\u6d77\u5916\u6700\u8fd1\u6bd4\u8f83\u70ed\u95f9\u7684\u4e00\u672c\u4e66\uff0c\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u7ffb\u8bd1\u7248\uff0c\u8bfb\u8d77\u6765\u8fd8\u662f\u4e0d\u9519\u7684\uff0c\u5bf9\u4e8e\u82af\u7247\u7684\u590d\u6742\u6027\u548c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u4ea7\u4e1a\u7684\u7ade\u4e89\u6709\u66f4\u4e3a\u5168\u9762\u7684\u7406\u89e3\uff0c\u5bf9\u4e8e\u4ea7\u4e1a\u6295\u8d44\u8fd8\u662f\u5f88\u6709\u610f\u4e49\u7684\u3002\u7167\u4f8b\u505a\u4e9b\u6458\u5f55\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet the seismic shift that most imperils semiconductor supply today isn\u2019t the crash of tectonic plates but the clash of great powers. As China and the United States struggle for supremacy, both Washington and Beijing are fixated on controlling the future of computing<\/strong>\u2014and, to a frightening degree, that future is dependent on a small island that Beijing considers a renegade province and America has committed to defend by force. The interconnections between the chip industries in the U.S., China, and Taiwan are dizzyingly complex. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u4eca\u5929\u82af\u7247\u9886\u57df\u7684\u7ade\u4e89\u548c\u5236\u88c1\u6216\u8005\u8bf4\u8fd9\u573a\u6218\u4e89\u7684\u80cc\u540e\u539f\u56e0\u5e76\u4e0d\u662f\u6280\u672f\u7684\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u653f\u6cbb\u52bf\u529b\u7684\u89d2\u9010\u3002 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It was only sixty years ago that the number of transistors on a cutting-edge chip wasn\u2019t 11.8 billion, but 4. In 1961, south of San Francisco, a small firm called Fairchild Semiconductor announced a new product called the Micrologic, a silicon chip with four transistors embedded in it. Soon the company devised ways to put a dozen transistors on a chip, then a hundred. Fairchild cofounder Gordon Moore noticed in 1965 that the number of components that could be fit on each chip was doubling annually as engineers learned to fabricate ever smaller transistors. This prediction\u2014that the computing power of chips would grow exponentially\u2014came to be called \u201cMoore\u2019s Law\u201d and led Moore to predict the invention of devices that in 1965 seemed impossibly futuristic. Looking forward from 1965, Moore predicted a decade of exponential growth\u2014but this staggering rate of progress has continued for over half a century. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
60\u5e74\u65f6\u95f4\uff0c\u82af\u7247\u7684\u6676\u4f53\u7ba1\u6570\u91cf\u4ece4\u4e2a\u5f00\u59cb\u5230\u76ee\u524d\u7684120\u4ebf\u4e2a\u3002\u56de\u52301965\u5e74\uff0c\u540e\u6765\u82af\u7247\u4ece\u519b\u4e8b\u5230\u7535\u8111\u3001\u5bb6\u7535\u4e0a\u7684\u5e94\u7528\u90fd\u662f\u96be\u4ee5\u60f3\u8c61\u7684\u3002\u8fd9\u4e48\u770b\u8d77\u6765\uff0c\u5f53\u65f6\u6562\u4e8e\u63d0\u51fa\u6469\u5c14\u5b9a\u5f8b\u662f\u76f8\u5f53\u4f1f\u5927\u7684\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On their own, semiconductor materials like silicon<\/strong> and germanium<\/strong> are like glass, conducting hardly any electricity at all. But when certain materials are added and an electric field is applied, current can begin to flow. Adding phosphorous or antimony to semiconducting materials like silicon or germanium, for example, lets a negative current flow.\u201cDoping\u201d semiconductor materials with other elements presented an opportunity for new types of devices that could create and control electric currents.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u7684\u6750\u6599\u6027\u80fd\u53d1\u73b0\u548c\u63ba\u6742\u5de5\u827a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Noyce and Moore began to realize that miniaturization and electric efficiency were a powerful combination: smaller transistors and reduced power consumption would create new use cases for their integrated circuits. At the outset, however, Noyce\u2019s integrated circuit cost fifty times as much to make as a simpler device with separate components wired together. Everyone agreed Noyce\u2019s invention was clever, even brilliant. All it needed was a market.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u6280\u672f\u7684\u4f18\u52bf\u5f88\u660e\u663e\uff1a\u66f4\u5c0f\u7684\u6676\u4f53\u7ba1\u548c\u66f4\u4f4e\u7684\u80fd\u8017\u3002\u552f\u4e00\u7684\u95ee\u9898\u662f\u6682\u65f6\u8fd8\u6ca1\u4ec0\u4e48\u5e02\u573a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Chip sales to the Apollo program transformed Fairchild from a small startup into a firm with one thousand employees. Sales ballooned from $500,000 in 1958 to $21 million two years later.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u771f\u6b63\u6210\u5c31\u4ed9\u7ae5\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u7684\u65e2\u4e0d\u662f\u6280\u672f\u548c\u4ea7\u54c1\uff0c\u66f4\u4e0d\u662fVC\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u963f\u6ce2\u7f57\u767b\u6708\u8ba1\u5212\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u5386\u53f2\u673a\u9047\u548c\u5927\u5ba2\u6237\u3002\u7531\u6b64\u53ef\u89c1\u5546\u4e1a\u7684\u590d\u6742\u6027\uff1a\u6210\u5c31\u4f1f\u5927\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\u5f80\u5f80\u662f\u65f6\u4ee3\uff0c\u53ca\u4e00\u7fa4\u88ab\u65f6\u4ee3\u9009\u4e2d\u3001\u505a\u597d\u51c6\u5907\u3001\u7ad9\u5728\u6f6e\u5934\u7684\u4eba\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lathrop called the process photolithography\u2014printing with light. He produced transistors much smaller than had previously been possible, measuring only a tenth of an inch in diameter, with features as small as 0.0005 inches in height. Photolithography made it possible to imagine mass-producing tiny transistors. Lathrop applied for a patent on the technique in 1957. With the Army band playing, the military gave him a medal for his work and a $25,000 cash bonus, which he used to buy his family a Nash Rambler station wagon.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5149\u523b\u673a\u7684\u53d1\u660e\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The military paid top dollar, but consumers were price sensitive. What remained tantalizing, though, was that the civilian market was far larger than even the bloated budgets of the Cold War Pentagon. \u201cSelling R&D to the government was like taking your venture capital and putting it into a savings account,\u201d Noyce declared. \u201cVenturing is venturing; you want to take the risk.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
To G \u8fd8\u662f To C \u662f\u82af\u7247\u521a\u5f00\u59cb\u53d1\u660e\u51fa\u6765\u5c31\u9762\u4e34\u7684\u9009\u62e9\uff0c\u4eca\u5929\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u9009\u62e9\u96be\u9898\u4f9d\u7136\u8fd8\u5728\u3002\u519b\u961f\u80fd\u51fa\u4ef7\u5f88\u9ad8\u4f46\u6c11\u7528\u80fd\u51fa\u8d27\u5f88\u5927\u91cf\u3002Noyce\u7684\u9009\u62e9\u5f88\u6709\u610f\u601d\uff0c\u4ed6\u8ba4\u4e3a\u521b\u4e1a\u516c\u53f8\u62ff\u4e86VC\u7684\u94b1\u5c31\u5e94\u8be5\u5192\u9669\uff0c\u4f46to G\u8fd9\u79cd\u5356\u7ed9\u519b\u961f\u7684\u4e1a\u52a1\u5374\u6ca1\u5192\u4ec0\u4e48\u98ce\u9669\uff0c\u50cf\u662f\u62ff\u4e86VC\u7684\u94b1\u7136\u540e\u628a\u94b1\u5b58\u94f6\u884c\u4e86\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u89c2\u70b9\u4eca\u5929\u4f9d\u7136\u76f8\u5f53\u6709\u610f\u4e49\uff01VC\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u91cd\u70b9\u4e4b\u4e00\u662f\u8981\u6536\u76ca\uff0c\u7ed9LP\u56de\u62a5\uff0c\u4f46\u4e5f\u8981\u6709VC\u5192\u9669\u7684\u6210\u5206\uff0c\u627f\u62c5\u8d77\u76f8\u5e94\u7684\u793e\u4f1a\u8d23\u4efb\u6765\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara reformed military procurement to cut costs in the early 1960s, causing what some in the electronics industry called the \u201cMcNamara Depression,\u201d Fairchild\u2019s vision of chips for civilians seemed prescient<\/strong>. The company was the first to offer a full product line of off-the-shelf integrated circuits for civilian customers. Noyce slashed prices, too, gambling that this would drastically expand the civilian market for chips. In the mid-1960s, Fairchild chips that previously sold for $20 were cut to $2. At times Fairchild even sold products below manufacturing cost, hoping to convince more customers to try them.<\/p>
