There is a saying in our business, \u2018If you are treated like an analyst, you are going to act like an analyst,\u2019\u201d Efrusy explained later. An analyst could point out the arguments on both sides of an issue<\/strong>, but that was different from taking a stand<\/strong>, and this difference defined the psychological gulf between being a venture capitalist and not being one. In the end, venture investing came down to that scary jump from messy information to a binary yes-or-no call<\/strong>. It came down to living with the reality that you would frequently be wrong. It was about showing up at the next partners\u2019 meeting, rising above your wounded pride, and mustering the optimism to make fresh bets on a bewildering future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5206\u6790\u5e08\u548c\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u7684\u533a\u522b\uff0c\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u662f\u8981\u5206\u6790\u5b8c\u6709\u7ed3\u8bba\u7684\uff1aYES or NO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the serious reason for the meeting was that Accel had closed only four deals so far that year<\/strong>, fewer than most of its rivals. A series of slides listed sixty-two software or internet investments<\/strong> done by other top firms; next to some there were notes saying, \u201cAware\u2014lost?\u201d or \u201cAware\u2014didn\u2019t evaluate,\u201d signifying that Accel had failed to invest despite knowing of the opportunity. The slides also noted the particular promise of a new kind of online business. If Internet 1.0 had been about selling stuff (Amazon, eBay), Internet 2.0 was about using the web as a communications medium<\/strong>. \u201c\u20182.0\u2019 frenzy around social networking; Accel may have missed the boat<\/strong>,\u201d one slide read. Having recognized Internet 2.0 as a hot field, the partnership\u2019s leaders encouraged Efrusy and other junior members of the team to go after it. The way Accel\u2019s founders saw things, there was a link between deliberately choosing a promising investment space, thereby reducing risk, and empowering the novices, thereby embracing risk<\/strong>. \u201cIt is a lot easier to turn young investors loose if you know they are working fertile ground,\u201d Jim Swartz said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accel\u7684\u4f4e\u6f6e\u671f\uff0c2004\u5e74\u4ec5\u6295\u4e864\u4e2a\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u9519\u8fc7\u4e8662\u4e2a\uff0c\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e2a\u62ce\u51fa\u6765\u5206\u6790\uff0c\u53d1\u73b0web2.0\u7684\u673a\u4f1a\u53ef\u80fd\u8d76\u4e0d\u4e0a\u4e86\uff0c\u9f13\u52b1\u5e74\u8f7b\u4eba\u91cd\u70b9\u627e\u91cc\u9762\u7684\u673a\u4f1a\u3002\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u4eec\u4e5f\u80fd\u770b\u5230\u7ed9\u5e74\u8f7b\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u8d4b\u80fd\u62e5\u62b1\u98ce\u9669\u548c\u9009\u62e9\u4e00\u4e2a\u6709\u524d\u666f\u7684\u9886\u57df\u9010\u6b65\u964d\u4f4e\u98ce\u9669\u7684\u8fde\u63a5\uff0c\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u4e00\u4ef6\u4e8b\uff1a\u9009\u597d\u65b9\u5411\u3001\u627e\u5230\u597d\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u8d4b\u80fd\u3001\u62e5\u62b1\u4f46\u662f\u6301\u7eed\u964d\u4f4e\u98ce\u9669\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u7b56\u7565\u6bd4\u8f83\u4e3b\u6d41\uff0c\u4e5f\u7b97\u662fHands off\u7684\u98ce\u683c\u4e86\uff0c\u4f46\u8fd8\u662f\u5ef6\u7eed\u4e86prepared mind\u7684\u884c\u4e1a\u601d\u8def\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n As Skype\u2019s value soared, the Accel partners recognized the magnitude of their error. In venture, backing a project that goes to zero costs you one times your money. Missing a project that returns 100x is massively more painful.<\/strong> \u201cThere were some colleagues who said we should have locked the Skype guys in a room and not let them out until they signed,\u201d Golden remembered, perhaps with Efrusy in mind. \u201cThere was a lot of frustration within the partnership.\u201dBut the good news was that Accel\u2019s distinctive culture<\/strong> gave it a way of processing its miss. It could build on the prepared-mind exercise<\/strong> begun in Sausalito.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a world of power-law returns, the costs of missing out were higher by far than the risk of losing one times your money<\/strong>. As one of the keenest proponents of the Skype deal, Efrusy could see that the partnership\u2019s mindset had evolved. Accel would not be weirded out by the next Skype-type opportunity. \u201cWhen I first arrived at Accel, I thought prepared mind was bullshit,\u201d Efrusy recalled later. \u201cIt isn\u2019t.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u9519\u8fc7\u673a\u4f1a\u7684\u6210\u672c\u662f\u5de8\u5927\u7684\uff0c\u4e5f\u662f\u6781\u5176\u75db\u82e6\u7684\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u5e42\u5f8b\u5b9a\u5f8b\u3002\u6295\u9519\u4e00\u4e2a\u4ec5\u4ec5\u662f\u4e8f\u4e86\u672c\u91d1\uff0c\u4f46\u9519\u8fc7\u4e00\u4e2a\uff0c\u81f3\u5c11\u662f\u9519\u8fc7\u4e00\u652f\u57fa\u91d1\uff0c\u8fd8\u53ef\u80fd\u662f\u9519\u8fc7\u4eba\u751f\u7684\u524d\u666f\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u89c2\u70b9\u8ba9\u6211\u5f00\u59cb\u53cd\u601d\u8fc7\u53bb\u7684\u770b\u6cd5\uff0c\u8fd9\u5176\u5b9e\u5c31\u662f\u8fd9\u4e2a\u884c\u4e1a\u7684\u6e38\u620f\u89c4\u5219\uff0c\u4e00\u81f4\u4fdd\u5b88\uff0c\u53ef\u80fd\u4e0d\u4f1a\u51fa\u5c40\uff0c\u4e0d\u4f1a\u6709\u5927\u8f93\uff0c\u4f46\u4e5f\u4e00\u5b9a\u4e0d\u4f1a\u6709\u51fa\u8def\u3002<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Efrusy pulled all the standard tricks<\/strong> to get around this obstacle. Through a friend who had interviewed <\/strong>for a job with Thefacebook, he got an appointment to talk by phone with Parker. Then Parker canceled on him. Next, Efrusy discovered that another friend, Matt Cohler, had recently begun working for Parker<\/strong>. He called and asked for a second introduction. Sorry, Cohler said. Parker wasn\u2019t interested. In early 2005, Efrusy heard from a colleague that Thefacebook had begun talking to other investors. He took a deep breath and emailed his contacts again<\/strong>. When nobody answered, Efrusy resorted to that old technology: the phone<\/strong>. Parker refused to return his voice messages. Efrusy now opened up a third channel. He learned that Reid Hoffman, the founder of LinkedIn, had invested in Thefacebook. An Accel partner named Peter Fenton was close to Hoffman. Efrusy asked Fenton to help him<\/strong>. Fenton called Hoffman and hit the same wall: Thefacebook wasn\u2019t open to a meeting. This time, however, the rejection was paired with a reason<\/strong>. As Hoffman explained it, Parker and Zuckerberg believed that venture capitalists would never understand their firm. They would not pay fair value for it. Hoffman also mentioned that Thefacebook had an offer at a high valuation from a corporate investor. \u201cYou\u2019re not going to pay as much. This isn\u2019t worth your time,\u201d he said, as though not meeting Thefacebook might be in Accel\u2019s best interest. Fenton relayed the message to Efrusy. \u201cIt is worth my time!\u201d Efrusy insisted. \u201cI don\u2019t value my time as much as you value yours.