5\u6708\u4efd\u575a\u6301\u4e86\u51e0\u5929\u52a1\u5fc5\u8bfb\u5b8c\u7684\u4e00\u672c\u4e66\uff0c\u6700\u8fd1\u7684AI\u7f8e\u80a1\u6da8\u7684\u6709\u70b9\u65e0\u6cd5\u7406\u89e3\u4e86\uff0c4\u6708\u4efd\u7f8e\u5143\u57fa\u91d1\u51c0\u503c\u6da8\u4e8640%+\uff0c5\u6708\u4efd\u6da8\u5e45\u8fdb\u4e00\u6b65\u903c\u8fd1\u4e8660%\uff0c\u8d8a\u6765\u8d8a\u4e0d\u53ef\u601d\u8bae\u4e86\u3002\u5f53\u4e0b\u7684\u884c\u60c5\u6700\u503c\u5f97\u7684\u5bf9\u6807\u7684\u5c31\u662f2000\u90a3\u6b21\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u5371\u673a\uff0c\u6240\u4ee5\u627e\u4e86\u7c7b\u4f3c\u7684\u4e66\u6765\u8bfb\u4e00\u8bfb\uff0c\u8fd8\u662f\u86ee\u6709\u6536\u83b7\u7684\u3002\u6700\u610f\u5916\u7684\u6536\u83b7\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u4e00\u6b21\u5927\u7684\u6ce1\u6cab\u4e0d\u53ea\u662f\u884c\u4e1a\u6ce1\u6cab\uff0c\u4e0d\u53ea\u662f\u884c\u4e1a\u5185\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\u5174\u8870\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u66f4\u591a\u5176\u4ed6\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\u88f9\u631f\u800c\u5165\uff0c\u548c\u5f53\u65f6\u7684\u793e\u4f1a\u7ecf\u6d4e\u73af\u5883\u76f8\u7ed3\u5408\u7684\u4ea7\u7269\u3002\u8fd9\u4e48\u770b\u6765\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u4eca\u5929\u7684AI\u884c\u60c5\u4f9d\u7136\u8fd8\u5904\u4e8e\u65e9\u671f\u9636\u6bb5\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nDisclosure was the least intrusive form of supervision\u2014like a mother\u2019s telling her child to keep the cookie jar in plain sight. Or as Louis D. Brandeis had explained, \u201cSunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.\u201dIn other words, the requirement to disclose motivated a CEO not to do ill and generally not to violate the law, but it did not ensure that he would build value for the owners.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u62ab\u9732\u662f\u5e72\u9884\u6700\u5c11\u7684\u76d1\u7763\uff0c\u5305\u62ec\u900f\u660e\u5316\u3001\u4fe1\u606f\u5e73\u6743\u7684\u76f8\u5e94\u52aa\u529b\uff0c\u8fd9\u5957\u673a\u5236\u5728AI\u65f6\u4ee3\u4f1a\u66f4\u597d\u7528\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nIn the 80s, companies such as Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Microsoft followed Intel\u2019s lead. Soon,Silicon Valley was known as a place where nerdy, postadolescent programmers worked for modest wages but got rich on stock options\u2014just as Ben Graham had imagined. Of course, as every economist since Adam Smith could tell you, nothing of value\u2014not even lunch\u2014is free.Stock options were not costless; it was just that their cost went unaccounted for.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
80\u5e74\u4ee3\u7845\u8c37\u9020\u5bcc\u7684\u5de5\u5177\u5c45\u7136\u662f\u5458\u5de5\u671f\u6743\u3002\u6240\u4ee5\u90a3\u4e2a\u65f6\u4ee3\u7684\u80a1\u6743\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u5206\u914d\u65b9\u5f0f\uff0c\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u5206\u914d\u66f4\u751a\u4e00\u7b79\u4e86\u3002\u5f53\u7136\u671f\u6743\u4e0d\u662f\u514d\u8d39\u7684\u5348\u9910\uff0c\u671f\u6743\u53d1\u591a\u4e86\u7684\u7a00\u91ca\u5bf9\u80a1\u4e1c\u4e5f\u5341\u5206\u8ba8\u538c\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nNortel Networks was a disastrous example; under the pressure of analysts\u2019 expectations, it acquired nineteen companies between 1997 and 2001 in a quest to transform itself from traditional telephony to data networking. The stock steadily climbed\u2014until investors realized that Nortel had issued $32 billion in stock for largely worthless assets\u2014whereupon Nortel\u2019s stock collapsed from $80 to $2.