Thanks to falling prices, Fairchild began winning major contracts in the private sector. Annual U.S. computer sales grew from 1,000 in 1957 to 18,700 a decade later. By the mid-1960s, almost all these computers relied on integrated circuits. In 1966, Burroughs, a computer firm, ordered 20 million chips from Fairchild\u2014more than twenty times what the Apollo program consumed. By 1968, the computer industry was buying as many chips as the military. Fairchild chips served 80 percent of this computer market. Bob Noyce\u2019s price cuts had paid off, opening a new market for civilian computers that would drive chip sales for decades to come. Moore later argued that Noyce\u2019s price cuts were as big an innovation as the technology inside Fairchild\u2019s integrated circuits.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u4ed9\u7ae5\u4e5f\u66fe\u8d1f\u6bdb\u5229\u51fa\u8d27\u3002\u4ed9\u7ae5\u8d4c\u7684\u65b9\u5411\u662f\u5bf9\u7684\uff0c\u5927\u89c4\u6a21\u91cf\u4ea7\u3001\u5feb\u901f\u964d\u4ef7\uff0c\u7136\u540e\u8d76\u4e0a\u4e86\u7f8e\u56fd60\u5e74\u4ee3\u519b\u65b9\u964d\u6210\u672c\u51cf\u652f\u51fa\u7684\u65b0\u673a\u4f1a\u6210\u5c31\u4e86\u81ea\u5df1\u3002\u6469\u5c14\u90fd\u79f0\u8d5eNoyce\u7684\u964d\u6210\u672c\u8d21\u732e\u4e0d\u4e9a\u4e8e\u53d1\u660e\u96c6\u6210\u7535\u8def\uff01<\/p>\n\n\n\n
2<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A CIA report in 1959 found that America was only two to four years ahead<\/strong> of the Soviets in quality and quantity of transistors produced. At least several of the early Soviet exchange students were KGB agents\u2014suspected at the time, but not confirmed until decades later\u2014forging an intimate connection between student exchanges and Soviet defense industrial goals.<\/p>
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was committed to outcompeting the United States in every sphere, from corn production to satellite launches. Khrushchev himself was more comfortable on collective farms than in electronics labs. He understood nothing about technology but was obsessed with the notion of \u201ccatching up and overtaking\u201d the United States, as he repeatedly promised to do. <\/p>
The USSR excelled in quantity but not in quality or purity, both of which were crucial to high-volume chipmaking. Moreover, the Western allies prohibited the transfer of many advanced technologies, including semiconductor components, to Communist countries via an organization called COCOM. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u82af\u7247\u521a\u51fa\u73b0\u768460\u5e74\u4ee3\uff0c\u82cf\u8054\u843d\u6237\u7f8e\u56fd\u4ec5\u4ec52-4\u5e74\u3002\u4f46\u5f53\u65f6\u7684\u8d6b\u9c81\u6653\u592b\u6bd4\u8d77\u82af\u7247\u66f4\u559c\u6b22\u96c6\u4f53\u519c\u573a\uff0c\u5c31\u8fd9\u6837\u7ed9\u803d\u8bef\u4e86\u3002\u82cf\u8054\u7684\u5957\u8def\u8fd8\u662f\u91cd\u6570\u91cf\u8f7b\u8d28\u91cf\uff0c\u65b9\u5411\u4e5f\u8d70\u9519\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Soviet leaders never comprehended how the \u201ccopy it\u201d strategy condemned them to backwardness. The entire Soviet semiconductor sector functioned like a defense contractor\u2014secretive, top-down, oriented toward military systems, fulfilling orders with little scope for creativity. The copying process was \u201ctightly controlled\u201d by Minister Shokin, one of his subordinates remembered. Copying was literally hardwired into the Soviet semiconductor industry, with some chipmaking machinery using inches rather than centimeters to better replicate American designs, even though the rest of the USSR used the metric system. Thanks to the \u201ccopy it\u201d strategy, the USSR started several years behind the U.S. in transistor technology and never caught up.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u82cf\u8054\u7684\u6284\u88ad\u7b56\u7565\u5728\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u4e0a\u65e0\u6cd5\u594f\u6548\u3002\u6b63\u662f\u8fd9\u4e2a\u7b56\u7565\u5bfc\u81f4\u4e86\u82cf\u8054\u5f00\u59cb\u5168\u9762\u843d\u540e\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sony had the benefit of cheaper wages in Japan, but its business model was ultimately about innovation, product design, and marketing. Morita\u2019s \u201clicense it\u201d strategy couldn\u2019t have been more different from the \u201ccopy it\u201d tactics of Soviet Minister Shokin.<\/p>
Throughout the 1960s, Japanese firms paid sizeable licensing fees on intellectual property, handing over 4.5 percent of all chip sales to Fairchild, 3.5 percent to Texas Instruments, and 2 percent to Western Electric. U.S. chipmakers were happy to transfer their technology because Japanese firms appeared to be years behind.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u7d22\u5c3c\u548c\u65e5\u672c\u516c\u53f8\u901a\u8fc7\u5927\u91cf\u7684\u6388\u6743\u4e70\u6280\u672f\u6765\u751f\u4ea7\u82af\u7247\uff0c\u7528\u4e0a\u65e5\u672c\u4f4e\u5de5\u8d44\u4f18\u52bf\u548c\u4ea7\u54c1\u521b\u65b0\uff0c\u5f00\u59cb\u5360\u636e\u5e02\u573a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fairchild continued to make its silicon wafers in California but began shipping semiconductors to Hong Kong for final assembly. In 1963, its first year of operation, the Hong Kong facility assembled 120 million devices. Production quality was excellent, because low labor costs meant Fairchild could hire trained engineers to run assembly lines, which would have been prohibitively expensive in California.<\/p>
Within a decade, almost all U.S. chipmakers had foreign assembly facilities. Sporck began looking beyond Hong Kong. The city\u2019s 25-cent hourly wages were only a tenth of American wages but were among the highest in Asia. In the mid-1960s, Taiwanese workers made 19 cents an hour, Malaysians 15 cents, Singaporeans 11 cents, and South Koreans only a dime.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
1963\u5e74\uff0c\u4ed9\u7ae5\u5c31\u5728\u9999\u6e2f\u8bbe\u7acb\u4e86\u7b2c\u4e00\u4e2a\u5c01\u88c5\u5de5\u5382\u3002\u8fd9\u4e5f\u662f\u4e9a\u6d32\u56db\u5c0f\u9f99\u8d77\u6b65\u7684\u539f\u70b9\u3002\u76f8\u6bd4\u5f53\u65f6\u9999\u6e2f25\u7f8e\u5206\u7684\u5de5\u8d44\uff0c\u97e9\u56fd\u4ec5\u4ec5\u662f10\u7f8e\u5206\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Colonel Davis gave Texas Instruments nine months and $99,000 to deliver this laser-guided bomb, which, thanks to its simple design, quickly passed the Air Force\u2019s tests. On May 13, 1972, U.S. aircraft dropped twenty-four of the bombs on the Thanh Hoa Bridge, which until that day had been still standing amid hundreds of craters, like a monument to the inaccuracy of mid-century bombing tactics. This time, American bombs scored direct hits. Dozens of other bridges, rail junctions, and other strategic points were hit with new precision bombs. A simple laser sensor and a couple of transistors had turned a weapon with a zero-for-638 hit ratio into a tool of precision destruction.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
TI\u7684\u82af\u7247\u641e\u51fa\u6765\u7684\u9ad8\u7cbe\u5ea6\u70b8\u5f39\u6539\u53d8\u4e86\u8d8a\u6218\u683c\u5c40\uff0c\u867d\u7136\u7ed3\u679c\u6ca1\u53d8\uff0c\u4f46\u6539\u53d8\u4e86\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u519b\u4e8b\u88c5\u5907\u601d\u8def\u3002\u770b\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u4fc4\u4e4c\u6218\u4e89\u4e2d\uff0c\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u7684\u75db\u82e6\u5982\u540c\u4e94\u5341\u5e74\u524d\u8d8a\u6218\u7684\u7f8e\u519b\u4e00\u822c\uff1a\u6ca1\u6709\u7cbe\u786e\u5236\u5bfc\u6b66\u5668\uff0c\u6218\u4e89\u6602\u8d35\u800c\u65e0\u8fdb\u5c55\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Taiwanese officials like K. T. Li, who\u2019d studied nuclear physics at Cambridge and ran a steel mill before steering Taiwan\u2019s economic development through the postwar decades, began crystallizing a strategy to integrate economically with the United States. Semiconductors were at the center of this plan. Li knew there were plenty of Taiwanese-American semiconductor engineers willing to help. In Dallas, Morris Chang urged his colleagues at TI to set up a facility in Taiwan.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u53f0\u6e7e\u7684\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u53d1\u5c55\u8d77\u6765\u5c31\u662f\u6e90\u4e8e\u5f53\u65f6\u7684\u5b98\u65b9\u628a\u5f20\u5fe0\u8c0b\u62db\u5546\u56de\u6765\u4e86\u3002\u6709\u65f6\u5019\u4e00\u4e2a\u4eba\u4e5f\u53ef\u4ee5\u6539\u53d8\u5386\u53f2\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Industrial society was giving way to a digital world, with 1s and 0s stored and processed on many millions of slabs of silicon spread throughout society. The era of the tech tycoons was dawning. \u201cSociety\u2019s fate will hang in the balance,\u201d Carver Mead declared. \u201cThe catalyst is the microelectronics technology<\/strong> and its ability to put more and more components into less and less space.