change their performance.\u201cWhen you look at the strongest performers in our portfolio, they are, generally speaking, the companies that we have the least amount of engagement with<\/strong>,\u201d one Founders Fund partner observed bluntly. It might flatter venture investors\u2019 egos to offer sage advice. But the art of venture capital was to find rough diamonds, not to spend time polishing them<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Founders Fund\u662f\u7b2c\u4e00\u5bb6\u516c\u5f00\u9610\u8ff0\u4e86\u5e42\u5f8b\u5b9a\u5f8b\u7684\u673a\u6784\uff0c\u4ed6\u4eec\u4e0d\u5728\u8ba4\u4e3a\u8fd9\u662f\u4e2a\u73b0\u8c61\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u8ba4\u4e3a\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u65e9\u671f\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u89c4\u5f8b\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0cVC\u6295\u8d44\u6700\u6838\u5fc3\u7684\u8fd8\u662f\u53d1\u73b0\u597d\u516c\u53f8\u3001\u627e\u5230\u94bb\u77f3\uff0c\u800c\u4e0d\u662f\u53bb\u82b1\u65f6\u95f4\u6253\u78e8\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u89c2\u70b9\u548c\u8d8a\u6765\u8d8a\u91cd\u89c6\u6295\u540e\u7684\u673a\u6784\u3001\u4ee5\u53ca\u548c\u4e4b\u524d\u5d07\u5c1aHands-on\u7684\u673a\u6784\u5f62\u6210\u9c9c\u660e\u5bf9\u6bd4\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Entrepreneurs who weren\u2019t oddballs would create businesses that were simply too normal<\/strong>. They would come up with a sensible plan, which, being sensible, would have occurred to others.Consequently, they would find themselves in a niche that was too crowded and competitive to allow for big profits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u8981\u6709\u70b9\u4e2a\u6027\uff0c\u592a\u4e00\u822c\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u62ff\u51fa\u6765\u7684\u65b9\u6848\u4e5f\u6bd4\u8f83\u4e00\u822c\uff0c\u5f88\u5bb9\u6613\u5c31\u9677\u5165\u5de8\u5927\u7684\u7ade\u4e89\u7ea2\u6d77\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was surely no coincidence, Thiel continued, that the best startup founders were often arrogant<\/strong>, misanthropic<\/strong>, or borderline crazy<\/strong>. Four of the six early PayPal employees had built bombs in high school. Elon Musk spent half the earnings from his first startup on a race car; when he crashed it with Thiel in the passenger seat, all he could do was laugh about the fact that he had failed to insure it. Such extremes and eccentricities were actually good signs<\/strong>, Thiel contended; VCs should celebrate misfits, not coach them into conformity<\/strong>. A few years into its existence, Founders Fund made an expensive error by refusing to invest in Uber; its bratty founder, Travis Kalanick, had alienated both Howery and Nosek. \u201cWe should be more tolerant of founders who seem strange or extreme<\/strong>,\u201d Thiel wrote, when Uber had emerged as a grand slam.\u201cMaybe we need to give assholes a second and third chance,\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n Peter\u5bf9\u4e8e\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u7684\u7406\u89e3\u5f88\u7279\u522b\uff0c\u4e5f\u5f88\u6709\u9053\u7406\uff1a\u597d\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u7ecf\u5e38\u5f88\u50b2\u6162\u3001\u4e0d\u5957\u8fd1\u4e4e\u3001\u6709\u4e9b\u75af\u72c2\u3002\u8fd9\u4e9b\u6781\u7aef\u548c\u53e4\u602a\u7684\u8868\u73b0\u5b9e\u9645\u662f\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u597d\u7684\u6807\u5fd7\uff0cVC\u5e94\u8be5\u62e5\u62b1\u8fd9\u4e2d\u4e0d\u5408\u7fa4\u7684\u4eba\uff0c\u800c\u4e0d\u662f\u8ba9\u4ed6\u4eec\u975e\u8981\u56de\u5f52\u6b63\u5e38\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n If Thiel opposed VC mentoring of founders lest it suppress quirky genius, he also disliked it for another reason. From the investor\u2019s point of view, there was a hefty opportunity cost<\/strong>. Venture capitalists who spent their days mentoring portfolio companies<\/strong> would not be seeking out the next batch of investment opportunities. At one point, Luke Nosek allowed himself to be sucked into the troubles at a portfolio company called Powerset: the CEO had left, and the company was desperate to sell itself to an acquirer. \u201cI put tons of effort into this and I made like $100,000,\u201d Nosek remembered ruefully. And because he was preoccupied with Powerset, Nosek failed to \u201cpursue opportunities elsewhere, including in Facebook and Twitter. \u201cI was just too busy, and I never ended up meeting with the people.