\u201d Fenton called Hoffman again<\/strong>. \u201cIt\u2019s worth our time,\u201d he told him.Having given a reason for the rejection, Hoffman felt obliged to help when that reason was invalidated. If Accel promised to take Thefacebook seriously\u2014if it promised not to make an insulting lowball offer\u2014then Hoffman would arrange a meeting with Parker. Even after this, no meeting transpired<\/strong>. Hoffman did his best. But Parker was in hiding. On April Fools\u2019 Day 2005, Efrusy grew tired of waiting. Emails had not worked. Telephoning had not worked. He had deployed three different intermediaries. There was one last maneuver he could try. He resolved to show up at Thefacebook<\/strong> in person, with or without an appointment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was a Friday afternoon, and Efrusy asked another thirtysomething colleague if he would accompany him. A visit from two Accel investors would make a stronger impression than a visit from one. And if Efrusy was going to sell the deal to his colleagues, he could always use an ally. Efrusy\u2019s young colleague was busy. But, in a testament to Accel\u2019s collaborative culture<\/strong>, Efrusy felt able to rope in the other investor who happened to be in the building: Arthur Patterson, the firm\u2019s co-founder<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u7528\u904d\u4e867\u79cd\u65b9\u5f0f\uff08\u9762\u8bd5\u7684\u670b\u53cb\u3001\u516c\u53f8\u7684\u670b\u53cb\u3001\u90ae\u4ef6\u3001\u7535\u8bdd\u3001\u901a\u8fc7\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\u627eAngel\u5e2e\u5fd92\u6b21\u3001\u76f4\u63a5\u964c\u751f\u62dc\u8bbf\u8fd8\u62c9\u4e0a\u4e86\u57fa\u91d1\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\uff09\u624d\u89c1\u5230\u4e862005\u5e74Facebook\u7684\u5e74\u8f7bCEO\u4eec\uff0c\u4e00\u5bb6\u8ba1\u5212\u4f30\u503c6000w\u4f30\u503c\u878dA\u8f6e\u7684\u516c\u53f8\u3002\u8fd9\u4e48\u505a\u7684\u524d\u63d0\u9996\u5148\u662f\u5224\u65adFacebook\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u5386\u53f2\u6027\u6295\u8d44\u673a\u4f1a\uff0c\u52a0\u4e0a\u8fd9\u6837\u771f\u6b63\u4e0d\u61c8\u7684\u52aa\u529b\uff0c\u597d\u8fd0\u6c14\u662f\u5fc5\u7136\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Knowing the founders\u2019 impatience with questions from VCs, Efrusy avoided asking any. \u201cI get how valuable this could be,\u201d he assured Parker and Zuckerberg, preempting what he knew to be their doubt. \u201cCome to our partnership meeting on Monday, and I promise I\u2019ll either give you a term sheet by the end of the day Monday, or you\u2019ll never hear from me again. Thefacebook confronted no trade-off between expanding user numbers and diminishing user engagement. When the meeting was done, Accel\u2019s verdict was unanimous. Nobody minded about Zuckerberg\u2019s mute style. Nobody brought up the alarming sexual imagery at the Facebook office. Nor did anybody worry about the fact that Sequoia\u2019s leaders, Michael Moritz and Doug Leone, had warned Accel to be wary of Parker. The only thing that mattered was the exploding popularity of the product<\/strong>. The fact that Zuckerberg was too young to buy a beer merely added to his authenticity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accel\u770b\u4f3c\u518d\u4f4e\u4e09\u4e0b\u56db\u7684\u8ffd\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u751a\u81f3\u53d7\u5230\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u7684\u4e0d\u53cb\u597d\u5bf9\u5f85\uff0c\u5927\u5bb6\u90fd\u6e05\u695a\u552f\u4e00\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u662f\u4ea7\u54c1\u7684\u7206\u70b8\u6027\u589e\u957f\uff0c\u4ee5\u53ca\u53ef\u80fd\u5e26\u6765\u7684\u5de8\u989d\u56de\u62a5\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The question was how to get Thefacebook to accept Accel\u2019s capital. The partnership knew it was up against a corporate investor, probably a big media firm, and Parker had revealed the terms that the rival was offering: a pre-money valuation\u2014that is, the value without counting the new capital going in\u2014of $60 million. After some deliberation, Accel sent Thefacebook a term sheet valuing it at the same $60 million<\/strong> price, but with an offer to inject more money<\/strong> than the other bidder. That night, Cohler sent an email back: thank you but no thank you<\/strong>. Evidently, the rival bid was real.<\/strong> By now, Accel\u2019s well-connected managing partner, Jim Breyer, had figured out that it was almost certainly from the Washington Post<\/strong> Company. The next day the Accel team regrouped to consider how much to increase its offer<\/strong>. That afternoon, Efrusy and two colleagues marched down University Avenue, catching Thefacebook gang midway through a meeting<\/strong>. He slapped down a new offer. Accel was now valuing Thefacebook at fully $70 million <\/strong>before any new capital went in. It proposed to invest $10 million in the firm, taking the post-money valuation to $80 million.For once, Parker was impressed. \u201cOkay, this is worth considering,\u201d<\/strong> he conceded. Graham was not prepared to get into a bidding war. His friend and mentor Warren Buffett had schooled him in the discipline of value investing<\/strong>, and he regarded Silicon Valley\u2019s power-law mentality with suspicion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n For the venture-capital industry, the Facebook deal showed how a traditional partnership could navigate the youth revolt<\/strong>. It could gather intelligence<\/strong> from a Stanford grad student. It could train and empower an investor<\/strong> in his early thirties. It could deploy the worldliness and connections<\/strong> of the forty-something managing partner. It could even draw on the investment judgment<\/strong> of its sixty-year-old founder. When Facebook went public in 2012, Accel reaped an astonishing profit of more than $12 billion<\/strong>. For shrugging off the slings and arrows of arrogant youth, the partnership had been amply rewarded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5373\u4fbf\u548cParker\u63a5\u89e6\u4e0a\u4e86\uff0c\u516c\u53f8\u4e5f\u8fbe\u6210\u4e00\u81f4\uff0c\u4f46\u5982\u4f55\u6295\u8fdb\u53bb\u8fd8\u662f\u4e0d\u5bb9\u6613\u7684\u3002\u7279\u522b\u662f\u5df2\u7ecf\u6709\u4e86\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u7684\u60c5\u51b5\u4e0b\uff0cAccel\u5148\u7ed9\u4e86\u4e00\u6837\u4f30\u503c\u7684offer\uff0c\u6536\u5230\u4e0d\u591f\u70ed\u60c5\u7684\u56de\u590d\u540e\u80fd\u770b\u51fa\u6765\u7ade\u4e89\u5bf9\u624b\uff0c\u4e0b\u73ed\u8def\u4e0a\u628a\u4eba\u622a\u4f4f\u7ed9\u4e86\u66f4\u9ad8\u7684offer\uff0c\u94b1\u4e5f\u66f4\u591a\uff0c\u53d8\u5f97\u6709\u5438\u5f15\u529b\u4e86\u3002\u5bf9\u624b\u6ca1\u52a0\u4ef7\uff0cAccel\u624d\u987a\u5229\u62ff\u4e0b\u3002\u8fd9\u5176\u4e2d\u4f5c\u8005\u603b\u7ed3\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u673a\u6784\u5982\u4f55\u8ba920\u591a\u5c81\u7684\u5b9e\u4e60\u751f\u5e2e\u5fd9\u641c\u96c6\u5230\u4fe1\u606f\u3001\u53d1\u73b0\u673a\u4f1a\uff0c\u8ba930\u5de6\u53f3\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u7ecf\u7406\u5386\u7ec3\u597d\uff0c\u8ba940\u5de6\u53f3\u7684\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\u7528\u4e0a\u5168\u7403\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u6765\u5e2e\u5fd9\uff0c\u6700\u540e\u8ba960\u5de6\u53f3\u57fa\u91d1\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u5f62\u6210\u6295\u8d44\u5224\u65ad\uff0c\u8fd9\u662f\u4e2a\u975e\u5e38\u597d\u7684\u914d\u5408\uff0c\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u673a\u6784\u4e5f\u582a\u79f0\u901a\u529b\u534f\u4f5c\u7684\u5178\u8303\u4e86\uff0c\u503c\u5f97\u6211\u4eec\u5b66\u4e60\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n By around 2015, after a series of mediocre funds, Kleiner had disappeared from the top table.Kleiner\u2019s descent was especially striking because of the path dependency <\/strong>in venture performance. VCs who back winning startups acquire a reputation for success<\/strong>, which in turn gives them the first shot at the next cohort of potential winners. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Kleiner\u2019s fall from grace is commonly ascribed to a spectacularly bad investment call<\/strong>. Starting in 2004, the firm pursued so-called cleantech startups\u2014bets on technologies<\/strong> that help fight climate change, from solar power to biofuels to electric vehicles. In 2008, Kleiner doubled down, devoting a new $1 billion<\/strong> growth fund exclusively to this sector. The commitment reflected a mixture of idealism and wishful thinking. John Doerr, Kleiner\u2019s dominant partner, was unabashedly emotional in his public promises to help save the planet. He liked to quote Mary, his teenage daughter: \u201cDad, your generation created this problem; you\u2019d better fix it.\u201d At the same time, Doerr insisted on the financial case for going green, reminding audiences that energy was a $6 trillion business.\u201cWell, I\u2019ll tell you what. Green technologies\u2014going green\u2014is bigger than the Internet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n KPCB\u7684\u8870\u843d\u662f\u5176\u8def\u5f84\u4f9d\u8d56\u7684\u7ed3\u679c\u30022004\u5e74\u57fa\u91d1\u5f00\u59cb\u5f80\u6e05\u6d01\u79d1\u6280\u65b9\u5411\u6295\u8d44\uff0c2008\u5e74\u7ee7\u7eed\u53cc\u500d\u4e0b\u6ce8\u3002\u4f46\u8fd9\u4e2a\u9886\u57df\u7684\u53d1\u5c55\u6ca1\u90a3\u4e48\u5feb\uff0c\u5bfc\u81f4\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e00\u5207\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Kleiner\u2019s limited partners, the upshot was painful. The first wave of green investments did particularly poorly, and the venture funds raised in 2004, 2006, and 2008 suffered accordingly. A dozen years after investing in the 2006 fund, one limited partner complained that he had lost almost half his capital.