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5317\u7535\u7684\u5931\u8d25\u6e90\u4e8e\u6ce1\u6cab\u65f6\u671f\u7684\u75af\u72c2\u6536\u8d2d\u3002\u4ece\u8fd9\u70b9\u4e0a\u770b\uff0c\u8fd1\u671f\u7684\u5e02\u573a\u5927\u89c4\u6a21\u6536\u8d2d\u4f3c\u4e4e\u8fd8\u6ca1\u6709\u53d1\u751f\uff0c\u8fd1\u671f\u552f\u4e00\u7684\u7cfb\u5217\u6536\u8d2d\u786c\u8981\u7b97\u7684\u8bdd\u4e5f\u5c31\u662fspacex\u548cxAI\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u4e8b\u60c5\u4e86\u3002\u76f8\u4fe1\u672a\u6765\u4e00\u5b9a\u4f1a\u6709\u8fd9\u4e48\u4e00\u6ce2\uff0c\u4e00\u65e6\u6570\u636e\u4e2d\u5fc3\u7684\u6536\u76ca\u53ef\u4ee5\u88ab\u5e02\u573a\u6ea2\u4ef7\u9ad8\u4f30\uff0c\u672a\u6765\u7684\u6536\u8d2d\u5c31\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u5728\u6570\u636e\u4e2d\u5fc3\u4e0a\u518d\u73b0\uff1f\u9759\u5f85\u5427\u3002\u552f\u4e00\u7684\u95ee\u9898\u662fAIDC\u95e8\u69db\u504f\u9ad8\u4e86\uff0c\u4e0d\u50cf\u5f53\u5e74\u4e70\u5149\u7f06\u57cb\u5149\u7f06\u90a3\u4e48\u5bb9\u6613\u3002\u90a3\u4f1a\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48\u5462\uff1f\u8fd9\u662f\u4e2a\u597d\u95ee\u9898\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nBy summer 1995, Congress was awash in proposals to reduce the scope of regulators, freeze the budget of the SEC for five years, eliminate some of its commissioners, and reduce disclosure requirements.The very day Blumenthal raised the alarm, Netscape Communications,an Internet company with a sensational product\u2014a browser for surfing the Web\u2014but with only two quarters of sales history and no profits, went public. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u653f\u6cbb\u548c\u7ecf\u6d4e\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u4e5f\u662f\u5f88\u7d27\u5bc6\u7684\u300295\u5e74\u7684\u76d1\u7ba1\u9884\u7b97\u7f29\u51cf\u5bf9\u653e\u677e\u76d1\u7ba1\u6709\u76f4\u63a5\u5f71\u54cd\uff0c\u624d\u6709\u4e86\u540e\u6765\u7684\u6ce1\u6cab\u3002\u8fd9\u8f6e\u7684\u5371\u673a\u5982\u679c\u6765\u7684\u8bdd\uff0c\u4e5f\u5e94\u8be5\u6709\u4e2a\u7c7b\u4f3c\u7684\u65f6\u523b\uff1f\u6bd4\u5982\u653e\u677e\u5bf9\u6570\u5b57\u8d27\u5e01\u7684\u76d1\u7ba1\uff1f\u6211\u53ea\u662f\u518d\u731c\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nIt was in September 1998, just as the currency crisis in Russia was roiling markets, that eBay, the Internet auction king, went public. The stock was offered at $18. After a full day of trading, it closed at $477. By year-end the stock was at $241. It strains credulity to report that eBay was trading at 1,800 times its previous year\u2019s earnings, but at least eBay had earnings. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
eBay\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u516c\u53f8\u706b\u7bad\u5f0f\u4e0a\u6da8\uff0c1800x P\/E\u4f30\u503c\u548c\u4eca\u5929\u7684SpaceX\u6309112x P\/S\u7684IPO\u4f30\u503c\u76f8\u6bd4\u4e5f\u6ca1\u5dee\u592a\u591a\u4e86\u3002\u5de8\u578b\u516c\u53f8\u4e0a\u5e02\u80af\u5b9a\u662f\u4e2a\u4e0d\u597d\u7684\u4fe1\u53f7\uff0c\u4f46\u503c\u5f97\u6ce8\u610f\u7684\u662f\u6ce1\u6cab\u7834\u88c2\u5230\u4e862000\u5e74\u4e4b\u540e\uff0c\u4e5f\u5c31\u662f2\u5e74\u4ee5\u540e\u4e86\u3002\u6240\u4ee5\u672a\u67652\u5e74\u8fd8\u662f\u8981\u5750\u7d27\u3001\u6293\u597d\uff0c\u4fdd\u6301\u4e00\u5b9a\u7684\u6fc0\u8fdb\uff0c\u5c24\u5176\u662f\u5bf9\u65b0\u4e1c\u897f\u3001\u65b0\u516c\u53f8\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nThe Nasdaq index and the Dow Jones average had tripled over this period to, respectively, 1,720 and 8,000.