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n VC\u7684\u4e3b\u4e1a\u5e94\u8be5\u662f\u5173\u6ce8\u548c\u627e\u5230\u597d\u516c\u53f8\u3002\u6240\u4ee5\u65f6\u95f4\u7684\u673a\u4f1a\u6210\u672c\u5de8\u5927\uff0c\u65f6\u95f4\u82b1\u5728\u6295\u540e\u670d\u52a1\u4e0a\uff0c\u56e0\u6b64\u9519\u8fc7\u7684\u597d\u516c\u53f8\u5c31\u662f\u5de8\u5927\u7684\u673a\u4f1a\u6210\u672c\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u5224\u65ad\u4e5f\u652f\u6301VC\u5e94\u8be5\u66f4\u591a\u5173\u6ce8\u6295\u8d44\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n With his grave and almost ponderous manner, Thiel could come across as a detached armchair philosopher<\/strong>. He was given to breathtakingly sweeping statements, delivered in a tone of deadpan certitude that made few allowances for the messiness of reality. He liked to dabble philanthropically in eccentric causes: \u201cseasteading\u201d\u2014the idea of building a floating libertarian utopia beyond the reach of governments\u2014as well as projects to defeat aging or to encourage gifted kids to drop out of college. But, like George Soros, Thiel had the courage to connect his philosophical convictions to his investment practices. As a student at the London School of Economics, Soros had absorbed the notion that limits to human cognition prevent people from stably apprehending truth; it followed that Soros should speculate aggressively on the self-reinforcing booms and busts that imperfect cognition generated.[50] Likewise, having absorbed the implications of the power law, Thiel imprinted them methodically on his venture firm. Founders Fund resolved that it would never eject founders from their startups, no matter how strangely they behaved<\/strong>; fifteen years \u201clater, it had stuck faithfully to this principle.[51] Indeed, Founders Fund never once sided against a founder in a board vote, and was generally content to do without a board seat<\/strong>. It was a bold reversal of the hands-on tradition<\/strong> established by Don Valentine and Tom Perkins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Peter\u5b66\u4ee5\u81f4\u7528\uff0c\u575a\u6301\u5bf9\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u65e0\u9650\u7684\u53cb\u597d\uff0c\u4e0d\u8981\u8463\u4e8b\u4f1a\u5e2d\u4f4d\u3001\u4e0d\u53cd\u5bf9\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\uff0c\u548c\u524d\u8f88\u4eecHands on\u7684\u505a\u6cd5\u622a\u7136\u76f8\u53cd\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thiel acted on his faith in mavericks by recruiting investing partners <\/strong>who themselves tested convention. His first-ever conversation with Luke Nosek had been about how Nosek wanted to be frozen upon death in hope of medical resurrection. This did not stop Thiel from welcoming Nosek into his partnership. Likewise, Sean Parker had been in trouble with the law, not to mention with power brokers such as Moritz; Thiel nonetheless embraced him. To banish consensual thinking, Founders Fund broke with the industry practice of Monday partnership meetings<\/strong>, replacing the Sand Hill Road tradition of collective responsibility with radical decentralization<\/strong>. Founders Fund investors sourced deals independently<\/strong>, even writing some small checks without consulting one another. Bigger bets required consultation<\/strong>\u2014the bigger the check, the more partners had to assent\u2014but even the biggest investments did not require a majority to vote<\/strong> in favor. \u201cIt usually takes one person with a lot of conviction banging their fist and saying, \u2018This needs to be done,\u2019\u201d one partner explained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Founders Fund\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u51b3\u7b56\u4f53\u7cfb\u4e5f\u5f88\u6709\u610f\u601d\uff0c\u9ad8\u5ea6\u53bb\u4e2d\u5fc3\u5316\uff0c\u5468\u4e00\u4e0d\u5f00\u4f8b\u4f1a\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u6563\u5f00\u627e\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u5c0f\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u81ea\u5df1\u53ef\u4ee5\u8bf4\u4e86\u7b97\uff0c\u5373\u4fbf\u662f\u5927\u7684\u6295\u8d44\uff0c\u4e5f\u65e0\u9700\u591a\u6570\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\u540c\u610f\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Like Soros\u2019s, Thiel\u2019s philosophical interests convinced him of the case for unusually aggressive risk-taking<\/strong>. Soros\u2019s longtime partner and alter ego Stanley Druckenmiller observed that huge and well-timed gambles were the essence of Soros\u2019s genius<\/strong>. Soros was right about the market\u2019s direction no more often than other traders. What distinguished him was that when he felt a truly strong conviction, he acted on it more courageously.