\u201d Industry outsiders only dimly perceived how the world was changing, but Intel\u2019s leaders knew that if they succeeded in drastically expanding the availability of computing power, radical changes would follow. \u201cWe are really the revolutionaries in the world today,\u201d Gordon Moore declared in 1973, \u201cnot the kids with the long hair and beards who were wrecking the schools a few years ago.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5fae\u7535\u5b50\u82af\u7247\u6210\u4e86\u51b3\u5b9a\u793e\u4f1a\u53d1\u5c55\u65b9\u5411\u7684\u50ac\u5316\u5242\u3002\u4e0d\u5f97\u4e0d\u4f69\u670d\u82f1\u7279\u5c14\u7684\u8fdc\u89c1\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Viewed from the Pentagon upon his arrival in 1977, the world looked far darker. The U.S. had just lost the Vietnam War. Worse, the Soviet Union had almost completely eroded America\u2019s military advantage, warned Pentagon analysts like Andrew Marshall. Marshall\u2019s grim conclusion was that after a decade of pointless fighting in Southeast Asia, the U.S. had lost its military advantage. He was fixated on regaining it. Though Washington had been shocked by Sputnik and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it wasn\u2019t until the early 1970s that the Soviets had built a big enough stockpile of intercontinental ballistic missiles to guarantee that enough of their atomic weapons could survive a U.S. nuclear strike to retaliate with a devastating atomic barrage of their own. More worrisome, the Soviet army had far more tanks and planes, which were already deployed on potential battlegrounds in Europe. The U.S.\u2014facing pressure at home to cut military spending\u2014simply couldn\u2019t keep up.<\/p>
Strategists like Marshall knew the only answer to the Soviet quantitative advantage was to produce better quality weapons. Guided missiles would not only \u201coffset\u201d the USSR\u2019s quantitative advantage, he reasoned. They\u2019d force the Soviets to undertake a ruinously expensive anti-missile effort in response. Perry calculated Moscow would need five to ten years and $30 to $50 billion to defend against the three thousand American cruise missiles that the Pentagon planned to field\u2014and even then, the Soviets could only destroy half the incoming missiles if they were all fired at the USSR.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
70\u5e74\u4ee3\u672b\u7684\u7f8e\u56fd\u65e5\u5b50\u5e76\u4e0d\u597d\u8fc7\uff0c\u521a\u8f93\u4e86\u8d8a\u6218\uff0c\u519b\u4e8b\u4e0a\u770b\u8d77\u6765\u4e5f\u8f93\u7ed9\u4e86\u82cf\u8054\uff0c\u82cf\u8054\u5728\u6240\u6709\u6b66\u5668\u7684\u6570\u91cf\u4e0a\u90fd\u5f88\u6709\u4f18\u52bf\u3002\u9762\u5bf9\u82cf\u8054\u7684\u6570\u91cf\u4f18\u52bf\uff0c\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u6218\u7565\u5bb6\u9009\u62e9\u4e86\u66f4\u9ad8\u7684\u8d28\u91cf\u4f18\u52bf\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
3<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 1980s were a hellish decade for the entire U.S. semiconductor sector. Silicon Valley thought it sat atop the world\u2019s tech industry, but after two decades of rapid growth it now faced an existential crisis: cutthroat competition from Japan. <\/p>
In addition to American companies like Intel and TI, Japanese firms like Toshiba and NEC were now building DRAM memory chips\u2014though most people in Silicon Valley didn\u2019t take these players seriously. U.S. chipmakers were run by the people who\u2019d invented high-tech. They joked that Japan was the country of \u201cclick, click\u201d\u2014the sound made by cameras that Japanese engineers brought to chip conferences to better copy the ideas. The fact that major American chipmakers were embroiled in intellectual property lawsuits with Japanese rivals was interpreted as evidence that Silicon Valley was still well ahead.<\/p>
Chips weren\u2019t the only U.S. industry facing pressure from high-quality, ultra-efficient Japanese competitors. In the immediate postwar years, \u201cMade in Japan\u201d had been a synonym for \u201ccheap.\u201d But entrepreneurs like Sony\u2019s Akio Morita had cast off this reputation for low price, replacing it with products that were as high quality as those of any American competitor. Morita\u2019s transistor radios were the first prominent challenger to American economic preeminence, and their success emboldened Morita and his Japanese peers to set their sights even higher. American industries from cars to steel were facing intense Japanese competition.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u7f8e\u56fd\u5927\u89c4\u6a21\u53d1\u5c55\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u4e4b\u540e\u768420\u5e74\u5374\u5feb\u8d70\u5230\u4e86\u6b7b\u80e1\u540c\uff0c\u65e5\u672c\u4eba\u5feb\u628a\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u82af\u7247\u4ea7\u4e1a\u706d\u4e86\uff0c\u751f\u6b7b\u5b58\u4ea1\u3002\u7f8e\u56fd\u4eba\u5f00\u59cb\u6253\u4e13\u5229\u5b98\u53f8<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The best evidence against the thesis that Japan was an \u201cimplementer\u201d rather than an \u201cinnovator\u201d was Kikuchi\u2019s boss, Sony CEO Akio Morita. Morita knew that replication was a recipe for second-class status and second-rate profits. He drove his engineers not only to build the best radios and TVs, but to imagine new types of products entirely.In 1979, just months before Anderson\u2019s presentation about quality problems in American chips, Sony introduced the Walkman. Sony sold 385 million units worldwide, making the Walkman one of the most popular consumer devices in history. This was innovation at its purest, and it had been made in Japan.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u7d22\u5c3c\u7684\u601d\u8def\u8fd8\u662f\u975e\u5e38\u6e05\u695a\u7684\uff0ccopy\u53ea\u80fd\u5728\u4ea7\u4e1a\u94fe\u4e0a\u5c45\u4e8e\u4eba\u4e0b\uff0c\u4e8c\u7b49\u516c\u6c11\u548c\u4e8c\u7b49\u5229\u6da6\uff0c\u521b\u65b0\u624d\u6709\u673a\u4f1a\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\u624d\u6709\u4e86\u4e0a\u4e2a\u65f6\u4ee3\u7684Ipod\uff0cWalkman\u7684\u6a2a\u7a7a\u51fa\u4e16\uff0c\u5356\u51fa\u4e863.85\u4ebf\u53f0\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWe\u2019re at war with Japan,\u201d Sporck insisted. \u201cNot with guns and ammunition, but an economic war with technology, productivity, and quality.\u201d<\/p>
Sporck saw Silicon Valley\u2019s internal battles as fair fights, but thought Japan\u2019s DRAM firms benefitted from intellectual property theft, protected markets, government subsidies, and cheap capital. Sporck had a point about the spies. After a 5 a.m. rendezvous in the lobby of a Hartford, Connecticut, hotel on a cold November morning in 1981, Hitachi employee Jun Naruse handed over an envelope of cash and received in exchange a badge from a \u201cconsultant\u201d at a company called Glenmar that promised to help Hitachi obtain industrial secrets. With the badge, Naruse gained entrance to a secret facility run by aircraft maker Pratt & Whitney and photographed the company\u2019s newest computer.<\/p>