\u2019 This steep ascent might have impressed upon investors the need for caution, but its effect was otherwise. If General Electric could trade at forty times earnings, who was to say what the limit was for Amazon? True, Amazon had no earnings, but in the wonderland of the late 90s, the lack of profits was a boon. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u7eb3\u6307\u548c\u9053\u6307\u6da83\u500d\uff0c\u5e26\u6765\u4e86\u65b0\u7684\u5176\u5b9e\u66f4\u53ef\u6015\u7684\u95ee\u9898\uff1a\u5c31\u662f\u84dd\u7b79\u6c34\u6da8\u8239\u9ad8\u4ee5\u540e\uff0c\u65b0\u7ecf\u6d4e\u80a1\u7968\u5c31\u66f4\u6ca1\u6709\u8fb9\u9645\u4e86\uff0c\u8fd9\u79cd\u57fa\u7840\u4f30\u503c\u62ac\u5347\u5e26\u6765\u5bf9\u672a\u6765\u65b0\u7ecf\u6d4e\u80a1\u7968\u7684\u66f4\u5927\u7684\u60f3\u8c61\u7a7a\u95f4\u662f\u52a0\u901f\u6ce1\u6cab\u7684\u6838\u5fc3\u4e00\u73af\u3002\u76ee\u524d\u8fd9\u4ef6\u4e8b\u4f3c\u4e4e\u6b63\u5728\u8def\u4e0a\uff0c\u5982\u679c\u505a\u786c\u4ef6\u7684\u4f01\u4e1a\u80fd\u670950x P\/E\uff0c\u6a21\u578b\u4f01\u4e1a\u53ef\u80fd\u5c31\u80fd\u6709100x P\/S\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u53ef\u80fd\u624d\u662f\u672a\u6765\u7684\u4e3b\u5347\u6d6a\u6240\u5728\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nTo grasp the transforming power of fiber optics marked one as a visionary, whereas skeptics\u2014the faithless\u2014were \u201cenemies of the future.\u201d\u00b0 To doubt technology\u2019s promise, to insist on evidence one could see, was to insult the new religion; it was to be trapped in old-world precepts. Had Columbus seen America before he sailed?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5148\u76f8\u4fe1\u8fd8\u662f\u5148\u770b\u89c1\uff0c\u54e5\u4f26\u5e03\u80af\u5b9a\u662f\u56e0\u4e3a\u76f8\u4fe1\u6240\u4ee5\u770b\u89c1\uff0c\u6240\u4ee5\u6280\u672f\u4e50\u89c2\u4e3b\u4e49\u662f\u5fc5\u8981\u7684\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cFaith is central to every process of innovation,\u201d Gilder adjured. \u201cThe act of creation is a religious act,\u201d and \u201cthe investor who never acts until the financials affirm his choice [is] doomed to mediocrity by [his] trust in spurious rationality.\u201d\u2019 Spurious rationality. The Internet economy was something greater; it existed on a higher plane than the merely rational.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5bf9\u521b\u65b0\u7684\u5b97\u6559\u822c\u7684\u72c2\u70ed\uff0c\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u865a\u5047\u7406\u6027\u7684\u8bf4\u6cd5\u5f88\u65b0\u9896\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nThe total of investment surged from $3 billion in 1990 to $60 billion in 1999, implying that venture firms were becoming more confident but also less discriminating.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He repeated again and again that the Valley was spawning the \u201clargest legal wealth creation in history.\u201d The phrase struck a popular chord. If Doerr, who had a history of success with earlier technology companies, such as Compag and Lotus, was plugging the Web, it seemed safe for everyone else. In fact, he told The New Yorker, two years after the Netscape IPO, the Web might well be \u201cunderhyped.