<\/strong> Likewise, Thiel had the guts to act on his understanding of the power law by betting big at the right moments<\/strong>. Because only a handful of startups would grow exponentially<\/strong>, there was no point getting excited about opportunities that seemed merely solid; in venture, the median investment was a failure<\/strong>. But when he encountered a potential grand slam, Thiel was ready to pile his chips onto the table.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thiel liked to tell a story about Andreessen Horowitz, another upstart venture shop of which we shall hear more later. In 2010, Andreessen Horowitz invested $250,000 in the social-networking app Instagram. It was by some metrics a spectacular home run: two years later, Facebook paid $1 billion for Instagram, and Andreessen netted $78 million\u2014a 312x return on its investment. And yet by other measures this was a debacle. Andreessen Horowitz made the Instagram investment out of a $1.5 billion fund, so it needed fully nineteen $78 million payouts merely to break even. To have backed a winning company was nice for the ego. But the brutal truth was that Instagram had been a wasted opportunity<\/strong>. In contrast, when Founders Fund got excited about a follow-on opportunity to invest in Facebook in 2007, Nosek went all in<\/strong>. He called up the Founders Fund limited partners and persuaded them to plow extra capital into a Facebook-only special purpose vehicle. Then he invested his parents\u2019 entire retirement fund in the company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Peter\u5bf9\u5e42\u5f8b\u5b9a\u5f8b\u7684\u7406\u89e3\u5f88\u900f\u5f7b\uff0c\u4e5f\u6df1\u5165\u7814\u7a76\u4e86\u7d22\u7f57\u65af\uff0c\u7d22\u7f57\u65af\u7684\u6838\u5fc3\u5e76\u4e0d\u662f\u80dc\u7387\u66f4\u9ad8\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u6bcf\u6b21\u611f\u89c9\u826f\u597d\u7684\u65f6\u5019\u6562\u4e0b\u91cd\u6ce8\u3002VC\u4e5f\u5e94\u8be5\u5728\u9047\u5230\u597d\u9879\u76ee\u65f6\u591a\u6b21\u4e0b\u91cd\u6ce8\u8fdb\u884c\u6295\u8d44\uff0c\u6bd5\u7adf\u53ea\u6709\u5c11\u6570\u624d\u80fd\u6307\u6570\u578b\u589e\u957f\uff0c\u627e\u5230\u8fd9\u4e9b\u9879\u76ee\u3001\u4e0b\u91cd\u6ce8\uff0c\u624d\u80fd\u83b7\u5f97\u6781\u5927\u7684\u6536\u76ca\u3002\u8fd9\u624d\u662fVC\u7684\u771f\u8c1b\u3002\u76f8\u6bd4\u4e8eA16Z\u597d\u4e0d\u5bb9\u6613\u6295\u8d44\u4e86Instagram\uff0c\u4ec5\u6295\u4e8625w\uff0c\u867d\u7136\u6536\u76ca\u8fbe300x\uff0c\u4f4619\u4e2a\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u9879\u76ee\u624d\u80fd\u56de\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u672c\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u628a\u673a\u4f1a\u6d6a\u8d39\u4e86\u3002\u76f8\u53cd2007\u5e74Founders Fund\u9047\u5230Facebook\u7684\u8ddf\u6295\u673a\u4f1a\u65f6\uff0cNosek\u9009\u62e9\u4e86ALL IN\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n In April 2005, Livingston, Graham, and the two Viaweb co-founders convened in a former candy factory that Graham had recently purchased. Coming on the heels of Masayoshi Son\u2019s growth checks, the spread of Bechtolsheim-type angels, and Peter Thiel\u2019s hands-off investing<\/strong>, Y Combinator represented yet another challenge to traditional venture capital. Having diagnosed the shortcomings of the venture incumbents, Graham was offering micro-investments<\/strong> on the theory that large checks were toxic for fledgling software startups. He had come up with the batch-processing idea and had invented a folksy, unsatanic way of turning hackers into founders. The way Graham saw things, his new investment formula was fundamentally different from conventional VC. He was not just meeting entrepreneurs and piggybacking on their talent. He was recruiting teenage coders and creating entrepreneurship.