After the photo shoot, Naruse\u2019s colleague on the West Coast, Kenji Hayashi, sent a letter to Glenmar proposing a \u201cconsultation service contract.\u201d Hitachi\u2019s senior executives authorized half a million dollars in payments to Glenmar to continue the relationship. But Glenmar was a front company; its employees were FBI agents. \u201cIt seems that Hitachi stepped into the trap,\u201d the company\u2019s spokesman sheepishly admitted,after Hitachi\u2019s employees were arrested and the story made the front page of the business section of the New York Times.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u4e2d\u7f8e\u8131\u94a9\u4e0b\u7684\u534e\u4e3a\u5b5f\u665a\u821f\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u548c\u5f53\u5e74\u65e5\u7f8e\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u8fd9\u4e2a\u65e5\u7acb\u95f4\u8c0d\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u5c45\u7136\u5982\u6b64\u795e\u4f3c\u3002\u5386\u53f2\u771f\u662f\u4e00\u904d\u4e00\u904d\u7684\u91cd\u6f14\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Jerry Sanders saw Silicon Valley\u2019s biggest disadvantage as its high cost of capital<\/strong>. The Japanese \u201cpay 6 percent, maybe 7 percent, for capital. I pay 18 percent on a good day,\u201d he complained. Building advanced manufacturing facilities was brutally expensive, so the cost of credit was hugely important. A next-generation chip emerged roughly once every two years, requiring new facilities and new machinery. In the 1980s, U.S. interest rates reached 21.5 percent as the Federal Reserve sought to fight inflation.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u65e5\u672c\u82af\u7247\u4ea7\u4e1a\u7684\u5de8\u5927\u4f18\u52bf\u5c31\u662f\u4fbf\u5b9c\u7684\u4fe1\u8d37\u8d44\u91d1\uff0c\u4e5f\u662f\u6e90\u4e8e\u653f\u5e9c\u7684\u652f\u6301\u548c\u6276\u690d\u3002\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u5229\u7387\u6c34\u5e73\u5927\u7ea620%\uff0c\u76f8\u6bd4\u4e4b\u4e0b\u7684\u65e5\u672c\u53ea\u67096-7%\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u4f18\u52bf\u786e\u5b9e\u76f8\u5f53\u5de8\u5927\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Several years later, in 1978, GCA introduced its first stepper. Sales orders began rolling in. Before the stepper, GCA had never made more than $50 million a year in revenue on its military contracts, but now it had a monopoly on an extraordinarily valuable machine. Revenue soon hit $300 million and the company\u2019s stock price surged.<\/p>
Just as the market slumped, GCA lost its position as the only company building steppers. Japan\u2019s Nikon had initially been a partner of GCA, providing the precision lenses for its stepper. But Greenberg had decided to cut Nikon out, buying his own lens maker, New York\u2212based Tropel, which made lenses for the U2 spy planes but which struggled to produce the number of high-quality lenses GCA needed. Meanwhile, GCA\u2019s customer service atrophied. The company\u2019s attitude, one analyst recounted, was \u201cbuy what we build and don\u2019t bother us.\u201d The company\u2019s own employees admitted that \u201ccustomers got fed up.\u201d This was the attitude of a monopolist\u2014but GCA was no longer a monopoly. After Greenberg stopped buying Nikon lenses, the Japanese company decided to make its own stepper. It acquired a machine from GCA and reverse engineered it. Soon Nikon had more market share than GCA.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
GCA\u53d1\u660e\u4e86\u6b65\u8fdb\u5f0f\u7684\u5149\u523b\u673a\uff0c\u9500\u552e\u989d\u5267\u589e\u3002\u4f46\u968f\u7740\u65e5\u672c\u82af\u7247\u4ea7\u4e1a\u7684\u5d1b\u8d77\uff0cGCA\u4e5f\u65e5\u76ca\u8270\u96be\u3002GCA\u7684\u8870\u843d\u4e3b\u8981\u662f\u5e02\u573a\u7ade\u4e89\u539f\u56e0\uff0c\u4e5f\u6709\u5176\u81ea\u8eab\u5bf9\u5ba2\u6237\u7684\u50b2\u6162\u56e0\u7d20\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Semiconductors are the \u201ccrude oil of the 1980s,\u201d Jerry Sanders declared, \u201cand the people who control the crude oil will control the electronics industry.\u201d As CEO of AMD, one of America\u2019s biggest chipmakers, Sanders had plenty of self-interested reasons to describe his main product as strategically crucial. But was he wrong? Throughout the 1980s, America\u2019s computer industry expanded rapidly, as PCs were made small enough and cheap enough for an individual home or office. Every business was coming to rely on them. Computers couldn\u2019t work without integrated circuits. Nor, by the 1980s, could planes, automobiles, camcorders, microwaves, or the Sony Walkman. Every American now had semiconductors in their houses and cars; many used dozens of chips daily. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u5df2\u7ecf\u662f\u77f3\u6cb9\u822c\u7684\u91cd\u8981\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The U.S. military was more dependent on electronics\u2014and thus on chips\u2014than ever before. By the 1980s, the report found, around 17 percent of military spending went toward electronics, compared to 6 percent at the end of World War II. Everything from satellites to early warning radars to self-guided missiles depended on advanced chips. The Pentagon\u2019s task force summarized the ramifications in four bullet points, underlining the key conclusions:<\/p>
\uff081\uff09U.S. military forces depend heavily on technological superiority to win.
\uff082\uff09Electronics is the technology that can be leveraged most highly.
\uff083\uff09Semiconductors are the key to leadership in electronics.
\uff084\uff09U.S. defense will soon depend on foreign sources for state-of-the-art technology in semiconductors.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u6218\u7565\u6e05\u9192\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Noyce\u2019s focus, however, was saving America\u2019s lithography industry. Fifty-one percent of Sematech funding went to American lithography firms. Noyce explained the logic simply: lithography got half the money because it was \u201chalf the problem\u201d facing the chip industry<\/strong>. It was impossible to make semiconductors without lithography tools, but the only remaining major U.S. producers were struggling to survive. America might soon be reliant on foreign equipment. Testifying to Congress in 1989, Noyce declared that \u201cSematech<\/strong> may likely be judged, in large part, as to how successful it is in saving America\u2019s optical stepper makers.\u201d<\/p>
Noyce agreed, and when he arrived in Massachusetts he decided that day to buy $13 million worth of GCA\u2019s newest equipment, as part of a program to share American-built semiconductor equipment with U.S. chipmakers and encourage them to buy more domestically produced tools.Sematech bet hugely on GCA, giving the company contracts to produce deep-ultraviolet lithography equipment that was at the cutting edge of the industry\u2019s capabilities. GCA delivered far beyond expectations, living up to its earlier reputation for technological brilliance. Soon independent industry analysts were describing GCA\u2019s newest steppers as \u201cthe best in the world.<\/p>
But GCA still didn\u2019t have a viable business model. Being \u201cahead of your time\u201d is good for scientists but not necessarily for manufacturing firms seeking sales. Customers had already gotten comfortable with equipment from competitors like Nikon, Canon, and ASML, and didn\u2019t want to take a risk on new and unfamiliar tools from a company whose future was uncertain. If GCA went bankrupt, customers might struggle to get spare parts. Unless a big customer could be convinced to sign a major contract with GCA, the company would spiral toward collapse. It lost $30 million between 1988 and 1992, despite $70 million in support from Sematech. Even Noyce could never convince Intel, the company he\u2019d founded, to switch its allegiance from Nikon.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u7f8e\u56fd\u5f53\u5e74\u4e3e\u56fd\u4f53\u5236\u7684\u4f8b\u5b50\uff1aSematech\uff0c\u633d\u6551\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u5149\u523b\u673a\u548c\u82af\u7247\u884c\u4e1a\u4e8e\u6c34\u706b\uff0c\u786e\u5b9e\u8d77\u5230\u4e86\u6781\u4e3a\u5173\u952e\u7684\u4f5c\u7528\u3002\u4ece\u8fd9\u4e2a\u89d2\u5ea6\u770b\uff0c\u5c31\u4e0d\u96be\u7406\u89e3\u56fd\u5185\u5f53\u4e0b\u7684\u6240\u8c13\u4e3e\u56fd\u4f53\u5236\u653b\u5173\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As commercial tension between the U.S. and Japan increased, Morita <\/strong>served as informal ambassador, explaining Japan to American powerbrokers. Morita at first found the power and wealth represented by his American friends seductive. As America lurched from crisis to crisis, however, the aura around men like Henry Kissinger and Pete Peterson began to wane. Their country\u2019s system wasn\u2019t working\u2014but Japan\u2019s was. <\/strong>By the 1980s, Morita perceived deep problems in America\u2019s economy and society. America had long seen itself as Japan\u2019s teacher, but Morita thought America had lessons to learn as it struggled with a growing trade deficit and the crisis in its high-tech industries. \u201cThe United States has been busy creating lawyers,\u201d Morita lectured, while Japan has \u201cbeen busier creating engineers.<\/strong>\u201d Moreover, American executives were too focused on \u201cthis year\u2019s profit,<\/strong>\u201d in contrast to Japanese management, which was \u201clong range.\u201d American labor relations were hierarchical and \u201cold style,\u201d without enough training or motivation for shop-floor employees. Americans should stop complaining about Japan\u2019s success, Morita believed. It was time to tell his American friends: Japan\u2019s system simply worked better.