<\/strong> Kleiner\u2019s second cleantech wave, starting with the green growth fund raised in 2008, did better. The partnership homed in on businesses that did have a moat, and produced a few dramatic hits: as of 2021, the plant-based meat company Beyond Meat had generated 107x,<\/strong> the battery maker QuantumScape had made 65x, and the \u201csmart solar\u201d company Enphase had produced 25x. This was enough to generate at least one venture fund that ranked in the industry\u2019s top quartile. But Kleiner\u2019s overall performance remained dull.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u51e0\u671f\u57fa\u91d1\u8868\u73b0\u90fd\u4e0d\u597d\uff0c06\u5e74\u7684\u57fa\u91d1\u4e8f\u4e86\u8fd1\u534a\uff0c08\u5e74\u7684\u57fa\u91d1\u597d\u5f88\u591a\uff0c\u4e5f\u6295\u51fa\u4e86\u4e0d\u5c11\u597d\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u4f46\u6574\u4f53\u4e00\u822c\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n As Accel\u2019s Facebook deal suggested, and as many other case studies confirm, venture capital is a team sport<\/strong>: it often takes multiple partners to land a home-run deal, and the investors who lead the chase are not always the same as the stewards who guide the portfolio companies after the deals have been completed. For a venture team to work productively, the culture of the partnership has to be right<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This is what Kleiner Perkins mismanaged spectacularly. In the early years of KPCB, the partnership had appeared lopsided. Tom Perkins was the flamboyant and domineering rainmaker, and he overshadowed the other three named partners. But if you looked under the hood, the other partners did matter<\/strong>\u2014not necessarily because of their investments, but because of their effect on Perkins<\/strong>. When the big man\u2019s ideas were crazy, they talked him down. When his temper threatened to blow up a deal, they knew how to smooth things over.<\/strong> On one such occasion in 1983, Mitch Kapor showed up at the Kleiner office to pitch Lotus Development. For no evident reason, Perkins flew into a fury. \u201cI don\u2019t see why I should waste my time listening to some company that we are obviously not going to invest in,\u201d he barked, storming off to his office. John Doerr, then three years into his career at Kleiner, looked like an inflatable balloon figure that had sprung a leak. He had worked hard with Kapor to prepare the pitch; now the pitch seemed dead before delivery. But at this point in the story, the value of teamwork came into play. Frank Caufield, one of the partnership\u2019s unsung investors, assured Doerr that he would talk sense into Perkins; he knew how to make him laugh and bring him down from his high pedestal. With Doerr sufficiently reflated, the Lotus pitch went ahead, and everyone ignored the brooding figure of Perkins, visible through the glass wall of the conference room. Thanks to Caufield\u2019s intervention, the tantrum did not matter and the deal was done<\/strong>. Perkins\u2019s volatility, which could have cost the partnership millions, had been elegantly managed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, Kleiner Perkins lost this equilibrium<\/strong>. Part of the problem was that the firm grew. Whereas traditional partnerships such as Benchmark still had only half a dozen general partners<\/strong>, Kleiner now had about ten\u2014plus various senior advisers and junior investors. In 2004, Vinod Khosla tired of this unwieldy structure and quit to set up his own shop, leaving Doerr without an intellectual counterweight<\/strong>. That same year, Mackenzie and Compton followed, creating a firm called Radar Partners. Doerr replaced these seasoned colleagues with a string of famous names<\/strong>. In 2000 he had hired Ray Lane, who had driven the success of Oracle. In 2005 he followed up with Bill Joy, a cofounder of Sun Microsystems, and the former secretary of state Colin Powell. In 2007, Doerr rounded out his team by adding the former vice president Al Gore as a sort of adjunct senior partner. The newcomers had no investment experience and were in their fifties or sixties<\/strong>. Kleiner had effectively embraced the opposite of the philosophy at Accel, which believed in recruiting hungry up-and-comers and training them<\/strong>. This change in Kleiner\u2019s culture set the stage for the cleantech fiasco.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n When Doerr decided to bet the franchise on a challenging sector, nobody was there to check him<\/strong>.\u201cIf it\u2019s not 10x different, it\u2019s not different<\/strong>,\u201d went his mantra. If Kleiner had not suffered a brain drain, Compton and Mackenzie would have been on hand to make these arguments. But without the old gang at the table, \u201cJohn became impossible to challenge<\/strong>,\u201d an insider recalled, probably exaggerating only slightly. Tom Perkins\u2019s firm went from being a white-hot-risk eliminator to a Hail Mary risk-taker.<\/p>\n\n\n\n VC\u6295\u8d44\u9700\u8981\u56e2\u961f\u914d\u5408\uff0c\u50cf\u4f53\u80b2\u6d3b\u52a8\u4e00\u6837\u3002Accel\u5efa\u7acb\u4e86\u597d\u7684\u699c\u6837\uff0c\u62db\u52df\u548c\u8bad\u7ec3\u90a3\u4e9b\u6709\u671d\u6c14\u3001\u6025\u8feb\u611f\u7684\u5e74\u8f7b\u4eba\uff0cKPCB\u7684\u95ee\u9898\u4e3b\u8981\u662f\u627e\u4e86\u4e00\u580650-60\u5c81\u7684\u77e5\u540d\u4eba\u58eb\u52a0\u76df\uff0c\u540d\u6c14\u5f88\u5927\uff0c\u4f46\u4e0d\u4f1a\u63d0\u4f9b\u4e0d\u540c\u610f\u89c1\u3002\u8fd9\u5c31\u8ba9\u672c\u6765\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\u5171\u540c\u53c2\u4e0e\u51b3\u7b56\u7684\u673a\u5236\u53d8\u6210\u4e86Doerr\u4e00\u8a00\u5802\uff0c\u8bf4\u4ec0\u4e48\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48\uff0c\u5931\u8d25\u5c31\u4e0d\u8fdc\u4e86\u3002\u8fd9\u4e5f\u662f\u5bf9\u673a\u6784\u8d1f\u8d23\u4eba\u800c\u8a00\u5de8\u5927\u7684\u6559\u8bad\uff0c\u8981\u6253\u9020\u4e00\u652f\u80fd\u597d\u597d\u914d\u5408\u597d\u7684\u56e2\u961f\u3001\u80fd\u4e92\u76f8\u53d6\u957f\u8865\u77ed\u7684\u56e2\u961f\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Milner continued, Facebook lagged foreign social-media sites in converting users into revenues.<\/strong> By virtue of being in Silicon Valley, Zuckerberg had found it easy to raise money from investors, so he had faced limited pressure to squeeze money out of customers. In contrast, foreign social-media businesses had been forced to maximize revenue from the get-go<\/strong>. Again, the multi-country spreadsheet tabulated this phenomenon, allowing Milner to point out that Facebook was an outlier<\/strong>. In China, most social-media revenues came from selling virtual gifts, an option that Facebook had not even tried. In Russia, VKontakte\u2019s revenues per user were fully five times Facebook\u2019s<\/strong>. International experience demonstrated that Zuckerberg had enormous room to monetize mindshare<\/strong>. Thanks to his global perspective<\/strong>, the Russian who had never set foot in the Valley understood Facebook better than the Palo Alto mafia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Andreessen knew otherwise. Milner was neither crazy nor dumb, nor was he even impetuous in the way that Masayoshi Son was. To the contrary, what distinguished Milner was his data-driven approach<\/strong>. He had meticulously compiled the key metrics on the world\u2019s social-media firms, and his revenue projections told him that a $10 billion valuation was reasonable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yuri\u6562\u4e8e2007\u5e74\u6309100\u4ebf\u4f30\u503c\u6295\u8d442\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u5230Facebook\uff0c\u4e0d\u662f\u83bd\u649e\uff0c\u80cc\u540e\u662f\u7f1c\u5bc6\u7684\u5206\u6790\u3002\u5168\u7403\u7684\u793e\u4ea4\u7f51\u7ad9\u7684\u53d8\u73b0\u90fd\u4e0d\u9519\uff0c\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u7684\u516c\u53f8\u53d8\u73b0\u80fd\u529b\u662fFacebook\u76845\u500d\u4ee5\u4e0a\uff0cFB\u6ca1\u505a\u6536\u5165\u662f\u56e0\u4e3a\u878d\u8d44\u592a\u5bb9\u6613\u4e86\uff0c\u5c31\u6ca1\u6709\u538b\u529b\uff0c\u4f46\u4e0d\u662f\u6ca1\u6709\u6f5c\u529b\uff0c\u76f8\u53cd\u6f5c\u529b\u5de8\u5927\uff0c\u4e5f\u662f\u5de8\u5927\u7684\u673a\u4f1a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the