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n YC\u6279\u91cf\u521b\u9020\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Graham described this alchemy in programming lingo: it was a hack on the world economy<\/strong>. Like a hacker who sees an inspired shortcut in a stretch of code, he had studied human society and realized that with a modest tweak it could be made to run more efficiently. \u201cThere are thousands of smart people who could start companies and don\u2019t, and with a relatively small amount of force applied at just the right place, we can spring on the world a stream of new startups<\/strong>,\u201d he wrote in 2006, a year after Y Combinator\u2019s founding. A new stream of startups would be desirable not just because they would create extra wealth, but because they would signal a fuller freedom for young hackers<\/strong>. \u201cWhen I graduated from college in 1986, there were essentially two options: get a job or go to grad school. Now there\u2019s a third: start your own company<\/strong>,\u201d Graham wrote. \u201cThat kind of change, from two paths to three, is the sort of big social shift<\/strong> that only happens once every few generations. It\u2019s hard to predict how big a deal it will be. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In sum, Y Combinator\u2019s example and the wider youth revolt<\/strong> signaled a new phase for venture capital. An industry that had initially consisted of generalist investors, and that later featured Accel-style specialists, was now dividing into seed investors, early-stage investors, and growth investors<\/strong>. Meanwhile, the capitalists were learning to defer to the founders<\/strong>; VC became less about Valentine-Perkins hands-on investing and more about Rock-style liberation<\/strong>. But there was a limit to the new ideas. Peter Thiel\u2019s power-law-driven theories could be pushed too far. From Genentech to Cisco and onward, there had been plenty of cases in which hands-on venture capital had fueled the success of portfolio companies. Likewise, Paul Graham\u2019s critique of overbearing, big-check venture capitalists was justified when he was talking about investments in small software concerns<\/strong>, which were simple to manage and required little capital. But companies that grew larger would still need guidance and money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n YC\u4e3b\u8981\u8fd8\u662f\u53d1\u73b0\u4e86\u8f6f\u4ef6\u521b\u4e1a\u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u592a\u591a\u94b1\u7684\u65b0\u673a\u4f1a\uff0c\u4f46\u4f9d\u7136\u6709\u9700\u8981\u66f4\u591a\u94b1\u7684\u9879\u76ee\u3002\u5b9e\u9645\u60c5\u51b5\u5c31\u662f\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u7684\u7ade\u4e89\u66f4\u6fc0\u70c8\u4e86\uff0c\u5f00\u59cb\u5206\u9636\u6bb5\u3001\u5206\u7b56\u7565\uff0c\u800c\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u975e\u5e38\u7a00\u7f3a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kuang had since returned to his native China and run an investment fund for Intel, and now he agreed to join Rieschel in launching a new China-focused venture firm, which they called Qiming.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u542f\u660e\u662f\u7b2c\u4e00\u5bb6\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since the 1980s, when Silicon Valley had eclipsed its rivals in Japan and Boston, there had been countless attempts to imitate it, most of them sponsored by local or national governments. By the late 1990s, the United States alone featured Silicon Desert <\/strong>(Phoenix), Silicon Alley<\/strong> (New York), Silicon Hills<\/strong> (Austin), and Silicon Forest<\/strong> (in both Seattle and Portland, Oregon). Israel, Taiwan, India<\/strong>, and Britain <\/strong>launched similar efforts, and Egypt<\/strong> boasted the Pyramid Technology Park. But even the most successful silicon wannabes came nowhere near to rivaling the original. Thanks to a tradition of engineering excellence and clever government support for venture funds, Israel became the standout innovation center outside the United States, with breakthroughs ranging from instant messaging to car-navigation software. But because of the small size of Israel\u2019s economy, the country\u2019s startup cluster was more of an adjunct to Silicon Valley than a competitor<\/strong>. When their inventions showed promise, Israeli entrepreneurs\u2019 first move was to seek U.S. venture backing and to target the U.S. market. In the process, many shifted their business headquarters to the West Coast. Far from challenging the Valley\u2019s dominance, they reinforced it.