In 1989, Morita set out his views in a collection of essays titled The Japan That Can Say No:<\/strong> Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n\u7d22\u5c3c\u76db\u7530\u662d\u592b\u5f53\u5e74\u662f\u65e5\u7f8e\u82af\u7247\u6218\u4e89\u7684\u4e2d\u95f4\u4eba\uff0c\u6c11\u95f4\u7684\u4ecb\u7ecd\u65e5\u672c\u6a21\u5f0f\u7ed9\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u5927\u4f7f\u3002\u6838\u5fc3\u8bae\u9898\u5c45\u7136\u4e5f\u662f08\u5e74\u91d1\u878d\u5371\u673a\u65f6\u4e2d\u56fd\u5728\u8ba8\u8bba\u8fc7\u7684\uff1a\u7f8e\u56fd\u6a21\u5f0f\u4e0d\u884c\u4e86\uff0c\u65e5\u672c\u6a21\u5f0fok\uff0c\u53ea\u4e0d\u8fc708\u5e74\u662f\u6240\u8c13\u7684\u534e\u76db\u987f\u5171\u8bc6\u548c\u5317\u4eac\u5171\u8bc6\u7684\u5dee\u5f02\uff0c\u5386\u53f2\u518d\u4e00\u6b21\u60ca\u4eba\u7684\u76f8\u4f3c\u3002\u76db\u7530\u6279\u8bc4\u7f8e\u56fd\u4eba\u4e0d\u6ce8\u91cd\u5de5\u7a0b\u5e08\uff0c\u6ce8\u91cd\u5f8b\u5e08\uff1b\u4e0d\u6ce8\u91cd\u957f\u671f\u5229\u76ca\uff0c\u6ce8\u91cd\u77ed\u671f\u5229\u6da6\u4eca\u5929\u4f9d\u7136\u5b58\u5728\u3002\u8fd8\u6709\u90a3\u672c\u8457\u540d\u7684\u4e66\uff0c\u65e5\u672c\u4eba\u53ef\u4ee5\u8bf4\u4e0d…<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was an embarrassing admission for Brown, the Pentagon leader who\u2019d hired Bill Perry in 1977 and empowered him to put semiconductors and computing power at the core of the military\u2019s most important new weapons systems. Brown and Perry succeeded in convincing the military to embrace microprocessors, but they hadn\u2019t anticipated Silicon Valley losing its lead. Their strategy paid off in terms of new weapons systems, but many of these now depended on Japan.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u65e5\u672c\u4eba\u7684\u9a84\u50b2\u5f15\u6765\u4e86\u7f8e\u56fd\u519b\u65b9\u7684\u6050\u614c\uff1a\u8fd9\u4e48\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u6b66\u5668\u90e8\u4ef6\uff0c\u5374\u8981\u4f9d\u8d56\u65e5\u672c\u3002\u5e26\u6765\u4e86\u540e\u9762\u7684\u4e00\u7cfb\u5217\u9ebb\u70e6\uff0c\u5f88\u591a\u60c5\u51b5\u4e0b\uff0c\u7ecf\u6d4e\u548c\u653f\u6cbb\u662f\u5206\u4e0d\u5f00\u3001\u76f8\u4e92\u8f6c\u5316\u7684\uff0c\u770b\u4f3c\u662f\u8d38\u6613\u548c\u5546\u4e1a\u7ade\u4e89\uff0c\u5b9e\u9645\u4e5f\u662f\u653f\u6cbb\u52bf\u529b\u7684\u89d2\u9010\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
4<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet Jack Simplot understood business in a way Silicon Valley\u2019s smartest scientists didn\u2019t. As America\u2019s chip industry struggled to adjust to Japan\u2019s challenge, cowboy entrepreneurs like him played a fundamental role in reversing what Bob Noyce had called a \u201cdeath spiral\u201d and executing a surprise turnaround. Silicon Valley\u2019s resurgence was driven by scrappy startups and by wrenching corporate transformations. The U.S. overtook Japan\u2019s DRAM behemoths not by replicating them<\/strong> but by innovating around them<\/strong>. Rather than cutting itself off from trade, Silicon Valley offshored even more production to Taiwan and South Korea to regain its competitive advantage.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u7f8e\u5149\u7684jack\u80fd\u5728\u6574\u4f53\u884c\u4e1a\u9762\u4e34\u60e8\u8d25\u7684\u65f6\u5019\u72ec\u8f9f\u8e4a\u5f84\uff0c\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u5e02\u573a\u81ea\u7531\u7ade\u4e89\u7684\u529b\u91cf\uff0c\u6e90\u6e90\u4e0d\u65ad\u7684\u521b\u65b0\u3002\u65e5\u672c\u8d76\u4e0a\u7f8e\u56fd\u662f\u9760copy\u7684\u540e\u53d1\u4f18\u52bf\uff0c\u7f8e\u56fd\u662f\u9760\u521b\u65b0\u6765\u6301\u7eed\u9886\u5148\uff0c\u601d\u8def\u4e0d\u540c\uff0c\u7ed3\u679c\u4e0d\u540c\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As all of Silicon Valley\u2019s tech titans were fleeing DRAM chips amid the Japanese onslaught, Simplot instinctively understood that Ward and Joe Parkinson were entering the memory market at exactly the right time. A potato farmer like him saw clearly that Japanese competition had turned DRAM chips into a commodity market. He\u2019d been through enough harvests to know that the best time to buy a commodity business was when prices were depressed and everyone else was in liquidation<\/strong>. Simplot decided to back Micron with $1 million. He\u2019d later pour in millions more.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u884c\u4e1a\u4f4e\u70b9\u4e5f\u662f\u5386\u53f2\u673a\u9047\u3002\u571f\u8c46\u5546\u4eba\u66f4\u7406\u89e3\u5927\u5b97\u5546\u54c1\uff0cDRAM\u82af\u7247\u6210\u4e3a\u5927\u5b97\u5546\u54c1\u540e\uff0c\u6700\u597d\u7684\u4e70\u5165\u673a\u4f1a\u5c31\u662f\u884c\u4e1a\u9677\u5165\u4f4e\u8c37\u7684\u65f6\u5019\u3002\u6bd5\u7adf\u8fd9\u662f\u6c38\u4e0d\u505c\u606f\u7684\u5468\u671f\uff0c\u9ad8\u70b9\u8fd8\u4f1a\u56de\u6765\u5c31\u597d\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWhile most of his competitors were fixated on shrinking the size of transistors and capacitors on each chip, Ward realized that if he shrunk the size of the chip itself, Micron could put more chips on each of the circular silicon wafers that it processed. This made manufacturing far more efficient. \u201cIt was by far the worst product on the market,\u201d Ward joked, \u201cbut by far the least expensive to produce.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u63d0\u9ad8\u5bc6\u5ea6\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Grove described his management philosophy in his bestselling book Only the Paranoid Survive: \u201cFear of competition, fear of bankruptcy, fear of being wrong and fear of losing can all be powerful motivators.\u201d <\/p>
In 1980, Intel had won a small contract with IBM, America\u2019s computer giant, to build chips for a new product called a personal computer. IBM contracted with a young programmer named Bill Gates to write software for the computer\u2019s operating system.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u53ea\u6709\u504f\u6267\u72c2\u624d\u80fd\u751f\u5b58\u7684intel\u8001\u5927\u3002DRAM\u9886\u57df\u60e8\u8d25\u540e\uff0c\u4e00\u4e2a\u5c0f\u5408\u540c\u6210\u5c31\u4e86\u66f4\u4e3a\u4f1f\u5927\u7684\u516c\u53f8\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Intel\u2019s new manufacturing method was called \u201ccopy exactly.\u201d Once Intel determined that a specific set of production processes worked best, they were replicated in all other Intel facilities. Before then, engineers had prided themselves on fine-tuning Intel\u2019s processes. Now they were asked not to think, but to replicate. \u201cIt was a huge cultural issue,\u201d one remembered, as a freewheeling Silicon Valley style was replaced with assembly line rigor. \u201cI was perceived as a dictator,\u201d Barrett admitted. But \u201ccopy exactly\u201d worked: Intel\u2019s yields rose substantially, while its manufacturing equipment was used more efficiently, driving down costs. Each of the company\u2019s plants began to function less like a research lab and more like a finely tuned machine.<\/p>
Grove and Intel got lucky, too. Some of the structural factors that had favored Japanese producers in the early 1980s began to shift. Between 1985 and 1988, the value of the Japanese yen doubled against the dollar, making American exports cheaper. Interest rates in the U.S. fell sharply over the 1980s, reducing Intel\u2019s capital costs. Meanwhile, Texas-based Compaq Computer muscled in on IBM\u2019s PC market, driven by the realization that though it was hard to write operating systems or build microprocessors.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u89c4\u6a21\u5316\u751f\u4ea7\u3001\u6301\u7eed\u63d0\u9ad8\u826f\u7387\uff0c\u7ed9Intel\u6210\u5c31\u4e00\u4ee3\u738b\u8005\u94fa\u5e73\u4e86\u9053\u8def\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
U.S.-Japan trade tension helped Korean companies, too. After Washington threatened tariffs unless Japan stopped \u201cdumping\u201d\u2014selling DRAM chips cheaply on the U.S. market\u2014in 1986, Tokyo agreed to limit its sales of chips to the U.S. and promised not to sell at low prices. This provided an opening for Korean companies to sell more DRAM chips at higher prices. The Americans didn\u2019t intend for the deal to benefit Korean firms, but they were happy to see anyone but Japan producing the chips they needed.