next weeks, Milner sweetened his bid with two innovations<\/strong>. He knew that Zuckerberg jealously protected his control over Facebook, recently spurning an advance from an investor who had demanded two board votes. So he declared he would not take a board seat<\/strong>\u2014not even one\u2014and Zuckerberg would get the right to vote<\/strong> Milner\u2019s shares as he wanted. In one stroke, the entrepreneur\u2019s chief qualm about raising money was erased. Rather than diluting the founder\u2019s control over his company, a capital injection from Milner would concentrate it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Milner promised to fix this problem. He would happily buy employee stock<\/strong> in addition to shares freshly issued by the company. What\u2019s more, he proposed a clever twist: he would pay one price for the company-issued (or \u201cprimary\u201d) stock and a different, lower price for the secondary stock sold by Facebook workers. Up to a point, it was obvious that the primary stock should be worth more: it was \u201cpreferred,\u201d meaning that it came with some protections against losses. But Milner used the two-tier pricing to add a secret weapon to his negotiating arsenal. He could offer Zuckerberg a satisfying valuation for Facebook\u2019s primary stock while holding down the cost of acquisition<\/strong> by lowballing his offer to employees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yuri\u5728FB\u9879\u76ee\u4e0a\u7ed9\u4e86Zuck\u4e24\u4e2a\u65e0\u6cd5\u62d2\u7edd\u7684\u7406\u7531\uff1a\u4e0d\u8981\u8463\u4e8b\u4f1a\u5e2d\u4f4d\u3001\u6295\u7968\u6743\u53ef\u4ee5\u59d4\u6258\u7ed9CEO\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u51e0\u4e4e\u4ece\u6765\u6ca1\u6709\u8fc7\u3002\u5c31\u8fde\u516c\u53f8\u7684\u671f\u6743\u538b\u529b\u4ed6\u4e5f\u5e2e\u5fd9\u89e3\u51b3\uff0c\u6295\u8d44\u66f4\u591a\u4e70\u8fdb\u6765\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e0d\u662f\u9ebb\u70e6\uff0c\u662f\u597d\u4e8b\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Needless to say, Milner reaped a bonanza. Facebook\u2019s audience and revenues exploded, just as he had predicted<\/strong>. Eighteen months later, in late 2010, the company was valued at $50 billion. DST was sitting on a profit of more than $1.5 billion, and Facebook continued to head skyward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Silicon Valley, it was a watershed<\/strong>. Thirteen years earlier, Masayoshi Son had shocked the traditional venture shops by foisting $100 million on Yahoo. In contrast, Milner had initially bought more than $300 million worth of Facebook. In the 1970s, hands-on venture investors had invented the idea of building governance around a startup founder<\/strong>. Now Milner was inverting the model. <\/strong>He was protecting founders from governance<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yuri\u51c6\u786e\u9884\u6d4b\u4e86FB\u7684\u6210\u957f\uff0c18\u4e2a\u6708\u4e4b\u540e\u4f30\u503c\u5c31\u7ffb\u4e865\u500d\u5230500\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u4e86\uff0c\u6d6e\u76c815\u4ebf\u3002\u8fd9\u662f\u7845\u8c37\u751f\u610f\u7684\u53e6\u4e00\u4e2a\u5206\u6c34\u5cad\u3002\u4e0d\u540c\u4e8e70\u5e74\u4ee3\u7684VC\u53d1\u660e\u7684\u4e00\u4e9b\u5217\u7ba1\u7406\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u7684\u65b9\u6cd5\uff0cYuri\u53cd\u8fc7\u6765\u5e2e\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u89c4\u907f\u8fd9\u4e9b\u7ba1\u6cbb\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Shleifer homed in on the part of his friend\u2019s spreadsheet listing the Chinese web portals that had gone public just before the bubble burst: Sina, Sohu, and NetEase. All three had taken off<\/strong> with the help of venture capitalists like Shirley Lin and Kathy Xu, who had bet on the character of the founders<\/strong> and the potential of their markets<\/strong>. But now Shleifer would apply a different kind of investment skill. The three portals had matured to the point <\/strong>where they had customers, revenues, and costs. An analyst with twelve hundred hours of training at Blackstone could model their fair value<\/strong>. Shleifer began by applying a technique that was standard at Blackstone but foreign to most Valley investors. Rather than looking at profit margins, he looked at incremental margins<\/strong>, meaning the share of revenue growth that falls to the bottom line as profits. Any amateur could see that the three Chinese portals all had negative margins; put simply, they were losing money. But a pro would know to focus on the incremental picture, and this looked spectacularly positive<\/strong>. As revenues grew, costs grew much less, so most of the additional income showed up as profits<\/strong>. It followed that growth would soon drive the three portals into the black. By thinking incrementally, Shleifer could see into the future.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Tiger\u7684Growth Equity\u4e1a\u52a1\u8d77\u70b9\u5c31\u662f\u8fd9\u6837\u4e00\u4e2a\u5206\u6790\u5e08\u7684\u8e0f\u5b9e\u5de5\u4f5c\uff0c\u7528\u5bf9\u51b2\u57fa\u91d1\u7684\u5206\u6790\u65b9\u6cd5\u770b\u521a\u4e0a\u5e02\u7684\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u516c\u53f8\uff0c\u4e0d\u50cf\u4e1a\u4f59\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u76f4\u63a5\u770b\u5230\u7684\u4e8f\u635f\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u4e13\u4e1a\u5730\u770b\u5230\u6bdb\u5229\u9010\u6e10\u597d\u8f6c\u7684\u8d8b\u52bf\uff0c\u770b\u5230\u6295\u8d44\u4ef7\u503c\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Feeling his excitement build, Shleifer took his notes from the phone calls <\/strong>and fed them into his earnings model. For now, of course, the portals were losing money. But because revenues were growing much faster than costs, profits in 2003 were set to surge: they would come in at around one-third of the companies\u2019 market capitalization. In 2004, Shleifer calculated, the profits might equal two-thirds of market cap, and for 2005 he penciled in a one-for-one ratio<\/strong>. Said differently, an investor could buy these portals almost for free. If Tiger Global put in, say, $10 million, it would acquire a claim on $3.3 million of profits the first year and $6.7 million the second year, so it would have earned its cost of acquisition back. In the third year it would have a claim on another $10 million in earnings, with the out-years promising exponential bonanzas. After staying up all night, Shleifer walked into Coleman\u2019s office. \u201cOkay, Sina, Sohu, and NetEase,\u201d he announced. \u201cLet\u2019s dance,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During September and October 2002, Tiger Global duly bought $20 million worth of Sina, Sohu, and NetEase, committing a bit under a tenth of the fund\u2019s $250 million portfolio. A tiny team of New Yorkers became the largest public shareholder in China\u2019s digital economy. By the summer of 2003, Tiger Global\u2019s China positions were up between 5x and 10x.