Engines That Move Markets 2123-4

石油故事

石油的故事也非常有趣,一条是公司线,从标准石油到壳牌、到埃克森、美孚等诸多家。巨头的出现其实是市场恶性竞争之后市场集中和合并的结果,最特别的就是洛克菲勒的果断持续收购。一条是技术线,从采掘,到提炼煤油、重油,把废物汽油再利用的过程。煤油一出现就陆续淘汰了鲸油、煤基煤油;海军的动力系统从燃煤机组到重油机组、到汽油机组的变化。

By Monday, when Drake returned to the site, he was welcomed by all manner of receptacles filled with the same liquid. A hand pump was attached and Drake was able to do exactly what his critics had said was impossible: to pump oil directly out of the ground. The area had begun the journey to its eventual christening as Oil Creek.

1859年,第一桶石油的发现。把石油泵出地面也一度是没人敢信的事情。

Inevitably, given such a surge in supply, in the short-term prices dropped precipitously. These prices drove many producers into bankruptcy, but those who survived would become rich. While the low prices caused difficulties for the producers, they also made kerosene derived from rock oil highly competitive, driving out coal oil, whale oil and other illuminants.

石油的英文真是Rock Oil,好硬的翻译。石油发现之后带来的并不是财富,而是马上的供给过剩和价格暴跌,让许多人的财富化为乌有。但暴跌也有其好处,让从石油中提炼出来的煤油极具竞争力,消灭了鲸油和煤炭提炼的煤油。

In 1866 oil prices fell to a low of $2.40 a barrel. Producers in Oil Creek reacted in time-honored fashion to the damaging price decline caused by overproduction, and sought to reduce output.

The mechanism for achieving this was a cartel arrangement which allocated production limits among members, thus providing greater stability and rising prices. Unfortunately for the producers, the law of capture and the relatively low barriers to entry created a market structure so fragmented that cooperation in production could never be sustained.

石油卡特尔的形成居然不是为了垄断利润,而是为了活下去。多么有意思的历史事实。为了活下去,大家开始协议限产来维持价格,可惜当年的石油门槛太低、市场太分散,这种合作无法持续。

Faced with the volatile prices of crude oil, Rockefeller quickly determined to concentrate on the marginally less voltaic refining business.

洛克菲勒当年也是受不了油价的大幅波动才开始进入波动没那么大的石油加工业。

William Rockefeller’s functions to appraise his brother’s buyers of price movements in New York to help protect them from such fluctuations. His other important function was to secure additional lines of credit on Wall Street, a vital feature for an enterprise in an industry so prone to boom and bust.

钱袋子就是命根子。洛克菲勒兄弟两个,一个搞业务,一个在纽约搞融资,绝配。成功果然都不是偶然的。

Flagler soon negotiated a rebate deal with the railroads that was to cement the future of the venture.

But for Rockefeller and Flagler, it was the opportunity that eventually allowed them to dominate the industry. The key was their understanding that the threat they faced as refiners and suppliers of goods to be transported was no greater than the threat the transporters faced themselves from rival routes. Recognising this, they were able to turn the situation to their advantage and negotiate a deal with Jay Gould which provided them with a majority shareholding in the Allegheny Transportation Company, the first pipeline out of Oil Creek. As a result, they were able to ship oil on the Erie rail system at a 75% discount to their competitors. They then used the negotiating power this gave them to arrange a 30% discount with Vanderbilt’s railroad, the New York Central System.

洛克菲勒也需要Flagler这样关键的合伙人才能成就自己。分析清楚铁路们面临的巨大竞争压力,可以拿下75%的运费折扣进而碾压同行,形成巨大优势。有时候,能够洞穿事实就极为关键。

There were physical as well as commercial risks to face, too, in the shape of frequent fires involving waste products in the refining process, which poured into adjoining rivers and were frequently ignited by passing ships. The waste product would in time come to be known as gasoline, a product that was to have an even greater economic value than kerosene.

今天熟悉的汽油,居然是当年石油化工的废料。

Crude oil was in overproduction and it was estimated that refining capacity was three times the market’s requirements. As a consequence, the price of kerosene halved. The relatively low cost of entry and the lure of high profits and a quick return on investment produced a fragmented and oversupplied business. In 1870 Rockefeller estimated that 90% of refineries were making losses. Despite his initial deals with the railroads, Rockefeller was still faced with an industry structure that militated against stability.