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u98ce\u9669\u6295\u8d44\u4ece30\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u5feb\u901f\u6269\u5f20\u81f3600\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\uff0c\u5c31\u5f88\u96be\u7ee7\u7eed\u7cbe\u6311\u7ec6\u9009\u6a21\u5f0f\u4e86\u3002\u7279\u522b\u662f\u5f53\u5927\u4eba\u7269\u90fd\u5bf9\u6b64\u6df1\u4fe1\u4e0d\u7591\u7684\u65f6\u5019\uff0c\u5e02\u573a\u53ea\u4f1a\u66f4\u52a0\u786e\u8ba4\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u70b9\u4e0a\uff0c\u5927\u4eba\u7269\u5f80\u5f80\u66f4\u5bb9\u6613\u51fa\u9519\u800c\u4e0d\u662f\u505a\u5bf9\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nHe used CMGI stock for every deal he made,and though he acquired companies pretty much on a whim, each (well publicized) deal further raised his stock. This was the game that Kozlowski at Tyco and many others were playing, but Wetherell\u2019s stock was far more virile. Over the five years from its IPO to early 1999, CMGI’s stock rose 140 times, giving it a market value of more than $6 billion.None of CMGI\u2019s various businesses were close to making money.\u201dBut the parent generated cash by periodically selling a piece of one of its startups in an IPO. What Wetherell had really built was an IPO farm\u2014\u2014the quintessential Internet business. According to Business Week, Wetherell was becoming \u201ca major force on the Web.\u201d Microsoft and Intel each acquired a minority stake. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u6362\u80a1\u6536\u8d2d\u3001\u505a\u5927\u505a\u5f3a\uff0c\u80a1\u4ef7\u6da8\u4e86140x\u3002\u867d\u7136CMGI\u7684\u4e1a\u52a1\u90fd\u4e0d\u8d5a\u94b1\uff0c\u4f46\u80a1\u4ef7\u4e0d\u65ad\u4e0a\u6da8\u3002\u8fd9\u79cd\u7c7b\u4f3c\u5b75\u5316\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\u4e1a\u52a1\u6a21\u5f0f\u8ba9\u6211\u60f3\u8d77\u6765\u4e86\u5f53\u5e74\u7684ITVC\u7684\u8bf4\u6cd5\uff0c\u65e0\u7591\u662f\u5e02\u573a\u9ad8\u70b9\u7684\u5e7b\u60f3\u4e86\u2014\u2014\u5173\u952e\u662f\u5f53\u65f6\u7684\u5e02\u573a\u6761\u4ef6\u8ba9\u8fd9\u79cd\u5e7b\u60f3\u786e\u5b9e\u53ef\u80fd\u5b9e\u73b0\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nNonetheless, Wetherell, who spent significant time in market chat rooms,deduced that investors hated the deal. The cash flow standard of Diller simply could not coexist with the airier standards of the new economy. Wetherell backed away from the merger. Wetherell\u2019s choice\u2014stock price over real cash flow\u2014epitomized the bubble as nothing else. The top-performing IPO of 1999 was Internet Capital, an incubator of business Web sites similar in structure to Wetherell\u2019s CMGI. It had gone public in August at $6. It closed on December 31 at $170. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u505a\u5c40\u8005\u672c\u8eab\u8fd8\u662f\u7684\u6e05\u9192\uff0c\u5f53\u6536\u8d2d\u76c8\u5229\u4f01\u4e1a\u505a\u5927\u5229\u6da6\u7684\u8ba1\u5212\u548c\u505a\u5927\u5e02\u503c\u76f8\u6096\u65f6\uff0c\u6536\u8d2d\u5c31\u53ef\u4ee5\u653e\u5f03\u4e86\u3002\u6536\u8d2d\u7684\u6807\u51c6\u65f6\u80a1\u4ef7\u4f18\u5148\u539f\u5219\u30021999\u5e74\u8868\u73b0\u6700\u597d\u7684IPO\u5c45\u7136\u662f\u4e00\u5bb6\u5b75\u5316\u5668\uff0c4\u4e2a\u6708\u6da8\u4e86\u63a5\u8fd130x\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nBy then, the price-earnings ratio of the average technology stock was well over two hundred. Nasdaq, which had been under 2,000 only sixteen months earlier, broke 5,000. By the peak of the bubble, the first quarter of 2000, a technology company was going public and doubling every other day\u2014a speculative orgy without precedent in public markets.*<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