The U.S. didn\u2019t simply provide a market for South Korean DRAM chips; it provided technology, too. With Silicon Valley\u2019s DRAM producers mostly near collapse, there was little hesitation about transferring top-notch technology to Korea. Lee proposed to license a design for a 64K DRAM from Micron, the cash-strapped memory chip startup, befriending its founder Ward Parkinson in the process. The Idahoans, looking for any money they could get, eagerly agreed even if it meant Samsung would learn many of their processes. \u201cWhatever we did, Samsung did,\u201d Parkinson remembered, seeing the cash infusion that Samsung provided as \u201cnot crucial, but close\u201d in helping Micron survive. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n\u97e9\u56fd\u662f\u5f53\u5e74\u65e5\u7f8e\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u4e89\u7aef\u6700\u5927\u7684\u53d7\u76ca\u65b9\u3002\u8fd9\u8f6e\u4e2d\u7f8e\u8131\u94a9\u7684\u6700\u5927\u53d7\u76ca\u65b9\u5462\uff1f\u65e5\u7f8e\u4e89\u7aef\u4e2d\u65e5\u65b9\u8fdb\u884c\u4e86\u914d\u989d\u5236\uff0c\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u51fa\u53e3\u4ef7\u683c\u63d0\u9ad8\u76f4\u63a5\u8ba9\u5f31\u5c0f\u7684\u97e9\u56fd\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u516c\u53f8\u6536\u76ca\uff0c\u5927\u91cf\u51fa\u53e3\u63a5\u7ba1\u4e86\u65e5\u672c\u5931\u53bb\u7684\u5e02\u573a\u4efd\u989d\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The companies like Intel and Micron that survived did so less thanks to their engineering skills\u2014though these were important\u2014than their ability to capitalize on technical aptitude to make money in a hypercompetitive, unforgiving industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u5173\u952e\u662f\u5728\u9ad8\u5ea6\u7ade\u4e89\u7684\u884c\u4e1a\u4e2d\u5982\u4f55\u6700\u5927\u5316\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u80fd\u529b\u6765\u8d5a\u94b1\uff0c\u8fd9\u662f\u6838\u5fc3\u3002\u662f\u5546\u4e1a\u80fd\u529b\uff0c\u4e0d\u53ea\u662f\u6280\u672f\u80fd\u529b\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Planes using laser guidance for their bomb strikes hit thirteen times <\/strong>as many targets as comparable planes without guided munitions. U.S. airpower proved decisive in the Persian Gulf War, decimating Iraqi forces while minimizing U.S. casualties. Weldon Word received an award for inventing the Paveway, improving its electronics, and driving down its cost so that each one was never more expensive than a jalopy, just as he had originally promised. It took several decades for people outside the U.S. military to realize how the Paveway and other weapons like it were changing war. But pilots who used these bombs knew just how transformative they were. \u201cThere are about ten thousand Americans who didn\u2019t get killed because of you guys,\u201d an Air Force officer told Word at the Pentagon award ceremony. Advanced microelectronics and a set of wings strapped to a bomb had transformed the nature of military power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u52a0\u6301\u7684\u7cbe\u786e\u5236\u5bfc\u70b8\u5f39\u6539\u53d8\u4e86\u7f8e\u4fc4\u7684\u519b\u4e8b\u5b9e\u529b\u5bf9\u6bd4\uff0c\u7f8e\u56fd\u5b8c\u80dc\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As Japan\u2019s stock market crashed, the country\u2019s vaunted long-term thinking no longer looked so visionary. Japan\u2019s seeming dominance had been built on an unsustainable foundation of government-backed overinvestment. Cheap capital had underwritten the construction of new semiconductor fabs, but also encouraged chipmakers to think less about profit and more about output. Japan\u2019s biggest semiconductor firms doubled down on DRAM production even as lower cost producers like Micron and South Korea\u2019s Samsung undercut Japanese rivals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The biggest error that Japan\u2019s chip firms made, however, was to miss the rise of PCs<\/strong>. None of the Japanese chip giants could replicate Intel\u2019s pivot to microprocessors or its mastery of the PC ecosystem. Only one Japanese firm, NEC, really tried, but it never won more than a tiny share of the microprocessor market. For Andy Grove and Intel, making money on microprocessors was a matter of life or death. Japan\u2019s DRAM firms, with massive market share and few financial constraints, ignored the microprocessor market until it was too late. As a result, the PC revolution mostly benefitted American chip firms. By the time Japan\u2019s stock market crashed, Japan\u2019s semiconductor dominance was already eroding. In 1993, the U.S. retook first place in semiconductor shipments.<\/strong> In 1998, South Korean firms had overtaken Japan as the world\u2019s largest producers of DRAM, while Japan\u2019s market share fell from 90 percent in the late 1980s to 20 percent by 1998.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
90\u5e74\u4ee3\u7684\u65e5\u672c\u91d1\u878d\u5371\u673a\u8ba9\u65e5\u672c\u4eba\u770b\u6e05\u695a\u4e86\u4e4b\u524d\u8fc7\u5ea6\u4e50\u89c2\u7684\u60c5\u51b5\uff0c\u4e00\u5207\u90fd\u662f\u5efa\u7acb\u5728\u4e0d\u624e\u5b9e\u7684\u57fa\u7840\u4e0a\uff0c\u4e8e\u662f\u4e00\u5207\u90fd\u4f1a\u8dcc\u56de\u53bb\uff1a\u957f\u671f\u53d8\u5f97\u4e0d\u53ef\u80fd\uff0c\u4fbf\u5b9c\u7684\u8d44\u672c\u4e0d\u53ef\u6301\u7eed\uff0c\u4ea7\u4e1a\u4e5f\u5f00\u59cb\u6e83\u8d25\uff0c\u66f4\u4e3a\u4e25\u91cd\u7684\u662f\uff1a\u6ca1\u673a\u4f1a\u6293\u4f4f\u6b63\u5728\u5174\u8d77\u7684PC\u7684\u5386\u53f2\u6027\u673a\u4f1a\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
5<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Minister Li followed through on his promise to find the money for the business plan Chang drew up. The Taiwanese government provided 48 percent<\/strong> of the startup capital for TSMC, stipulating only that Chang find a foreign chip firm to provide advanced production technology. He was turned down by his former colleagues at TI and by Intel. \u201cMorris, you\u2019ve had a lot of good ideas in your time,\u201d Gordon Moore told him. \u201cThis isn\u2019t one of them.\u201d However, Chang convinced Philips, the Dutch semiconductor company, to put up $58 million, transfer its production technology, and license intellectual property in exchange for a 27.5 percent stake in TSMC. The rest of the capital was raised from wealthy Taiwanese who were \u201casked\u201d by the government to invest. \u201cWhat generally happened was that one of the ministers in the government would call a businessman in Taiwan,\u201d Chang explained, \u201cto get him to invest.\u201d The government asked several of the island\u2019s wealthiest families. From day one, TSMC wasn\u2019t really a private business: it was a project of the Taiwanese state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u53f0\u79ef\u7535\u4ece\u6210\u7acb\u7b2c\u4e00\u5929\u8d77\uff0c\u5c31\u662f\u53f0\u6e7e\u201c\u4e3e\u5c9b\u4f53\u5236\u201d\u7684\u4ea7\u7269\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Singaporean government also tried replicating TSMC, establishing a foundry called Chartered Semiconductor, though the company never performed as well as its Taiwanese rival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u4e3e\u56fd\u4f53\u5236\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4e5f\u8bd5\u4e86\uff0c\u4e0d\u90a3\u4e48\u6210\u529f\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
More than at any point since Jay Lathrop had turned his microscope upside down in his U.S. military lab, in the 1990s the future of lithography was in doubt. Three existential questions hung over the lithography industry: engineering, business, and geopolitics. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Some researchers sought to use beams of electrons to carve chips, but electron beam lithography was never fast enough for mass production. Others placed their bet on X-rays or extreme ultraviolet light, each of which reacted with different sets of photoresist chemicals. At the annual international conference of lithography experts, scientists debated which technique would win out. It was a time of \u201clithography wars,\u201d one participant put it, between competing groups of engineers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u5149\u523b\u673a\u4e0d\u5bb9\u6613\uff0c\u7535\u5b50\u8def\u7ebf\u8d70\u4e0d\u901a\uff0c\u7ee7\u7eed\u56de\u5230<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cGrove wasn\u2019t convinced. \u201cAbandoning today\u2019s \u2018commodity\u2019 manufacturing can lock you out of tomorrow\u2019s emerging industry,\u201d he declared, pointing to the electric battery industry.<\/strong> The U.S. \u201clost its lead in batteries thirty years ago when it stopped making consumer electronics devices,\u201d Grove wrote. Then it missed PC batteries, and now was far behind on batteries for electric vehicles. \u201cI doubt they will ever catch up,\u201d he predicted in 2010.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
