没想到凯恩斯除了在宏观经济学奠基之外，还是个投资高手，是价值投资的鼻祖了。高手的“道”基本是相通的，这就是非常值得学习的地方。这本书虽然读起来十分生涩，但还是十分推荐的，也是难得的佳作了。读下来，即便是宏观经济学上，也厘清了许多的误会。按惯例做些摘要。
这次的摘要做的破费周折，一大部分是在昨天飞机晚点的长沙候机室里写的，长沙到宁波的飞机上又补充了大半。现在是从舟山到上海的大巴上收尾，也聊做记录。
This aspect of Keynes – the shrewd investor, the canny player of financial markets – is rather unexpected in light of the man’s early life and beliefs. Keynes was an aesthete, his first allegiance to philosophy and the art of living well.
money makes a good servant but a bad master – in Keynes’ formulation, money’s merit lay solely in its ability to secure and maintain the conditions allowing one to “live wisely and agreeably and well.” Like economics itself, money was a mere expedient, nothing other than “a means to the enjoyment and realities of life”, and moneymaking little more than an “amusement.”
凯恩斯的成功投资首先来源于其个人哲学，包括对钱的看法：金钱是个好佣人，但是是个坏主人。如果只是用它来维持好的生活条件，以更聪明的生活，它就是好的佣人；但如果以金钱为追逐目标，它就是最坏的主人了。
Emboldened by Adam Smith’s paradoxical doctrine that selfish private actions would be transmuted into public virtues, and later by Darwin’s observations on natural selection and survival of the fittest, fin de siècle British society embraced free trade and a substantially laissez-faire government. The spirit of competition and endeavor pervaded Queen Victoria’s nation.
亚当斯密的分工和市场理论，可以将个人的自私转为社会美德，结合达尔文的自然选择和适者生存理论，英国社会选择了自由贸易和相应政策，竞争和努力成为维多利亚时代的潮流。这个可以说是英国社会所谓工业革命前夜的思想潮流了。可惜这样的潮流在当下的国内依然无法完全被认可，但好处是大众已经充分认可了——这也是个难得的前夜。
In a conclusion of frightening prescience, Keynes declared that the aggressive reparations terms would return to haunt the Continent: If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp. Nothing can then delay for very long that final civil war between the forces of reaction and the despairing convulsions of revolution, before which the horrors of the late German war will fade into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and the progress of our generation.
对二战的预言，凯恩斯敏锐看到一战的分赃不均带来的后遗症。这也是二战后秩序重新调整，马歇尔计划等推出的缘由——基于这个理由，其实第三次世界大战的预言就毫无意义了，纯属数字游戏了。
Putting his money where his mouth was, Keynes decided to back the pessimistic views expressed in Economic Consequences by speculating heavily on the foreign exchange market, taking short positions on key Continental currencies and long positions on the U.S. dollar.”
Additionally, speculation offered the pleasing prospect of earning considerable amounts of money relatively painlessly. Like his contemporary Winston Churchill, much of Keynes’ business was transacted while lounging in his bed. As one of his biographers noted: Some of this financial decision-making was carried out while he was still in bed in the morning; reports would come to him by phone from his brokers, and he would read the newspapers and make his decisions.”
预见到二战之后，凯恩斯开始了外汇市场的投资：卖出欧元、买入美元，大获全胜。这样的决断是在早上的床上作出的，也是种有趣的生活方式。
Keynes despised the pursuit of wealth. In a later paper he would invoke a glowing future where: The love of money as a possession… will be recognized for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease.”
单纯追求钱其实是病态的。成为金钱的奴隶是不好的，可惜很多人不以为然。
His first recorded investment was in 1905, at twenty-two years of age, when he bought shares in an insurance company and later an engineering firm using his “special fund” of birthday money and cash from academic prizes. Keynes’ investments until 1919 were relatively sporadic, but his portfolio – principally in the form of ordinary shares – enjoyed a steady increase in value, and by the end of 1918 he owned securities worth £9,428, around $625,000 in today’s money.”