2000\u5e74\u7684\u4e00\u5b63\u5ea6\u65f6\u6ce1\u6cab\u9ad8\u5cf0\uff0c\u5f53\u5929\u4e0a\u5e02\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u4f01\u4e1a\u540e\u7eed\u80a1\u4ef7\u5c45\u7136\u80fd\u6bcf\u5929\u7ffb\u500d\u3002\u8fd9\u65f6\u79d1\u6280\u80a1\u7684\u5e73\u5747P\/E\u8fbe\u5230\u4e86200x\u3002\u5927\u76d8\u6307\u6570\u662f\u4ece1998\u5e74\u4e0b\u534a\u5e74\u5f00\u59cb\u52a0\u901f\uff0c16\u4e2a\u6708\u6da8\u4e862.5x\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nSuch diverse ventures reflected his view that expertise was less critical than talent, which is to say, Skilling believed that Enron could fearlessly enter terrain in which it had little or no experience. Enron thus became something of an open laboratory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fastow\u2019s new solution bordered on the diabolical: to create a vehicle that was separate and yet not separate, that was independent of Enron and yet controlled by Fastow personally. In short: a personal fief within the public company. This demand was so counter to the proper spirit of the public corporation as to testify to the unhappy debasement generally of managerial culture\u2014to the long years of executive profiteering. Indeed, Fastow seems to have felt that profiteering was nothing less than his due. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5b89\u7136\u662f\u76d1\u7ba1\u653e\u677e\u7684\u4ea7\u7269\uff0c\u4e5f\u662f\u5f00\u653e\u8bd5\u9a8c\u7684\u4ea7\u7269\u3002\u4f46\u4ed6\u672c\u8eab\u5e76\u4e0d\u662f\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u6ce1\u6cab\u4e0b\u7684\u602a\u80ce\uff0c\u5374\u523a\u7834\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e2a\u6ce1\u6cab\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nNineteen ninety-eight was the year of eBay and Amazon, and Enron wanted in on the party. It wanted to exploit the Web and, just as importantly, to exploit the stock market\u2019s love of the Web. EnronOnline would trade energy products\u2014that much was predictable\u2014but Enron would also trade broadband, that is, capacity on the fiber-optic networks that were crisscrossing the country to carry Internet traffic. More improbably, Enron invested in a fiber network itself, acquiring and building a patchwork system that stretched for 18,000 miles.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
1998\u5e74\u968f\u7740ebay\u548c\u4e9a\u9a6c\u900a\u7684\u4e0a\u5e02\uff0c\u5b89\u7136\u4e5f\u60f3\u8fdb\u519b\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u4e86\u2014\u2014\u8ba1\u5212\u5c06\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u5e26\u5bbd\u4f5c\u4e3a\u5927\u5b97\u5546\u54c1\u7684\u4ea4\u6613\uff0c\u5177\u4f53\u4ea4\u6613\u5e26\u5bbd\u5bb9\u91cf\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u8fd8\u662f\u5f88\u6709\u521b\u610f\u7684\u3002\u8fd9\u79cd\u4f20\u7edf\u4f01\u4e1a\u8fdb\u519b\u6ce1\u6cab\u65b0\u4e1a\u52a1\u7684\u8352\u8bde\u60f3\u6cd5\uff0c\u624d\u662f\u6ce1\u6cab\u7684\u9ad8\u5cf0\uff0c\u76f8\u6bd4\u4e4b\u4e0b\u94f6\u884c\u3001\u5730\u4ea7\u3001\u94a2\u94c1\u7b49\u4f20\u7edf\u4ea7\u4e1a\u90fd\u8981\u5f00\u59cbAI\u4e1a\u52a1\u4e86\uff0c\u624d\u53ef\u80fd\u662f\u8fd9\u4e2a\u6ce1\u6cab\u7684\u5dc5\u5cf0\u5427\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nBroadband, the high-speed lines that conveyed millions of e-mails and other data without which modern man would be unable to function, was the shovel to the Internet\u2019s gold.\u00a0(The businesses were a natural fit, because fiber-optic lines were laid alongside gas pipelines.\u201d) Skilling characteristically decided that fiber-optic capacity could be traded. As it happened, bandwidth capacity was in huge oversupply; in terms of its scarcity value, one might as well have traded air. No matter\u2014Enron, as usual, invested in a capital asset so as to gain entr\u00e9e as a trader, which in this case meant that it strung together a national fiber network.