[20] In less than a year, a $250 million hedge fund had become a $350 million one. Coleman elevated Shleifer to partner <\/strong>and moved him from his cubicle into an office. Together, the two were advancing down the path that would lead to Yuri Milner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u8d22\u52a1\u5206\u6790\u7684\u7ed3\u679c\u975e\u5e38\u660e\u663e\uff0c\u4f30\u503c\u76f8\u5f53\u4e8e2003\u5e743\u500dP\/E\uff0c2005\u5e741\u500dP\/E\uff0c\u679c\u65ad\u6295\u5165\u4e862000w\uff0c\u4e00\u5e74\u540e\u76842003\u5e74\u6da8\u4e865-10x\uff0c\u8ba9\u57fa\u91d1\u56de\u672c\u4e86\u3002\u5206\u6790\u5e08\u4e5f\u7acb\u5373\u6210\u4e3a\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The more he more he considered Shleifer\u2019s proposed bets, the more Coleman wanted to do them. But he still had to manage the liquidity risk<\/strong>\u2014the danger of holding unsellable positions using capital that could be withdrawn at short notice<\/strong>. In July 2003 he came up with a fix: he would set up a separate pool<\/strong> of capital to make private investments<\/strong>. The analytical techniques of hedge-fund investing<\/strong> would be married to the structure of a venture-style fund<\/strong>, with the limited partners locked in for long periods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Coleman hoped to raise $75 million for Tiger\u2019s new private fund, but he met with resistance. \u201cTwentysomething white guys talking about the really interesting investments they had found in China . . . we sounded completely nuts,\u201d Coleman said later. Everyone had war stories about Americans who went to China and got fleeced. Many were still scarred by the tech bust and leery of dot-com investing. But despite this skeptical reception, Coleman managed to raise $50 million<\/strong>. It was enough to close a few investments. It was not enough to close all five Chinese prospects, however. In a testament to the difference between venture thinking and the hedge-fund mindset<\/strong>, the one that Tiger chose to drop was Alibaba. Shleifer had negotiated a term sheet to buy 6.7 percent of the company for $20 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tiger\u7684\u8001\u677fColeman\u4e5f\u5f88\u5389\u5bb3\uff0c\u770b\u5230\u673a\u4f1a\u7684\u540c\u65f6\u4e5f\u5173\u6ce8\u5230\u4e86\u6d41\u52a8\u6027\u98ce\u9669\uff0c\u5bf9\u51b2\u57fa\u91d1\u662f\u53ef\u4ee5\u968f\u65f6\u8d4e\u56de\u7684\u3002\u4e8e\u662f\u8ba1\u5212\u8bbe\u7acb\u53ef\u4ee5\u6295\u79c1\u52df\u80a1\u6743\u7684\u57fa\u91d1\uff0c\u8ba1\u5212\u52df\u96c67500w\uff0c\u5b9e\u9645\u53ea\u52df\u96c6\u5230\u4e865000w\uff0c\u53ea\u591f\u62955\u4e2a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Shleifer had discussed an investment with Neil Shen, the future Sequoia China boss who was then the finance chief at the online travel company Ctrip. The two had agreed on a valuation, and while Shen said later that the agreement was provisional, Shleifer had mentally banked it<\/strong>. A few weeks after he had left China, Shen called him in New York. SARS had ended, Ctrip\u2019s revenues had jumped, and Shen was now demanding a 50 percent increase in Ctrip\u2019s valuation<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5f53\u5e74\u8001\u6c88\u6446Tiger\u8fd9\u9053\u5f88\u6709\u4ef7\u503c\uff0c\u4e00\u662f\u643a\u7a0b\u591a\u62ff\u4e86\u4e0d\u5c11\u94b1\uff0c\u4e8c\u662f\u540e\u6765\u9047\u5230\u738b\u5174\u7684\u5750\u5730\u8d77\u4ef7\u5c31\u5fc3\u7167\u4e0d\u5ba3\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n But by moving sideways from hedge-fund stock picking into private technology bets, Tiger had created the template for Milner\u2019s later Facebook investment. The Tiger tool kit <\/strong>featured the global tabulation of tech business segments, the modeling of earnings and fair value, and rapid intercontinental opportunism in response to a shock<\/strong>\u2014in Tiger\u2019s case, SARS; in Milner\u2019s case, the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Yet in order for Milner to learn from Tiger\u2019s template, he had to know of its existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the first half of 2004, Tiger duly invested in Mail,<\/strong> Rambler, and Yandex. The following year, even as Shleifer began chasing \u201cthe this of the that\u201d in Latin America, the relationship with Milner deepened<\/strong>. Tiger became the first institutional backer of Milner\u2019s investment vehicle, Digital Sky Technologies<\/strong>. Through Milner, Tiger gained exposure to other Russian internet stocks, including VKontakte, the clone of Facebook. Through Tiger, conversely, Milner\u2019s eyes were opened to the possibility of investing globally. \u201cAll of a sudden this whole world opened to me,\u201d Milner said later. \u201cTiger was an inspiration<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tiger\u662fYuri\u7684\u8001\u5e08\uff0c\u4e5f\u662fDST\u7684\u4e3b\u8981\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\uff0c\u96be\u5f97Yuri\u90a3\u4e48\u731b\uff0c\u8fd8\u662f\u8981\u6709\u9ad8\u4eba\u3002\u540d\u5e08\u51fa\u9ad8\u5f92\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n For his part, Paul Graham of Y Combinator preached that there was nothing much to learn<\/strong>. \u201cBuild something users love, and spend less than you make. How hard is that?\u201d he demanded. But Horowitz was acknowledging that even talented founders would have to suffer through a grueling learning period<\/strong>. The title of his compelling memoir\u2014The Hard Thing About Hard Things\u2014captured the trauma of entrepreneurship. At the same time, Andreessen and Horowitz would supply technical founders<\/strong> with the sort of Rolodex that a seasoned CEO would have\u2014connections to customers, suppliers, investors, and the media<\/strong>. Accel had differentiated itself by specializing in certain fields<\/strong>; Benchmark had pitched its \u201cbetter architecture\u201d of high fees and small funds<\/strong>; Founders Fund had pledged to back the most original and contrarian companies<\/strong>. For their part, Andreessen and Horowitz promised to smooth the learning curve for scientists<\/strong> who wanted to be chief executives.\u201cOur claim to fame is \u2018by entrepreneurs for entrepreneurs,\u2019\u201d he declared confidently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u7845\u8c37\u7684\u5404\u5927\u6d3e\u522b\u5404\u6709\u4e0d\u540c\uff0cYC\u8ba4\u4e3a\u521b\u4e1a\u6ca1\u4ec0\u4e48\u597d\u5b66\u7684\uff0c\u53ef\u4ee5\u96c6\u4e2d\u57f9\u8bad\uff1bA16Z\u8ba4\u4e3a\u6280\u672f\u548c\u79d1\u5b66\u5bb6\u51fa\u8eab\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u53d8\u6210\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u6709\u4e2a\u6bd4\u8f83\u8270\u96be\u7684\u5b66\u4e60\u66f2\u7ebf\uff0c\u4e8e\u662f\u63d0\u4f9b\u5404\u79cd\u652f\u6301\uff0c\u53f7\u79f0\u201c\u4ee5\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u652f\u6301\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u201d\uff1bAccel\u8fd8\u662f\u4e13\u4e1a\u57fa\u91d1\uff0c\u4fdd\u6301\u9886\u57df\u5185\u7684\u7edd\u5bf9\u4e13\u4e1a\u5ea6\uff1bFounders Fund\u8981\u627e\u6700\u539f\u521b\u548c\u7279\u522b\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\uff0cBechmark\u4fdd\u6301\u5c0f\u57fa\u91d1\u6a21\u5f0f\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n In June 2009, the month after Milner closed his Facebook deal, a16z announced it had raised $300 million from investors. To make good on the promise of coaching founders<\/strong>, the partnership promised to recruit a much larger head count than other VC outfits. In the past, other VCs had hired \u201coperating partners\u201d who focused on helping portfolio companies <\/strong>rather than making investments, but Andreessen Horowitz aimed to build an extensive consultancy<\/strong> under its roof. There would be a team to help startups find office space, another to advise on publicity, and yet others to source key recruits or provide introductions to potential customers. Up to a point, this promise of coaching corresponded to the reality. Often, the key interventions came not from the elaborately staffed consulting service but from Andreessen and Horowitz themselves. In the case of a next-generation networking startup called Nicira, for example, Horowitz saved the company from two extremely costly errors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u6295\u540e\u518d\u591a\u518d\u6df1\uff0c\u6700\u6838\u5fc3\u7684\u6295\u540e\u8fd8\u662f\u6765\u81ea\u57fa\u91d1\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Too much of a tough attitude would cause further defections, Horowitz answered. The priority for now was to keep the engineers in place while Okta fixed its real problem: its sales strategy. The startup had been trying to sell its secure dashboard to small companies. But small companies generally don\u2019t care about network security.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u6218\u7565\u7ea0\u504f\uff0c\u4e0d\u8981\u628a\u4ea7\u54c1\u5356\u7ed9\u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u7684\u5ba2\u6237\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Soon after it got going, in September 2009, Andreessen Horowitz plunked down $50 million<\/strong> for a stake in the breakout telephony company Skype, which by now was owned by eBay. The bet amounted to fully one-sixth of a16z\u2019s first fund, yet it had little to do with its promise to coach green technical founders<\/strong>. After all, Skype was already six years old; it had no shortage of sophistication. Instead, the Skype deal had everything to do with Andreessen\u2019s recent exposure to Milner and to his privileged position at the heart of the Valley network. Andreessen\u2019s Skype coup was followed by other Milner-style growth deals.