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u7845\u8c37\u7684\u6210\u529f\u4e0d\u53ef\u590d\u5236\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u610f\u5916\u6709\u4e86\u6536\u83b7\u3002\u5149\u653f\u5e9c\u652f\u6301\u662f\u6ca1\u7528\u7684\uff0c\u5fc5\u987b\u4ea7\u4e1a\u8ddf\u4e0a\u624d\u884c\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Except, in a way, they could be. For, as Rieschel\u2019s presence hinted, China\u2019s technology boom was forged to a remarkable extent by American investors, and the Chinese VCs who emerged alongside them were themselves quasi-American\u2014in their education, professional formation, and approach to venture capital. They had studied at top U.S. colleges, worked at U.S. companies, and carefully absorbed the U.S. venture playbook: equity-only funds, stage-by-stage financing<\/strong>, sleeves-rolled-up involvement<\/strong>, and stock options for startup employees<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Because of the might of China\u2019s Communist Party, both Chinese and foreign observers tend to ascribe the nation\u2019s technology success to the country\u2019s supposedly farseeing political leaders. But the truth is more surprising. Far from vindicating the industrial strategy of the Communist Party, China\u2019s tech success was a triumph for the financial model created by Arthur Rock<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u4e2d\u56fd\u79d1\u6280\u516c\u53f8\u7684\u53d1\u5c55\u662fRock Hands-on\u6a21\u5f0f\u7684\u80dc\u5229\uff1a\u80a1\u6743\u57fa\u91d1\u3001\u9636\u6bb5\u6027\u6295\u8d44\u3001\u4eb2\u81ea\u4e0b\u573a\u5e72\u6d3b\u3001\u80a1\u7968\u671f\u6743\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ma\u2019s tone softened. He suggested a compromise: fifty-fifty ownership. Eventually, the two settled on the even split, a rough echo of the terms that Arthur Rock offered founders in the 1960s. Goldman would pay $5 million for its half of the company, which Ma called Alibaba. After all the sparring about ownership, the size of Goldman\u2019s check was oddly uncontentious. \u201cI pulled out a random number,\u201d Lin said later.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rather like Venrock, which landed the Series A deal with the pungent Steve Jobs and then gave away a chunk of the equity to Arthur Rock, Goldman duly gave up 17 percent of Alibaba, parceling it out among four other investment companies. Fifteen years later, Goldman could see what it had given up. Alibaba staged a triumphant IPO. That $1.7 million stake would have been worth an astonishing $4.5 billion.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Lin proposed that SoftBank invest $20 million in Alibaba in exchange for a fifth of the company. The implied valuation of $100 million was ten times what Lin and her co-investors had paid three months earlier. Just as he had done with Yahoo, half a decade before, Son said yes immediately, without hesitating.\u201cHe just accepted the number I said,\u201d Lin marveled later. \u201cI was thinking, \u2018He is crazy!\u2019 It was like when somebody says yes to you in the most improbable way. You feel that total excitement.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u963f\u91cc\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u662f\u56fd\u5185\u8bf4\u8d77\u6765\u5f88\u4f20\u5947\uff0c\u4f46\u7ad9\u5728\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u4fa7\uff0c\u5374\u5f88\u550f\u5618\u3002GS\u7684\u6797\u590f\u5982\u5f53\u5e74\u575a\u630160%\u7684\u80a1\u4efd\u88ab\u9a6c\u4e91\u8c08\u5230\u4e8650%\/500w\u5200\uff0c\u575a\u6301\u4e0b\u6765\u5c31\u6ca1\u6709\u5b59\u6b63\u4e49\u7684\u4e8b\u60c5\u4e86\u30021000w\u7684\u4f30\u503c\u878d\u8d44\u540e3\u4e2a\u6708\uff0c\u5c31\u6562\u53bb\u627e\u5b59\u6b63\u4e49\u63091\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u878d2000w\uff0c10x\u7684\u4f30\u503c\u589e\u957f\uff0c\u60ca\u8bb6\u7684\u662f\u5b59\u90fd\u6ca1\u5e26\u8fd8\u4ef7\u7684\uff01\u771f\u6b63\u7684\u9ad8\u624b\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n8 Google, Conway<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
9 Paypal Peter Thiel & YC <\/h2>\n\n\n\n
10 China <\/h2>\n\n\n\n