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the half-decade after deregulation, telecom companies borrowed $1.6 trillion from banks and enlisted Wall Street to sell $600 billion in bonds.\u00ae They raised billions more in stock sales. Most of this money was spent on woefully redundant networks.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5bbd\u5e26\u7f51\u7edc\/\u5e26\u5bbd\u662f\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4e2d\u7684\u7b2c\u4e00\u5ea7\u91d1\u77ff\u3002\u7535\u4fe1\u516c\u53f8\u5c45\u7136\u501f\u6765\u4e862.2\u4e07\u4ebf\u7f8e\u5143\u5e76\u6295\u5165\u8fdb\u53bb\u4e86\u3002\u76f8\u6bd4\u4eca\u5929\u7684capex\u6295\u5165\u8fd8\u90fd\u662f\u5927\u5382\u7684\u73b0\u91d1\u6d41\uff0c\u6ca1\u6709\u52a8\u7528\u592a\u591a\u4fe1\u8d37\uff0c\u8db3\u4ee5\u8bf4\u660e\u8fd9\u4e2a\u6ce1\u6cab\u624d\u521a\u521a\u8d77\u6b65\u3002\u4e5f\u786e\u5b9e\u5982\u6b64\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Of course, the trouble with using mergers to increase earnings (as we saw with Tyco) is that one can never stop.\u00a0In retrospect, this unhappy marriage spelled the end of the dot-com bubble. But few people realized it at the time. There was no outward signal\u2014no obvious trigger. The public appetite for dot-coms was, merely,exhausted by the unceasing parade of IPOs. In the middle of March, two months after the merger had been announced, Internet stocks cracked,and when they did, investors, not unlike the familiar cartoon character.In a mere month, Yahoo was cut in half, Wetherell\u2019s CMGI surrendered two-thirds of its once-stupendous valuation, and Ventro, the brainchild of David Perry, who had driven West in such a haste, was reduced, with similar dispatch, from $239 to $26, or almost 90 percent.\u00a0In mid-April 2000,the Nasdaq plunged 10 percent in a single day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u6ce1\u6cab\u7834\u88c2\u7684\u8dcc\u5e45\u662f\u5341\u5206\u51f6\u9669\u7684\uff0cyahoo\u53ef\u4ee5\u4e00\u4e2a\u6708\u8dcc\u6389\u4e00\u534a\u3002CMGI \u8dcc\u63892\/3\uff0c\u5927\u76d8\u53ef\u4ee5\u4e00\u5929\u638910%\u3002\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u4e8b\u60c5\u8981\u5c0f\u5fc3\u3002\u5373\u4fbf\u662f\u7f8e\u5149\u3001\u82f1\u4f1f\u8fbe\u5c06\u6765\u4e5f\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u6709\u8dcc\u6389\u4e00\u534a\u751a\u81f3\u66f4\u591a\u7684\u53ef\u80fd\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
An investor who bought on the dip, as the soothsayers of the 90s had so unceasingly urged, over the ensuing twelve months saw technology issues cut in half yet again. By early 2001, the Nasdaq had plunged from 5,000 to under 2,000, and the value of Amazon had shrunk from a peak of $37 billion to under $5 billion. Internet stocks had been merely the most exotic flower in the hothouse\u2014the last to bloom, the first to expire. It was simply realistic to think that others would expire, too. First the cool of evenings, then the killer frost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u8dcc\u5e45\u5927\u7684\u65f6\u5019\u5de6\u4fa7\u53ef\u80fd\u4e8f\u66f4\u591a\uff0c\u4e9a\u9a6c\u900a\u7684\u5e02\u503c\u4ece370\u4ebf\u8dcc\u5230\u4e8650\u4ebf\uff0c15%\u4e0d\u5230\u4e86\u3002\u6700\u540e\u76db\u5f00\u3001\u6700\u5148\u51cb\u96f6\uff0c\u8fd9\u624d\u662f\u53ef\u6015\u7684\u4e8b\u5b9e\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nTelecoms were another matter. The investment in telecoms was at least twenty times greater than in dot-coms.\u201d People thought of their WorldCom shares\u2014even their Global Crossing shares\u2014as safer, less adolescent, than the plunging dot-com stocks. They were more integral to the general economy.