洛克菲勒面临的环境也真是不容易,简直是多少次死里逃生的感觉:当时原油过剩,炼化产能三倍过剩,中端产品煤油的价格腰斩。想冲进来赚快钱的被纷纷搞死。90%的炼化都是亏损的。其实1870年标准石油成立,立马面对的就是1873年前后的大经济危机。

1872 The market for kerosene continued to deteriorate and prices dropped a further 25%, causing some competitors to declare bankruptcy. Standard Oil, however, managed to remain profitable and declare dividends while at the same time expanding and strengthening its position through discreet purchases of refineries and related businesses.

市场继续恶化,价格再跌25%,同行大量破产。只有标准石油能保持利润,还持续分红,同时不断收购扩张。这么恶劣的市场环境下能够有能力持续扩张,真是难得的天才和胆量,更难得的是能力。所以并购其实不是一件简单的事情,要寻求时机,要在时机成熟时敢于下手。太难了。有钱就去并购,纯粹是博傻。

The incentive to pump oil and take a ‘free ride’ on the cartel’s restricted production and higher prices was too great to be ignored. The so-called ‘Treaty of Titusville’, signed in New York in December 1872, survived only until January 1873. This was to be Rockefeller’s last attempt at ‘voluntary’ restraint。

自愿限产是无法达成一致的,这是人性。洛克菲勒1873年就看清楚了这一点,没有花太多时间。

This took place in September 1873 and was an early indicator of financial troubles, including widespread insolvency, defaults on railroad bonds, liquidation of banks and the temporary closure of the stock exchange. Over the next six years the US economy fell into a slump, with huge unemployment and wage deflation of almost 25%.

In the refining industry, with the crude oil price down to 48 cents a barrel (below the cost of water in some areas), Rockefeller’s access to cash made him unstoppable.

2.4就够低了,还能再跌80%也是绝了,跌到0.48美元/桶。这种价格下还能从银行获得信贷,持续收购,才是真正的成功点。

Standard Oil’s reach was long, but it was not long enough to break the political and financial support for Shell in Britain.

标准石油和壳牌之间的竞争,实际是商业触碰不了政治和金融,商业上极其常见,商业有其自身的边界。

Shell had an agreement with the Rothchilds to access crude oil supply from the Russian Empire, and this was then refined and shipped to Asia. Initially its principal competitor had been Standard Oil, but increasingly Royal Dutch had eaten into its Asian market and profitability.Royal Dutch was also worried because its oilfields in Sumatra appeared to be running dry.

壳牌的起家,是和罗斯柴尔德勾搭好能从俄国进口原油,然后出口到亚洲。对手是标准石油和皇家荷兰。

Eventually, in late 1901, Standard Oil offered to take over Shell at a price of $40m ($2.7bn). However, Marcus’s pride and nationalistic bent prevented him from accepting the offer. To have done so would have ended his control of the company and passed it into the hands of an American competitor. Instead he negotiated with Henri Deterding of Royal Dutch, and the result was an organisation managed by Deterding, but which was to be an equal partnership between the two companies, including the Rothschilds as partners. The new entity was to be named British Dutch.

辛丑条约的当年,标准石油差点就收购了壳牌,取而代之的是壳牌和荷兰皇家合并成了英国荷兰石油,今天的壳牌。

Shell had had high hopes of recruiting Britain’s Royal Navy as a substantial customer, as the trend seemed to be moving towards using oil-powered engines for ships. However, these hopes were dashed when the Navy elected to continue with coal as its propulsion fuel.

壳牌当年竞争英国海军的订单,正赶上海军军舰动力换成重油驱动。没想到的是海军还是继续用煤了。商业上这样的故事其实每天都在上演,趋势面前其实并不是大家都要第一时间上船的。

By the early 1900s, Standard Oil had lost its virtual monopoly of global oil. In Asia and Europe it had to contend with Shell and Royal Dutch, and in its own backyard new competitors had sprung up with the discoveries outside Pennsylvania.