6<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By the 2000s, it was common to split the semiconductor industry into three categories. \u201cLogic\u201d refers to the processors that run smartphones, computers, and servers. \u201cMemory\u201d refers to DRAM, which provides the short-term memory computers need to operate, and flash, also called NAND, which remembers data over time. The third category of chips is more diffuse, including analog chips like sensors that convert visual or audio signals into digital data, radio frequency chips that communicate with cell phone networks, and semiconductors that manage how devices use electricity. This third category has not been primarily dependent on Moore\u2019s Law to drive performance improvements. Clever design matters more than shrinking transistors. Today around three-quarters of this category of chips are produced on processors at or larger than 180 nanometers, a manufacturing technology that was pioneered in the late 1990s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u5b58\u50a8\u3001\u903b\u8f91\u548c\u6a21\u62df\u82af\u7247\u7684\u4e09\u5927\u5206\u7c7b\u4e2d\uff0c\u6a21\u62df\u82af\u7247\u4e0d\u592a\u4f9d\u8d56\u5236\u7a0b\uff0c\u66f4\u4f9d\u8d56\u8bbe\u8ba1\uff0c\u8fd8\u5728180\u7eb3\u7c73\u5de5\u827a\u8282\u70b9\u4e0a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To better control the movement of electrons, new materials and transistor designs were needed. Unlike the 2D design used since the 1960s, the 22nm node introduced a new 3D transistor, called a FinFET (pronounced finfet), that sets the two ends of the circuit and the channel of semiconductor material that connects them on top of a block, looking like a fin protruding from a whale\u2019s back. The channel that connects the two ends of the circuit can therefore have an electric field applied not only from the top but also from the sides of the fin, enhancing control over the electrons and overcoming the electricity leakage that was threatening the performance of new generations of tiny transistors. These nanometer-scale 3D structures were crucial for the survival of Moore\u2019s Law, but they were staggeringly difficult to make, requiring even more precision in deposition, etching, and lithography. This added uncertainty about whether the major chipmakers would all flawlessly execute the switch to FinFET architectures or whether one might fall behind.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
FinFET\u76843D\u5de5\u827a\u624d\u6210\u5c31\u4e8622\u7eb3\u7c73\u8282\u70b9\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mobile devices would be a \u201cgame-changer\u201d for the chip industry, he told Forbes, perceiving them as heralding shifts as significant as the PC had brought. He was committed to winning the lion\u2019s share of this business, whatever the cost. Chang realized that TSMC could pull ahead of rivals technologically because it was a neutral player around which other companies would design their products. He called this TSMC\u2019s \u201cGrand Alliance,\u201d a partnership of dozens of companies that design chips, sell intellectual property, produce materials, or manufacture machinery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cAs smartphones began to take off, driving up demand for silicon, Morris Chang sat at the center. \u201cTSMC knows it is important to use everyone\u2019s innovation,\u201d Chang declared, \u201cours, that of the equipment makers, of our customers, and of the IP providers. That\u2019s the power of the Grand Alliance.\u201d The financial implications of this were profound. \u201cThe combined R&D spending of TSMC and its ten biggest customers,\u201d he bragged \u201cexceeds that of Samsung and Intel together.\u201d The old model of integrating design and manufacture would struggle to compete when the rest of the industry was coalescing around TSMC.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
TSMC\u7684\u6210\u679c\u4e0d\u662f\u5076\u7136\u7684\uff0c\u5f20\u5fe0\u8c0b\u5bf9\u79fb\u52a8\u7aef\u7684\u5224\u65ad\u9065\u9065\u9886\u5148\u4e8e\u4e1a\u5185\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cEUV was one of the biggest technological gambles of our time. In 2012, years before ASML had produced a functional EUV tool, Intel, Samsung, and TSMC had each invested directly in ASML to ensure the company had the funding needed to continue developing EUV tools that their future chipmaking capabilities would require. Intel alone invested $4 billion in ASML in 2012, one of the highest-stakes bets the company ever made, an investment that followed billions of dollars of previous grants and investments Intel had spent on EUV, dating back to the era of Andy Grove.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cASML rewarded certain suppliers with investment, like the $1 billion it paid Zeiss in 2016 to fund that company\u2019s R&D process. It held all of them, however, to exacting standards. \u201cIf you don\u2019t behave, we\u2019re going to buy you,\u201d ASML\u2019s CEO Peter Wennink told one supplier. It wasn\u2019t a joke: ASML ended up buying several suppliers, including Cymer, after concluding it could better manage them itself.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
EUV\u662f\u4e00\u573a\u4e16\u7eaa\u8c6a\u8d4c\u3002\u5ba2\u6237\u5927\u91cf\u6295\u8d44\u7ed9ASML\uff0cASML\u53cd\u8fc7\u6765\u5927\u91cf\u6295\u8d44\u7ed9\u4f9b\u5e94\u94fe\u7684\u4e16\u7eaa\u7814\u53d1\u5408\u4f5c\u7ed3\u6676\u3002\u8fd9\u4e48\u5927\u7684\u4e00\u4ef6\u4e8b\u60c5\uff0c\u5176\u5f71\u54cd\u610f\u4e49\u4f30\u8ba1\u624d\u521a\u521a\u663e\u73b0\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u610f\u8bc6\u5230\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cTSMC, Intel, and Samsung were certain to adopt EUV, though they had different strategies about when and how to embrace it. GlobalFoundries was less confident. The company had struggled with its 28nm process. To reduce the risk of delays, it decided to license its 14nm process from Samsung rather than develop it in-house, a decision that didn\u2019t suggest confidence in its R&D efforts.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
GF\u5df2\u7ecf\u6389\u961f\u4e86\u300214nm\u4e70\u6765\uff0c\u53ef\u80fd\u90fd\u4e0d\u5982\u81ea\u7814\u7684SMIC\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
7<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWhen it comes to core intellectual property, the building blocks of transistor patterns from which many chips are designed, China\u2019s market share is 2 percent; most of the rest is American or British. China supplies 4 percent of the world\u2019s silicon wafers and other chipmaking materials; 1 percent of the tools used to fabricate chips; 5 percent of the market for chip designs. It has only a 7 percent market share in the business of fabricating chips. None of this fabrication capacity involves high-value, leading-edge technology.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u82af\u7247\u7684\u6280\u672f\u79ef\u7d2f\u548c\u4ea7\u4e1a\u94fe\u4e0a\uff0c\u65e0\u7591\u6211\u4eec\u662f\u76f8\u5f53\u843d\u540e\u7684\u3002\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u76f8\u5f53\u957f\u7684\u8def\u8981\u8d70\uff0c\u76f8\u5f53\u591a\u7684\u56f0\u96be\u8981\u514b\u670d\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cRather than trying to sell chips and servers to Chinese customers, she announced, IBM would open its chip technology to Chinese partners, enabling them, she explained, to \u201ccreate a new and vibrant ecosystem of Chinese companies producing homegrown computer systems for the local and international markets.\u201d IBM\u2019s decision to trade technology for market access made business sense. The firm\u2019s technology was seen as second-rate, and without Beijing\u2019s imprimatur it was unlikely to reverse its post-Snowden market shrinkage. IBM was simultaneously trying to shift its global business from selling hardware to selling services, so sharing access to its chip designs seemed logical.
For China\u2019s government, however, this partnership wasn\u2019t solely about business. One of the individuals working with IBM\u2019s newly available chip technology was the former cyber security chief of China\u2019s nuclear missile arsenal, Shen Changxiang, the New York Times reported. Just a year earlier, Shen had been warning of the \u201chuge security risks\u201d in working with U.S. firms. Now he appeared to have concluded that IBM\u2019s offer to turn over chip technology supported Beijing\u2019s semiconductor strategy and China\u2019s national interests.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nIBM\u548c\u56fd\u5185\u7684\u751c\u871c\u5c81\u6708\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cHowever, Zhao\u2019s real interest was in buying the island\u2019s crown jewels\u2014MediaTek, the leading chip designer outside the U.S., and TSMC, the foundry on which almost all the world\u2019s fabless chip firms rely. He floated the idea of buying a 25 percent stake in TSMC and advocated merging MediaTek with Tsinghua Unigroup\u2019s chip design businesses. Neither transaction was legal under Taiwan\u2019s existing foreign investment rules, but when Zhao returned from Taiwan he took the stage at a public conference in Beijing and suggested China should ban imports of Taiwanese chips if Taipei didn\u2019t change these restrictions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u8d75\u4f1f\u56fd\u7684\u53f0\u6e7e\u4e4b\u884c\u5c45\u7136\u662f\u8981\u62ff\u4e0bTSMC\uff0c\u4f55\u5176\u56a3\u5f20\u3002\u4e8b\u540e\u6765\u770b\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e48\u75f4\u4eba\u8bf4\u68a6\u8fd8\u662f\u4e0d\u61c2\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In spring 2016, Tsinghua quietly bought 6 percent of the shares in Lattice Semiconductor, another U.S. chip firm. \u201cThis is purely a financial investment,\u201d Zhao told the Wall Street Journal. \u201cWe don\u2019t have any intention at all to try to acquire Lattice.\u201d Scarcely weeks after the investment was publicized, Tsinghua Unigroup began to sell its shares in Lattice. Shortly thereafter, Lattice received a buyout offer from a California-based investment firm called Canyon Bridge, which journalists from Reuters revealed had been discreetly funded by the Chinese government. The U.S. government firmly rejected the deal. While Canyon Bridge was maneuvering to purchase Lattice Semiconductor, for example, one of Canyon Bridge\u2019s cofounders tipped off a colleague in Beijing, passing along details about the transaction via WeChat and at meetings in a Starbucks in Beijing. His colleague bought stock based on this knowledge; the Canyon Bridge executive was convicted of insider trading.