<\/strong> Using the capital in its first fund, a16z also invested alongside DST in the gaming company Zynga and staked $20 million on the mobile app Foursquare. Its second fund, a war chest of $650 million, made a pair of $80 million bets on Facebook and Twitter<\/strong>; a $40 million bet on Groupon; and a pair of $30 million bets on the picture-sharing app Pinterest and the real estate rental platform Airbnb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n VC\u8fd8\u662f\u8981\u7075\u6d3b\uff0c\u5373\u4fbfA16Z\u53cd\u590d\u8bb2\u81ea\u5df1\u600e\u4e48\u5e2e\u52a9\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\uff0c\u6295\u540e\u7684\u610f\u4e49\uff0c\u4f46\u6700\u5927\u7684\u4e00\u7b14\u94b1\u8fd8\u662f\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u7ed9\u4e86Skype\uff0c\u4e00\u5bb6\u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u4ec0\u4e48\u6295\u540e\u7684\u516c\u53f8\uff0c\u53bb\u505a\u4e86\u6210\u957f\u9636\u6bb5\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u3002\u5e76\u4e14\u5728\u6210\u957f\u6027\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u8def\u4e0a\u8d8a\u8d70\u8d8a\u8fdc\uff0c\u6ca1\u6709\u505c\u4e0b\u6765\u7ea0\u504f\u7684\u610f\u601d\uff0c\u5176\u5b9e\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u6700\u597d\u7684\u7b56\u7565\u3002\u65e9\u671f\u548c\u6210\u957f\u671f\u8981\u5e73\u8861\u597d\uff0c\u6838\u5fc3\u8fd8\u662f\u6293\u4f4f\u673a\u4f1a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n For a venture partnership that had advertised itself as an early-stage startup doctor<\/strong>, committing more than a third of a fund\u2019s capital to growth deals <\/strong>was off brand. But this surprising pivot was a testimony to the influence of one man. \u201cWe made a bet that this expansion-stage opportunity had arisen,\u201d Andreessen said later. \u201cA lot of this had to do with Yuri Milner.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n As a16z hired additional investing partners<\/strong>, following its proud rule that all must have an entrepreneurial background,<\/strong> it found that some did not work out: being a founder is not the same as being able to pick which founders to invest in<\/strong>. In 2018, a16z elevated a non-entrepreneur to the rank of general partner for the first time. \u201cIt\u2019s a kind of a big thing for especially me to eat crow on,\u201d Horowitz admitted to Forbes. \u201cIt took probably longer than it should\u2019ve to change it, but we changed it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A16Z\u5728\u6210\u957f\u6027\u6295\u8d44\u4e0a\u8d8a\u8d70\u8d8a\u8fdc\uff0c\u4e5f\u8d8a\u6765\u8d8a\u597d\u4e86\uff0c\u589e\u52a0\u4e86\u65b0\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\uff0c\u4e5f\u4e0d\u518d\u8981\u6c42\u5fc5\u987b\u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u80cc\u666f\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The VC firms that launch with a splash tend to have two things in common. They have a story about their special approach<\/strong>, and they have recognizable partners with strong networks<\/strong>. In a few exceptional instances, the special approach<\/strong> is powerful enough to explain most of the success. Such was the case with Yuri Milner, who arrived in the Valley with no connections and vaulted straight to the top. Such was the case with Tiger Global, which improvised the hedge fund\/venture hybrid model. And such was more or less the case with Y Combinator, whose batch-based seed investing was genuinely novel. But in the large majority of examples, new venture firms succeed because of the founders\u2019 experience and status<\/strong>, not because of the claimed originality of their methods<\/strong>. Academic research confirms what is intuitively obvious: success in venture capital owes much to connections<\/strong>.\u201cSilicon Valley is gripped by the cult of the individual<\/strong>, But those individuals represent the triumph of the network<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u6210\u529f\u7684VC\u673a\u6784\u6709\u4e24\u4e2a\u4e8b\u6bd4\u8f83\u5171\u901a\uff0c\u4e00\u4e2a\u662f\u8bb2\u81ea\u5df1\u7279\u522b\u7684\u5b9a\u4f4d\u6216\u65b9\u6cd5\u8bba\uff0c\u53e6\u4e00\u4e2a\u662f\u9760\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\u80fd\u529b\u548c\u8fde\u63a5\u3002Tiger\u3001Yuri\u3001YC\u53ef\u4ee5\u8bb2\u5b9a\u4f4d\u548c\u7279\u522b\u7684\u65b9\u6cd5\u8bba\uff0c\u4f46\u66f4\u591a\u7684\u662f\u9760\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\u7684\u8fde\u63a5\u80fd\u529b\u3002\u8fd9\u5c31\u662fVC\u7684\u672c\u8d28<\/strong>\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its ownership group featured Bob Kagle, the Benchmark partner who had invested in eBay, and Mark Stevens, a longtime stalwart at Sequoia. Its regular fans included Ben Horowitz and Ron Conway. And this fusing of sports and technology finance operated in two ways: the venture capitalists rooted for the Warriors<\/strong>, and the Warriors became venture capitalists<\/strong>. Kevin Durant, the team\u2019s star forward, assembled a portfolio of some forty startups, ranging from LimeBike to Postmates. Andre Iguodala, the defensive specialist, built a similar empire, while a retired Warrior, David Lee, was recruited by a VC partnership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u4f01\u4e1a\u5bb6\u548cVC\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\u89d2\u8272\u4e4b\u95f4\uff0c\u5f80\u5f80\u662f\u53ef\u4ee5\u7075\u6d3b\u8f6c\u6362\u7684\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The venture partnership that best embodied this boom was Sequoia Capital. Through the 1980s and 1990s, Sequoia and Kleiner had been the top two Valley firms, and in some ways they were similar: partnerships with a focus on networking, software, and the internet<\/strong>, with turbo-power-law rainmakers. <\/strong>Early in the first decade of the twenty-first century, when John Doerr was at the peak of his celebrity and Sequoia was on the wrong side of the youth revolt<\/strong>, Kleiner appeared stronger. But around the middle of the decade, the tables turned, and Kleiner and Sequoia began to look like opposites. Where Kleiner charged into cleantech, Sequoia approached cautiously. Where Kleiner led on recruiting women, Sequoia followed woefully late but then implemented the shift less clumsily. Where Doerr parted with Vinod Khosla and other members of his team, Michael Moritz remained bonded to Doug Leone<\/strong>, who provided the engineering savvy and ability to read people that complemented Moritz\u2019s grand strategy. And where Doerr hired established, fifty-something celebrities, Sequoia had no interest in recruiting comfortable executives who, as Moritz put it, \u201chad been too successful, had lost some spring in their step, were not hungry enough<\/strong>, had too many outside commitments and, most of all, were not prepared to become rookies again.\u201d The contrast in approach generated an astonishing contrast in performance. In 2021, when Kleiner partners had all but disappeared from the Forbes Midas list, Sequoia occupied the number one and number two slots, and three of the top ten, making it by far and away the top firm in the industry. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Sequoia\u548cKPCB\u4e00\u5ea6\u662f\u7845\u8c37\u7684\u53cc\u5b50\u661f\uff0c80\/90\u5e74\u4ee3\u768420\u5e74\u95f4\u6301\u7eed\u5173\u6ce8\u5728\u7f51\u7edc\u3001\u8f6f\u4ef6\u548c\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u4e0a\uff0c\u6295\u51fa\u4e86\u6574\u4e2a\u65f6\u4ee3\uff1b\u4f46\u8fdb\u516521\u4e16\u7eaa\u90fd\u9047\u5230\u4e9b\u95ee\u9898\uff0cSequoia\u88ab\u5e74\u8f7b\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u523b\u610f\u56de\u907f\uff0cKP\u5230\u4e86\u9876\u70b9\uff0c\u770b\u8d77\u6765\u66f4\u5f3a\u4e00\u4e9b\uff1b\u5341\u5e74\u4e4b\u540e\u5c31\u5f7b\u5e95\u53cd\u8f6c\u4e86\uff0cKP\u5168\u529b\u6295\u5165\u5230\u6e05\u6d01\u6280\u672f\uff0cSequoia\u8ddf\u4e86\u4e00\u9635\u5f00\u59cb\u8f6c\u5176\u4ed6\u65b9\u5411\uff0c\u6536\u83b7\u4e86\u65b0\u7684\u65f6\u4ee3\u3002\u7528\u4eba\u4e0a\u4e5f\u7686\u7136\u76f8\u53cd\u8d77\u6765\uff0cDoerr\u548cKhosla\u5206\u624b\uff0cMoritz\u548cLeone\u6301\u7eed\u642d\u6863\uff1bKP\u4e0d\u65ad\u62db50\u5c81\u5de6\u53f3\u7684\u77e5\u540d\u4eba\u58eb\u52a0\u76df\uff0cMoritz\u4fdd\u6301\u62db\u5e74\u8f7b\u4eba\uff0c\u8ba4\u4e3a\u592a\u6210\u529f\u7684\u4eba\u7f3a\u4e4f\u9965\u997f\u611f\uff0c\u6700\u7ec8\u4eca\u5929\u6765\u770b\uff0c\u5df2\u7ecf\u5730\u4f4d\u76f8\u5f53\u4e0d\u540c\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sequoia\u2019s secret sauce began with the union between Moritz and Leone<\/strong>, the most successful buddy <\/strong>act in the history of venture capital. Moritz was strategic, and Leone was operational<\/strong>. Moritz enforced discipline, and Leone enjoyed conversations at the watercooler. Moritz had admired \u201cthe purposeful cadence of a relentless, disciplined march\u201d\u2014the stamina and willpower that patiently built success, one advance upon another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moritz\u548cLeone\u7684\u53cc\u5b50\u661f\u7ec4\u5408\uff0c\u957f\u671f\u7d27\u5bc6\u914d\u5408\u3001\u9ad8\u5ea6\u4e92\u8865\u5bf9\u4e8e\u6210\u529f\u6781\u4e3a\u5173\u952e\u3002Moritz\u5584\u4e8e\u6218\u7565\u6027\u601d\u8003\uff0c\u6267\u884c\u7eaa\u5f8b\uff0c\u5d07\u5c1a\u76ee\u6807\u660e\u786e\u3001\u6309\u7eaa\u5f8b\u7a33\u6b65\u524d\u8fdb\uff0c\u901a\u8fc7\u8010\u5fc3\u548c\u610f\u5fd7\u6784\u67b6\u4e00\u4e2a\u53c8\u4e00\u4e2a\u7684\u6210\u529f\uff1bLeone\u66f4\u52a0\u52a1\u5b9e\u53c2\u4e0e\u5b9e\u9645\u8fd0\u8425\uff0c\u80fd\u591f\u901a\u8fc7\u6c9f\u901a\u53ca\u65f6\u5239\u8f66\uff0c\u4e0d\u5141\u8bb8\u5458\u5de5\u4e0d\u80fd\u5168\u5fc3\u6295\u5165\u3002\u60f3\u8d85\u8d8a\u5e73\u5eb8\uff0c\u9996\u5148\u8981\u7cbe\u795e\u4e0a\u5148\u505a\u5230\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Stamina<\/strong> was just the start of the Sequoia formula. Moritz and Leone focused uncompromisingly on the culture of the firm<\/strong>: external investment hits would flow from an internal quest for excellence<\/strong>. Moritz once enumerated the challenges that this entailed: \u201crecruitment, team building, setting of standards, questions of inspiration and motivation, avoiding complacency<\/strong>, the arrival of new competitors and the continual need to refresh ourselves and purge under-performers.<\/strong>\u201d From this long list, team building and the development of young talent were particular priorities.<\/strong> Sequoia believed in \u201cnurturing the unknown, the homegrown, and what becomes the next generation<\/strong>,\u201d as Moritz put it. Of course, this was a fair description of what Accel had done by training Kevin Efrusy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Sequoia\u7684\u6210\u529f\u79bb\u4e0d\u5f00Moritz\u5bf9\u6587\u5316\u7684\u6253\u9020\uff0c\u8010\u529b\u7b2c\u4e00\uff0c\u5185\u90e8\u8ffd\u6c42\u5353\u8d8a\u6765\u6536\u83b7\u6210\u529f\uff0c\u901a\u8fc7\u62db\u8058\u3001\u56e2\u5efa\u3001\u8bbe\u5b9a\u9ad8\u6807\u51c6\u3001\u4e92\u76f8\u6fc0\u52b1\u548c\u5e26\u6765\u7075\u611f\u3001\u907f\u514d\u81ea\u6ee1\u60c5\u7eea\u3001\u4e0d\u65ad\u66f4\u65b0\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u505a\u6cd5\u3001\u53ca\u65f6\u6e05\u9664\u7ee9\u6548\u5dee\u7684\u8868\u73b0\u8005\u3002\u4e0d\u65ad\u5730\u57f9\u517b\u4e0b\u4e00\u4ee3\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The story of Roelof Botha<\/strong> illustrated the Moritz-Leone approach to talent development. Sequoia hired Botha from his position as PayPal\u2019s chief financial officer in 2003<\/strong>; it was a canny way of forging links with a go-getting cohort of PayPal alums, who were not otherwise well-disposed toward the partnership. Beyond his PayPal connections, the South African\u2013born Botha was a natural Sequoia hire: he had been top of his class at Stanford Business School and had the drive of an immigrant<\/strong>. But he was not yet thirty<\/strong> and had no experience as an investor<\/strong>, so the firm\u2019s senior partners made it their mission to develop him. Of course, if he foundered, they would push him out as clinically as they closed a weak startup, sending him on his way with an airtight nondisclosure agreement. But their vehement intention was to help him put points on the board: to make him a Sequoia warrior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unsuccessful startups generally fail faster than good ones succeed, so demoralizing losses materialize before the winners. The first time Botha had to report that one of his companies was a zero, he teared up at the partners\u2019 meeting<\/strong>: normally, he was composed and certain of his judgment; failure was acutely painful. Then, three years into his tenure, Botha shifted from anguish to elation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Roelof\u6700\u8fd1\u63a5\u4e86Leone\u9000\u4f11\u7684\u73ed\uff0c\u6210\u4e3aSequoia\u7ee7Von\u3001Moritz&Leone\u4e4b\u540e\u7684\u7b2c\u4e09\u4ee3\u63a5\u73ed\u4eba\u4e86\u3002\u4ed6\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u4e5f\u975e\u5e38\u5177\u5907\u4ee3\u8868\u6027\uff0c2003\u5e74\u662fPaypal\u7684CFO\uff0c\u88ab\u62db\u8fdb\u6765\uff1a\u65af\u5766\u798f\u6bd5\u4e1a\u3001\u6709\u521d\u4ee3\u79fb\u6c11\u7684\u5185\u9a71\u529b\u3001\u4e0d\u5230\u4e09\u5341\u5c81\u3001\u6295\u8d44\u7ecf\u9a8c\u662f\u767d\u7eb8\uff0c\u5bf9\u4ed6\u91cd\u70b9\u57f9\u517b\uff0c\u5b9a\u671f\u6d3e\u5b83\u53bb\u5173\u95ed\u4e00\u95f4\u4e0d\u6210\u529f\u7684\u4f01\u4e1a\uff0c\u8def\u4e0a\u8ba9\u4ed6\u7b7e\u4e86\u4fdd\u5bc6\u534f\u8bae\uff0c\u4f46\u662f\u8fd9\u4e00\u5207\u90fd\u662f\u4e3a\u4e86\u8ba9\u4ed6\u65e9\u65e5\u6210\u4e3a\u516c\u53f8\u7684\u4e00\u7ebf\u6218\u58eb\u3002\u70c2\u4f01\u4e1a\u603b\u662f\u6b7b\u7684\u66f4\u5feb\uff0c\u4e8f\u635f\u5148\u5151\u73b0\uff0c\u4ed6\u7684\u9879\u76ee\u7b2c\u4e00\u6b21\u4e8f\u6210\u96f6\u8ba9\u4ed6\u611f\u53d7\u5230\u5207\u5b9e\u7684\u75db\u82e6\uff0c\u5408\u4f19\u4eba\u4f1a\u8bae\u4e0a\u5927\u54ed\u3002\u4e09\u5e74\u5c31\u4ece\u8fd9\u79cd\u75db\u82e6\u8d70\u5411\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e2a\u6536\u83b7\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5931\u8d25\u540e\u7684\u53cd\u601d\u80fd\u5230\u54ed\u7684\u7a0b\u5ea6\uff0c\u6211\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u8fc7\uff0c\u8fd9\u771f\u662f\u975e\u5e38\u4eba\u6240\u80fd\u53ca\u554a\u3002\u7528\u60c5\u81f3\u6df1\uff0c\u5bf9\u5de5\u4f5c\u7684\u8ba4\u771f\u81f3\u6df1\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite Sequoia\u2019s cerebral and disciplined culture<\/strong>, the firm\u2019s team-building efforts included a surprisingly soft side<\/strong>. Partnership off-sites began with something called \u201ccheck-ins\u201d: colleagues opened up to one another about marital tensions<\/strong>, insecurities at work<\/strong>, or a sickness in the family<\/strong>. \u201cIf you\u2019re willing to expose yourself and nobody takes advantage of it, it creates a trusting atmosphere<\/strong>,\u201d Doug Leone reflected. The off-sites also featured poker tournaments<\/strong>: Partners competed for the \u201cDon Valentine tartan,\u201d a monstrously garish red, yellow, and black jacket. At one retreat, during an intensely muddy game of flag football, Botha allowed his South African childhood to seize control of his instincts. He barreled toward a muscular opponent and felled him with a rugby-style tackle. \u201cIt was one of the moments that unlatched our friendship,\u201d Botha remembered later. The team building extended to the way that Sequoia celebrated its successes. When a portfolio company achieved a profitable exit<\/strong>, the newspapers would profile the named partner on the board, as though venture were a lone-wolf business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u56e2\u5efa\u662f\u6587\u5316\u7684\u5f88\u91cd\u8981\u7ec4\u6210\u90e8\u5206\uff0c\u4e5f\u662f\u5de5\u4f5c\u6587\u5316\u7684\u8865\u5145\u3002\u5de5\u4f5c\u4e0a\u8981\u7406\u667a\u3001\u7eaa\u5f8b\u4e25\u660e\uff0c\u56e2\u5efa\u8981\u8ba9\u56e2\u961f\u611f\u5230\u56e2\u7ed3\u548c\u4e92\u4fe1\uff0c\u6bd4\u8f83\u6e29\u6696\uff0c\u5206\u4eab\u4e2a\u4eba\u548c\u5bb6\u5ead\u7684\u6210\u957f\uff0c\u6251\u514b\u8d5b\u7b49\uff0c\u975e\u5e38\u6709\u7528\u3002\u56e2\u5efa\u7684\u76ee\u7684\u662f\u5efa\u7acb\u4fe1\u4efb\u3002 <\/p>\n\n\n\n Because of Sequoia\u2019s status as the Valley\u2019s leading venture firm, most startup founders were eager to pitch to it; by the partnership\u2019s own reckoning, it was invited to consider around two-thirds of the deals<\/strong> that