三十年后的1900年,标准石油已经垄断不在了,欧洲亚洲有壳牌、荷兰石油;美国也有宾州之外的对手了。

Its structure, effectively a holding company with operating subsidiaries, was a model subsequently adopted by most major corporations. At the time in America, such a structure ran foul of the state-based legislative framework and it came repeatedly under attack as a consequence.

标准石油的架构改成了控股架构,下面子公司为运营实体。这种结构后来普遍被使用。

The implied price-earnings multiple was between eight and ten times the following year’s earnings. The price at which private trades took place in the stock implied a secure dividend yield of 7%.

1900年前后的P/E水平就是次年利润的8-10倍,7%的分红水平。

Standard Oil was given six months from 21 June 1911 to complete the dissolution process.

The company was subdivided, largely according to its geographic operating units. The original holding company became Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon) and was by some distance the largest single entity, accounting for over 40% of the assets of the trust. The next largest operation was Standard Oil of New York (Mobil), with approximately 10%. Other companies included: Standard Oil of California (Chevron), Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio, which later became a division of BP, subsequently BP Amoco), Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco), Continental Oil (Conoco) and Atlantic Oil (ARCO). The stock market listing of these companies, though, was not to take place until after World War I.

辛亥革命的当年标准石油进行了分拆,也是公司成立四十年后的事情了,分出来埃克森占40%、美孚10%、雪佛龙、BP Amoco、Conoco、ARCO六七家。所以后来埃克森美孚一合并,又是大巨头了。

The concern over the economic benefits of the breakup neglected the changing demand characteristics associated with the automobile and oil-powered shipping, particularly on the military side.

Net income for Standard Oil of California was ten times higher in 1920 than it was in 1911 and even if this figure was abnormally high, the growth rate was certainly not much less than 30% comparable per annum. Unocal’s stock note by contrast has roughly half that level. What is more, the growth in net income of Standard Oil had not been achieved at the expense of a weakened balance sheet or shareholder dilution. The Standard Oil shareholder had been rewarded with a consistently high cash dividend and frequent stock distributions. At the end of the period, therefore, the net assets of Standard Oil were more than two and a half times those of Unocal. It might have been a growing history, but there were very different returns to be earned by different companies. Those who doubted the ability of Standard Oil subsidiaries when out from under the umbrella of the trust were proved definitively wrong.

拆分完成后的10年,埃克森公司的利润增长了10倍,年增长接近30%。拆分并没有改变洛克菲勒的实力。

Knowledge of the chemistry of rock oil was new, however, and it led to the creation of an entire new industry. This industry operated in a largely unregulated environment and for an extended period was characterised by price volatility and excess supply。

监管一定程度上是好事,石油一开始的开采没有监管,才出现了巨大的波动和过量供给。

The power of the trust came not from control of production but from the strength of its negotiating position with the providers of distribution。

洛克菲勒的垄断,其垄断力的来源并不是控制了产能,而是能和上下游有很强的谈判力,这个结果还是很吃惊的。

The extended survival of AT&T as a single entity, by contrast, rested upon the company’s awareness that its future was dependent upon arriving at an accommodation with the authorities.

标准石油还是没有像AT&T当年把未来看的那么透,能通过和政府的妥协保持独立。

Not only did Standard Oil became a giant company in the oil industry, the recycling of its profits made it one of the largest financial concerns in the world and at the same time propelled its bank, which ultimately became Citibank, into the upper leagues of financial institutions.

标准石油的成功没想到还带出了一家巨大的银行:花旗。这等历史故事真是极其精彩。

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《风险投资简史》2125

挺有意思的书,难得有国内的朋友出来写VC的历史,这是非常有挑战性的尝试,值得鼓励。书的内容上整体还是不错的,很多有趣的历史故事增加了量化描述之后更有味道。按惯例做些摘要。

人在一生中只要在国运上升期抓住一两次趋势的机会,就可以取得空前绝后的成就,估计中外这样的例子屡见不鲜。19世纪中后期,美国成了全球的基建狂魔,进入一个大建设时代。摩根抓住了美国铁路基建大跃进的机会,通过兼并处于困境中的铁路资产一举成为当时最大的银行家,一度控制全美1/6的铁路,这些铁路公司的收入之和相当于美国年度财政收入的一半。