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The vehicle for the masquerade was the capacity swap. Carriers had long exchanged leases on pieces of each other\u2019s networks without the exchange of cash or any accounting effect. In the latter half of 2000\u2014that is, at the very time their performance was souring\u2014the game significantly changed. Carriers began to swap broadband leases for large, identical sums of cash. The money was simply round-tripped; checks were sent in both directions to no net effect. Nonetheless, each carrier booked its side of the swap as revenue.\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u8fd9\u79cd\u5bbd\u5e26\u4ea4\u6613\u7684swap\u6bd4\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u5faa\u73af\u6295\u8d44\u8fd8\u8981\u53ef\u6076\uff0c\u8fd9\u5176\u5b9e\u662f\u660e\u76ee\u5f20\u80c6\u7684\u9020\u5047\u4e86\u3002\u53ea\u662f\u901a\u8fc7\u4f30\u503c\u6280\u672f\u6765\u5b9e\u73b0\u5229\u6da6\uff0c\u800c\u4e0d\u662f\u73b0\u91d1\u6d41\u3002\u8981\u7279\u522b\u5c0f\u5fc3\u8fd9\u79cd\u4f30\u503c\u7e41\u8363\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nSuch opportunism was relatively unknown to dot-com executives, many of whom were either idealistic, deluded, or both. Executives at eToys, Webvan, and many others never sold a share; they believed their own stories. Telecom executives were not so naive. Criminal insider trading is difficult to prove, and the executives, later, would protest they had been as unaware as anyone. But the pattern of massive selling, unwarranted optimism, and often deceptive disclosure suggests otherwise. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u6bd4\u8d77\u7535\u4fe1\u5927\u4f6c\u4eec\uff0c\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u7684\u521b\u59cb\u4eba\u8fd8\u662f\u6bd4\u8f83\u5929\u771f\uff0c\u76f8\u4fe1\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u6545\u4e8b\u3002\u7535\u4fe1\u5927\u4f6c\u4eec\u5c31\u5f88\u5bb9\u6613\u770b\u6e05\u73b0\u5b9e\uff0c\u53ea\u662f\u5fd9\u4e8e\u5957\u73b0\u4e86\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nRonald Barone, an analyst with UBS Warburg, afterward confessed to feeling \u201cbrain-drained.\u201d This did not keep him from raising his forecast. Another, Curt Launer, of Credit Suisse, diligently reported, \u201cTrends in all of our modeling inputs point to earnings of $2.20 in 2002.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Life is rarely that clean. What it shows, rather, is that the executives were increasingly eager to unload the stock just as Enron was reporting increasingly bogus numbers. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5206\u6790\u5e08\u5439\u7968\u6c38\u8fdc\u662f\u6ce1\u6cab\u4e2d\u4e0d\u53ef\u7f3a\u5c11\u7684\u4e00\u73af\u3002\u5439\u7968\u5439\u5230\u8111\u5b50\u88ab\u69a8\u5e72\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nWall Street can be fooled, as the memo writer for Global observed, but not forever. When investors catch a scent of weakness, they will turn with surprising haste. All former affection is forgotten; now they want only to sell. And so it was with Enron. Month after month the stock declined\u2014$80 at the end of January, $68 at the end of February, then $58, $62, and $52 at the end of May. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Just when it seemed the public had heard the worst imaginable, there came to light some fresh and more offensive tale of executive wrongdoing. And with each new episode the market fell lower. As John Kenneth Galbraith had written, in The Great Crash, of 1929: \u201cThe worst continued to worsen.