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u5927\u4e3e\u6d77\u5916\u6536\u8d2d\u4e2d\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u5c0f\u63d2\u66f2\uff0c\u4e0d\u582a\uff0c\u4e0d\u9075\u5b88\u89c4\u5219\uff0c\u628a\u522b\u4eba\u5f53\u50bb\u5b50\u3002\u8fd9\u4e48\u5927\u7684\u4e8b\u5c45\u7136\u661f\u5df4\u514b\u8c08\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cHowever, the company asked its consultants to determine its supply chain risk. They reported that the company had two key vulnerabilities: access to Google\u2019s Android operating system, the core software on which all non-Apple smartphones run, and the supply of the semiconductors that every smartphone requires. The company identified the 250 most important semiconductors that its products required and began designing as many as possible in-house. These chips were largely related to the business of building telecom base stations but also included the application processors for the company\u2019s smartphones, semiconductors that were monstrously complex and required the most advanced chipmaking technology. \u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u534e\u4e3a\u8fd8\u662f\u63d0\u524d\u6709\u9632\u5907\u7684\uff0c\u53ea\u662f250\u4e2a\u91cd\u8981\u82af\u7247\u7684\u4f9d\u8d56\u592a\u591a\u4e86\u5427\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe battle for the electromagnetic spectrum will be an invisible struggle conducted by semiconductors<\/strong>. Radar, jamming, and communications are all managed by complex radio frequency chips and digital-analog converters, which modulate signals to take advantage of open spectrum space, send signals in a specific direction, and try to confuse adversaries\u2019 sensors. Simultaneously, powerful digital chips<\/strong> will run complex algorithms inside a radar or jammer that assess the 289signals received and decide what signals to send out in a matter of milliseconds. At stake is a military\u2019s ability to see and to communicate.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u672a\u6765\u7684\u6218\u4e89\u91cd\u70b9\u5c06\u4f1a\u662f\u9891\u8c31\u6218\u3001\u7535\u78c1\u6218\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cOne U.S. semiconductor executive wryly summed things up to a White House official: \u201cOur fundamental problem is that our number one customer is our number one competitor.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u8fd9\u4e5f\u662f\u4e2d\u7f8e\u76ee\u524d\u66f4\u591a\u662f\u535a\u5f08\uff0c\u4e0d\u662f\u5bf9\u6297\u7684\u6838\u5fc3\u539f\u56e0\u3002\u672a\u6765\u672a\u5fc5\u771f\u8131\u94a9\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe real issue was that a company in the People\u2019s Republic of China had marched up the technology ladder\u2014from, in the late 1980s, simple phone switches to, by the late 2010s, the most advanced telecom and networking gear. Its annual R&D spending now rivaled American tech giants like Microsoft, Google, and Intel. Of all China\u2019s tech firms, it was the most successful exporter, giving it detailed knowledge of foreign markets. It not only produced hardware for cell towers, it also designed cutting-edge smartphone chips. It had become TSMC\u2019s second biggest customer, behind only Apple. The pressing question was: Could the United States let a Chinese company like this succeed?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u5386\u53f2\u4e0a\u7f8e\u56fd\u53cd\u590d\u7ed9\u51fa\u7684\u7b54\u6848\u662fNo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cNevertheless, it\u2019s surprising that China\u2019s done nothing to retaliate against the hobbling of its most global tech firm. It has repeatedly threatened to punish U.S. tech firms but never pulled the trigger. Beijing said it was drawing up an \u201cunreliable entity list\u201d of foreign companies that endanger Chinese security, but it doesn\u2019t appear to have added any firms to the list. Beijing has evidently calculated that it\u2019s better to accept that Huawei will become a second-rate technology player than to hit back against the United States. The U.S., it turns out, has escalation dominance when it comes to severing supply chains. \u201cWeaponized interdependence,\u201d one former senior official mused after the strike on Huawei. \u201cIt\u2019s a beautiful thing.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u73b0\u72b6\uff0c\u6253\u4e0d\u8fc7\u5f97\u8ba4\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cPerhaps in a decade China can succeed in building its own EUV scanner. If so, the program will cost tens of billions of dollars, but\u2014in a revelation that is bound to be discouraging\u2014when it\u2019s ready it will no longer be cutting edge. By that time, ASML will have introduced a new generation tool, called high-aperture EUV, which is scheduled to be ready in the mid-2020s and cost $300 million per machine, twice the cost of the first generation EUV machine.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u6280\u672f\u8fdb\u6b65\u4e1d\u6beb\u4e0d\u505c\uff0c\u65b0\u7684EUV\u5373\u5c06\u51fa\u6765\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cChina\u2019s also investing heavily in emerging semiconductor materials like silicon carbide and gallium nitride, which are unlikely to displace pure silicon in most chips but will likely play a bigger role in managing the power systems in electric vehicles. Here,\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u78b3\u5316\u7845\u548c\u6c2e\u5316\u9553\u6709\u8d85\u8f66\u673a\u4f1a\uff0c\u4f46\u76ee\u524d\u8fd8\u662f\u5728\u529f\u7387\u534a\u5bfc\u4f53\u4e0a\uff0c\u7535\u6e90\u7c7b\u82af\u7247\u3002\u5b58\u50a8\u548c\u6570\u5b57\u4e0a\u6ca1\u592a\u591a\u53d8\u5316\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cBarring severe new restrictions on access to foreign software and machinery, China looks likely to play a much bigger role in producing non-cutting-edge logic chips. In addition, it\u2019s pouring money into the materials needed to develop power management chips for electric vehicles. China\u2019s YMTC, meanwhile, has a real chance to win a chunk of the NAND memory market. Across the chip industry, estimates suggest that China\u2019s share of fabrication will increase from 15 percent at the start of the decade to 24 percent of global capacity by 2030, overtaking Taiwan and South Korea in terms of volume. China will almost certainly still lag technologically. But if more of the chip industry moves to China, the country will have more leverage in demanding technology transfer.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u975e\u5148\u8fdb\u5236\u7a0b\u7684\u903b\u8f91\u82af\u7247\u3001\u5b58\u50a8\u82af\u7247\u90fd\u5927\u6709\u53ef\u4e3a\u3002\u672a\u5fc5\u8981\u4ece\u6b27\u7f8e\u62a2\u5e02\u573a\uff0c\u65e5\u97e9\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u7b2c\u4e00\u6b65\u3002 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cAlthough the Biden administration has promised to work \u201cwith industry, allies, and partners,\u201d the U.S. and its allies aren\u2019t completely aligned when it comes to the future of the chip industry. The U.S. wants to reverse its declining share of chip fabrication and retain its dominant position in semiconductor design and machinery. Countries in Europe and Asia, however, would like to grab a bigger share of the high-value chip design market. Taiwan and South Korea, meanwhile, have no plans to surrender their market-leading positions fabricating advanced logic and memory chips. With China viewing expansion of its own fabrication capacity as a national security necessity, there\u2019s a limited amount of future chip fabrication business that can be shared between the U.S., Europe, and Asia.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u7f8e\u56fd\u4e5f\u4e0d\u5bb9\u6613\uff0c\u91cd\u5efa\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u82af\u7247\u4ea7\u4e1a\uff0c\u4f24\u5bb3\u7684\u4e0d\u53ea\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\uff0c\u4e5f\u4f1a\u6709\u5176\u5404\u4e2a\u6218\u7565\u76df\u53cb\u7684\u5229\u76ca\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cSilicon Valley isn\u2019t simply a story of science or engineering. Technology only advances when it finds a market. <\/strong>The history of the semiconductor is also a story of sales, marketing, supply chain management, and cost reduction. Silicon Valley wouldn\u2019t exist without the entrepreneurs who built it. Bob Noyce was an MIT-trained physicist, but he made his mark as a businessman, perceiving a vast market for a product that didn\u2019t yet exist. \u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u6280\u672f\u53ea\u6709\u5728\u5176\u9002\u5408\u7684\u5e02\u573a\u4e2d\u624d\u80fd\u4f18\u52bf\u5c3d\u663e\u3002\u7845\u8c37\u6545\u4e8b\u4e5f\u5e76\u975e\u662f\u7b80\u5355\u7684\u6280\u672f\u548c\u79d1\u5b66\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u5546\u4e1a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cJim Keller, the star semiconductor designer who\u2019s widely credited for transformative work on chips at Apple, Tesla, AMD, and Intel, has said he sees a clear path toward a fifty times increase in the density <\/strong>with which transistors can be packed on chips<\/strong>. First, he argues, existing fin-shaped transistors can be printed thinner to allow three times as many to be packed together. Next, fin-shaped transistors will be replaced by new tube-shaped transistors, often called \u201cgate-all-around.\u201d<\/strong> These are wire-shaped tubes that let an electric field be applied from all directions\u2014top, sides, and bottom\u2014providing better control of the \u201cswitch\u201d to cope with challenges as transistors shrink. These tiny wires will double the density at which transistors can be packed, Keller argues. Stacking these wires on top of each other can increase density eight times further, he predicts. This adds up to a roughly fifty times increase in the number of transistors that can fit on a chip. \u201cWe\u2019re not running out of atoms,\u201d Keller has said. \u201cWe know how to print single layers of atoms.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cNeil Thompson and Svenja Spanuth, two researchers, have gone so far as to argue that we\u2019re seeing a \u201cdecline of computers as a general purpose technology.\u201d They think the future of computing will be divided between \u201c\u200a\u2018fast lane\u2019 applications that get powerful customized chips and \u2018slow lane\u2019 applications that get stuck using general-purpose chips whose progress fades.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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