结论是很认可的。论据稍微牵强些,最近读的Engines That Move Markets正好也细致描述了这段故事,并非所谓抓住基建大跃进的机会那么简单,因为事实上摩根是在铁路狂热阶段在欧洲发的债,赚了钱,同时也作为欧洲可转债的持有代理人再开展工作,并没有那么慧眼,背后的投资人实际是亏损了很多。控制铁路越多,越说明当年最高点时参与的多么疯狂。

在多利奥特主导下,1957年,ARD向DEC投资了7万美元,占股70%。第二年就推出了第一款产品,卖了10万美元。1968年DEC成功上市,成为小型计算机领域仅次于IBM的公司,市值达到2.4亿美元。1971年ARD完全退出时,拿回收益3.55亿美元,回报超过5000倍。到1986年,公司高点时有12万员工,收入高达140亿美元。

VC界较为公认的第一个机构和第一个案子,5000倍回报。用了11年上市,14年才退出,长期。

CVC和独立VC的周期性基本上重叠。第一波发展从69-73年持续了4年,随着石油危机、经济滞胀等因素冲击,股市下行,大家都大幅缩减投资规模,大量CVC不得不饮恨退场。到1978年,活跃的CVC减少到不足20家。

CVC的周期性和VC一致。

Arthur Rock认为创新的点子和产品很多,但牛人才是最稀缺的,所以他提出了“人才优先/People First”的投资策略,指出创始人必须具备的六方面素质:正直、有上进心、市场导向、专业、掌握会计知识、有领导力。

People First,无论是机构还是创业者,都需要如此。

1974年,K&P向天腾Tandem投资了第一笔5万美元,用于公司成立和人员招聘等支出,一个刚加入K&P的成本会计专家也加入了这个项目。在容错电脑的概念被市场验证后,天腾启动了第一轮融资,K&P独家投资了100万美元,占40%股份。第二年第二次融资时,继续加磅50万美元,一共投资了155万美元,对于1972年成立的仅800万美元的VC一期基金而言显然是重注。1977年天腾顺利IPO,K&P持有的市值达到1250万美元,到1982年增至2亿美元。

KPCB出道时的极佳运气,但敢于下重注也确实是实力。4年实现IPO,近10倍回报,基金回本。

1978年,Apple的那一轮融资由Venrock领投37w美元,红杉跟投了15万美元。半年之后苹果推出了新产品,公司在市场上一炮而红,苹果开始了新一轮融资,估值比上一轮涨了3倍。可惜的是,红杉在18个月后就以600万美元的价格出售了苹果的股份,一年半回报40倍,最终也成了红杉犯下的最大错误之一,开始了反思,吸取了教训。瓦伦丁后来开始强调长期投资的理念,要求公司必须加强持有优质标的公司的耐心。

有趣的历史,红杉的长期主义居然是源自于这么一场失败。过早的退出,虽然短期有利,长期还是失去了太多。

早期硅谷的投资圈,曾经一度有“关系”、“技术”、“市场”三大流派之说,Arthur Rock认为People First,被认为是依靠人脉关系进行投资的代表人物;KPCB的Tom是聚焦技术的代表人物,而销售出身的瓦伦丁则非常看重初创公司所在赛道的规模和增长潜力,被认为是市场派的代表人物。他说,红杉的投资必须瞄准潜力巨大的目标市场。

国内也似乎是类似派别,赛道系,主要看市场,依然还是红杉;技术系,就比较多了,专业基金为主;关系型或者主要看人的,真格就是典型了。剩下的基本都要看,就不那么典型了。

红杉的接班人制度是最系统和规范的。在红杉,公司的管理者被称为“管家/Steward”,每次领导层更迭都被视为欢了一个管家。创始人瓦伦丁1996年提前让贤后,2012年莫里茨宣布身患顽疾,逐渐淡出;Jim Goetz上任,直至2017年退出,由Roelof Botha接任红杉新一任管家。

非常棒的制度,有机会再多找资料看看。

2010年,由Chris Sacca创立的Lowercase Capital/小写资本也是个非典型的VC基金。第一笔基金仅有850万美元的规模,第二期和第三期也不过3000万和2500万美元的规模。Sacca认为,只有小规模的基金也能聚焦于自己的投资策略,聚焦于具有巨大增长潜力的早期投资机会。2017年宣布不再募集新的基金。

有一定道理的,基金规模不是越大越好。适度规模更重要。

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