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u5b89\u7136\u4e8b\u4ef6\u5bf9\u6ce1\u6cab\u7834\u88c2\u8fd8\u662f\u81f3\u5173\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u5f71\u54cd\u3002\u5b89\u7136\u751a\u81f3\u4e0d\u662f\u4e00\u5bb6\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u516c\u53f8\uff0c\u4f46\u5176\u505a\u6cd5\u523a\u7834\u4e86\u4e92\u8054\u7f51\u6ce1\u6cab\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e5f\u662f\u9700\u8981\u5341\u5206\u5c0f\u5fc3\u548c\u8b66\u60d5\u7684\u4e8b\u60c5\u3002\u523a\u7834AI\u6ce1\u6cab\u7684\uff0c\u672a\u5fc5\u662fAI\u516c\u53f8\uff0c\u53ef\u80fd\u662f\u5176\u4ed6\u5de8\u65e0\u9738\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nit had fallen 11 percent in September alone, then 5 percent more at the start of October. One week after the Fastow in dictment, the S&P 500 closed at 776\u2014exactly half of the peak it had reached in March 2000. The Dow, barely above 7,000, had fallen almost 40 percent. This was its steepest slide in thirty years. Some $7 trillion of the public\u2019s savings had evaporated. The Nasdaq, now close to 1,100,had fallen 78 percent, the largest slide by a major index since the Great Depression. Of some 825 companies that had gone public in 1999 and 2000, 715 were below the offer price.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
2000\u5e743\u6708\u89c1\u9876\uff0c9\u6708\u4efd\u5927\u76d8\u4e0b\u8dcc11%\uff0c10\u6708\u4e2d\u65ec\u5df2\u7ecfDow\u8dcc\u5e45\u523040%\u4e86\uff0c\u7eb3\u65af\u8fbe\u514b\u8dcc\u4e8678%\uff0c\u6ce1\u6cab\u7834\u88c2\u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u592a\u957f\u65f6\u95f4\uff0c6\u4e2a\u6708\u5c31\u591f\u4e86\uff0c\u751a\u81f33\u4e2a\u6708\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u662f\u9700\u8981\u7279\u522b\u53bb\u907f\u514d\u7684\uff0c\u505a\u597d\u671f\u6743\u4ed3\u4f4d\u5168\u90e8\u5f52\u96f6\u7684\u51c6\u5907\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nThe collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s and the daunting advances made in Silicon Valley throughout the \u201990s gave the public a heady appetite to invest in shares and ultimately to speculate. However, these factors alone do not explain the headlong abandonment of moral standards.Nor does the refrain, popularized by Alan Greenspan, that America had suddenly become infected by greed.\u201d People have always been greedy,and they have always been subject to speculative frenzy.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
2000\u5e74\u6ce1\u6cab\u4e5f\u4e3b\u8981\u6e90\u4e8e\u5f53\u65f6\u51b7\u6218\u83b7\u80dc\u5e26\u6765\u7684\u4fe1\u5fc3\uff0c\u8ba9\u5927\u5bb6\u52c7\u4e8e\u6295\u8d44\u80a1\u7968\u3002\u4f46\u76d1\u7ba1\u8ddf\u4e0d\u4e0a\uff0c\u4eba\u6027\u4e2d\u7684\u8d2a\u5a6a\u88ab\u9010\u6b65\u653e\u5927\uff0c\u4ece\u6ce1\u6cab\u8d70\u5411\u75af\u72c2\uff0c\u6700\u540e\u5954\u6e83\u3002\u5f53\u524d\u7684AI\u4e50\u89c2\u4e3b\u4e49\u5176\u5b9e\u6709\u7c7b\u4f3c\u7684\u5fc3\u91cc\u6548\u679c\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nA better measure of the speculation is that during the Great Crash per se\u2014meaning the swift correction that occurred, despite little change in the economy, in October and November of \u201929\u2014stocks fell by half. Coincidentally, in 2000-02, the S&P 500 fell by exactly the same amount; the Dow, a little less; the Nasdaq, considerably more. Billions upon billions were squandered in an array of redundant industries: dot-coms, energy, telecoms, and so forth.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
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