ended up getting funded by the top two dozen venture shops<\/strong>. But this privileged deal flow was both a blessing and a curse<\/strong>. The partners\u2019 days were crammed with meetings organized at the visitors\u2019 request. It was easy to become reactive<\/strong>.To manage this danger, Goetz brought Accel\u2019s prepared-mind approach to Sequoia, leading the partners in mapping out tech trends and anticipating which sorts of startups would prosper from them<\/strong>. He was early to sketch out a detailed picture of the mobile internet landscape, laying out the base stations that phone carriers would have to build, the chips that would go into the handsets, and the software that would run on them. Another prepared-mind \u201clandscape\u201d showed the shift of data from customer devices to the cloud<\/strong>, anticipating the new hardware configurations, software business models, and security vulnerabilities that would flow from it. Yet a third landscape focused on the rise of the developer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u7845\u8c372\/3\u7684\u9879\u76ee\u662f\u88ab\u524d20\u5bb6\u673a\u6784\u5728\u6c34\u4e0b\u5c31\u62ff\u4e0b\u7684\uff0c\u4f46\u8fd9\u79cd\u72ec\u7279\u7684\u9879\u76ee\u5b89\u6392\u65e2\u6709\u597d\u5904\u4e5f\u6709\u574f\u5904\u3002\u6700\u5927\u7684\u574f\u5904\u5c31\u662f\u4f1a\u6162\u6162\u53d8\u6210\u53cd\u5e94\u6027\u7684\uff0c\u5e94\u5bf9\u8fd9\u4e9b\u627e\u4e0a\u95e8\u7684\u9879\u76ee\uff0c\u7f3a\u4e4f\u4e3b\u52a8\u6027\u3002Goetz\u501f\u9274\u4e86Accel\u7684\u65b9\u6cd5\u5f00\u59cb\u901a\u8fc7\u7814\u7a76\u8d8b\u52bf\u6784\u5efa\u201c\u672a\u6765\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u5730\u56fe\u201d\uff0c\u627e\u5230\u673a\u4f1a\u70b9\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n While Goetz led on the prepared mind, Botha pioneered the application of behavioral science<\/strong> to venture capital. This was a radical idea, and Botha\u2019s colleagues came to regard it as transformative for Sequoia. At other venture partnerships, investors often boasted about relying on instinct. They claimed to have \u201cpattern recognition<\/strong>,\u201d an investment sixth sense<\/strong>; \u201cI\u2019ve had this my entire career, and I do not know why,\u201d one successful VC said happily. He set out to apply the resulting insights<\/strong> to Sequoia\u2019s Monday partners\u2019 meetings. The goal, at a minimum, was to make the investment process consistent from one week to the next. \u201cSometimes we felt that if a particular company had been there the previous Monday, or the subsequent Monday, our decision would have been different,\u201d Botha explained. \u201cThat didn\u2019t feel like a recipe for sustainable success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Botha\u2019s focus on behavioral science grew partly out of the premature sale of YouTube. In accepting Google\u2019s acquisition offer, the founders had behaved precisely as behavioral experiments predict<\/strong>: people are often willing to gamble in order to avoid a loss, but they are irrationally risk averse when it comes to reaching for the upside<\/strong>. Examining the pattern of Sequoia\u2019s exits, Botha determined that premature profit-taking occurred repeatedly at the firm<\/strong>, despite Moritz\u2019s earlier efforts to extend the partnership\u2019s holding periods. The behavioral literature also drew attention to another tendency that Botha observed: VCs suffered from \u201cconfirmation bias,\u201d<\/strong> the practice of filtering out information that challenges a position you have taken. At Sequoia, the partners sometimes missed attractive Series B <\/strong>deals because they wanted to make themselves feel good. They hated to admit they had been wrong in saying no to the same startup at the Series A stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Botha\u628a\u884c\u4e3a\u5fc3\u7406\u5b66\u5f15\u5165\u4e86\u6295\u8d44\u51b3\u7b56\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\u3002\u5f88\u591a\u673a\u6784\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u4e3b\u8981\u4f9d\u8d56\u76f4\u89c9\uff0c\u5f62\u6210\u6a21\u5f0f\u8bc6\u522b\u7b49\u65b9\u6cd5\u8bba\u3002\u5728Youtube\u7b49\u9879\u76ee\u51fa\u552e\u65f6\u4f1a\u53d1\u73b0\u5927\u5bb6\u5728\u9762\u5bf9\u4e8f\u635f\u65f6\u5e94\u8be5\u98ce\u9669\u89c4\u907f\u5374\u66f4\u613f\u610f\u8d4c\u4e00\u628a\u8d62\u56de\u6765\uff0c\u4f46\u9762\u5bf9\u5229\u6da6\u65f6\u5374\u4e0d\u7406\u6027\u5730\u98ce\u9669\u89c4\u907f\u66f4\u613f\u610f\u65e9\u65e5\u83b7\u5229\u4e86\u7ed3\u7684\u5fc3\u7406\u504f\u5dee\uff0c\u867d\u7136\u516c\u53f8\u5e0c\u671b\u591a\u6301\u6709\u4e00\u9635\u5b50\uff0c\u8fd8\u662f\u4e0d\u65ad\u5730\u5356\u65e9\u4e86\uff0c\u53cd\u590d\u51fa\u73b0\u3002\u786e\u8ba4\u504f\u5dee\u4e5f\u7ecf\u5e38\u51fa\u73b0\uff0c\u7ecf\u5e38\u4f1a\u9519\u8fc7\u5f88\u597d\u7684B\u8f6e\u6295\u8d44\u673a\u4f1a\uff0c\u4ec5\u4ec5\u662f\u4e0d\u60f3\u627f\u8ba4A\u8f6e\u65f6\u81ea\u5df1\u770b\u8d70\u773c\u4e86\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u8fd8\u662f\u6ee1\u6df1\u523b\u7684\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first step toward overcoming cognitive bias is to recognize it. Botha arranged for outside psychologists <\/strong>to present to the partnership. He led his colleagues through painful postmortems of past decisions<\/strong>, homing in on times when they had weighed evidence irrationally. Previously, the partners had tried to extract lessons from portfolio companies that had failed<\/strong>. Now Botha was equally focused on the times when Sequoia had declined to invest in a startup that subsequently succeeded<\/strong>. To enable scientific postmortems, the partners kept a record of all votes<\/strong> at investment meetings. \u201cIt\u2019s not about scapegoating,\u201d Botha explained. \u201cIt\u2019s just \u2018What did we learn as a team?\u2019 If we can get better at decisions, that is a source of advantage.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u5f15\u5165\u5fc3\u7406\u5b66\u5bb6\uff0c\u5206\u6790\u8fc7\u5f80\u5931\u8d25\u7684\u6559\u8bad\uff0c\u5206\u6790\u6bcf\u6b21\u9519\u8fc7\u7684\u539f\u56e0\uff0c\u662f\u4e00\u6761\u75db\u82e6\u4f46\u4e00\u5b9a\u901a\u5411\u5149\u660e\u7684\u8def\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n As well as running postmortems, Botha began to build new habits<\/strong> into real-time decision making. To overcome the risk-aversion<\/strong> identified by decision science, the partners included a \u201cpre-parade\u201d section<\/strong> in each investment memo\u2014a description of how the company would turn out assuming everything went perfectly<\/strong>. By building this exercise into their process, the partners gave themselves permission to voice their excitement about a deal, and to do so with a fullness that would otherwise have been uncomfortable. \u201cWe all suffer from the desire not to be embarrassed<\/strong>,\u201d Jim Goetz reflected. \u201cBut we\u2019re in the business of being embarrassed<\/strong>, and we need to be comfortable enough to say out loud what might be possibl<\/strong>e.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u8fd9\u4e2a\u5c06\u514b\u670d\u51b3\u7b56\u65f6\u76f8\u6c42\u5b89\u7a33\u3001\u4e0d\u7406\u6027\u7684\u98ce\u9669\u89c4\u907f\u7684\u4e60\u60ef\u6539\u8d77\u6765\u633a\u96be\u7684\uff0c\u4f46\u53ef\u4ee5\u5c1d\u8bd5\uff0c\u5728Memo\u52a0\u4e0a\u5982\u679c\u4e00\u5207\u987a\u5229\u7684\u8bdd\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u516c\u53f8\u80fd\u505a\u6210\u4ec0\u4e48\u6837\u3002\u901a\u5e38\u8fd9\u79cd\u60f3\u8c61\u4e0d\u88ab\u63a5\u53d7\uff0c\u5bb9\u6613\u88ab\u73b0\u5b9e\u6253\u8138\uff0c\u4f46\u5176\u5b9eVC\u8fd9\u79cd\u5e38\u5e38\u88ab\u6253\u8138\u7684\u751f\u610f\uff0c\u53cd\u800c\u66f4\u9700\u8981\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u60f3\u8c61\uff0c\u624d\u80fd\u8fbe\u5230\u672a\u6765\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sequoia also began to design around the problem of \u201canchoring\u201d\u2014that is, basing a judgment on other people\u2019s views<\/strong> rather than wrestling with the evidence and taking an independent position<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Ahead of a decision, each of them would read the investment memo with an unpolluted mind<\/strong>; they should 12 Growth Equity Yuri & Tiger<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
13 King Sequoia <\/h2>\n\n\n\n