第一笔投资22岁的凯恩斯用压岁钱和奖金买了一个保险公司和一个工程公司的股份。13年之后，他38岁的时候这笔投资已经是一笔相当于今天500万的财富了。这个业绩是相当不错的，考虑到其中还经历了第一次世界大战的话。
Smith found that, overwhelmingly, ordinary shares outperformed bonds not only in inflationary periods but also in times of falling prices. Smith’s simple but profound observation – that equities were, in effect, “compound interest machines,” offering not just dividends but capital growth through reinvestment of undistributed earnings – was a key factor in kick-starting the “cult of the common stock” in the mid-1920s.”
Smith的研究发现了股票是台复利机器的秘密。
If everyone is thinking alike then somebody isn’t thinking. —General George S. Patton
Paradoxically, group intelligence will only manifest when participants act as if they are not part of a group.
有人偷懒了。思维上的懒惰其实很常见。诡异的也是，只有看起来是“外人”，才能更好发挥集体智慧，否则盲从和从众就是常态。集体智慧就只能是集体懒惰。
“There is also, as Keynes observed, “a peculiar zest in making money quickly.” Emulation and envy are powerful stimulants, and the desire to keep up with the Joneses often fuels herd behavior. The economist Charles Kindleberger wryly noted that “there is nothing so disturbing to one’s well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich,” and the prospect of easy money on the stock exchange inevitably encourages others to venture their hand. Indeed, during booms the more cautious among the investment community are often castigated for their lack of entrepreneurial zeal.”
被市场情绪感染的解释之一：羡慕和嫉妒是最有效的激励，所以所谓的赚钱效应就十分关键。大家最看不惯的就是身边的人突然暴富，就会因此而敢于去冒险——这正是泡沫时期大家蜂拥而入不顾风险的原因。这种群情激愤的时刻，无需理智、勇气和信心。相反，当下国内的冷静时刻，是需要足够理性和信心的。
In skating over thin ice, our safety is in our speed. —Ralph Waldo Emerson, Prudence
Speculators walk a tightrope between staying in the market long enough to optimize trading gains, but not so long that the individual is caught in a bearish lurch downward.
投机是冰上起舞，玩的是速度——不仅要吃到最肥的上涨，还要能躲开快速的下跌。
Keynes’ principal stock market trading strategy in the 1920s – which he christened “credit cycle investing” – faithfully reflected the market-timing approach of the typical speculator. Credit cycling was an application of the oldest stock market maxim in the book: buy low and sell high. As Keynes explained many years later, credit cycling in respect of common stocks “means in practice selling market leaders on a falling market and buying them on a rising one.” It was a “top-down” approach to stock market investment, involving “a general systematic movement out of and into ordinary shares as a whole at different phases of the trade cycle.” This approach – sometimes dignified with the slightly more scientific-sounding appellations of “momentum investing” or “anticipatory trading” – relies on the speculator’s ability to apprehend turns in the market and time trades accordingly. For the “credit cycler,” price momentum is the fundamental trading driver, rather than any assessment of the inherent value of a stock relative to its price.
When stock prices are rising, it’s called “momentum investing”; when they are falling, it’s called “panic.” —Paul Krugman, The New York Times
20年代的凯恩斯用信贷周期理论来投资，也是当下的趋势投资了，价格趋势本身是最主要的动力，不是基本面。克鲁格曼的取笑毫不夸张。
In contrast to his American confrere, Keynes had substantially reduced his exposure to the stock market prior to the Great Crash of 1929. This move was not, however, attributable to any superior foresight on Keynes’ account. Rather, his “terrifying adventures” on the speculative markets – this time, the commodities market – had once again brought him undone. In 1928, after several years of profitable trading, Keynes’ positions in the rubber, corn, cotton, and tin markets turned against him, and he was obliged to liquidate the bulk of his equities to cover these losses.
In aggregate, Keynes’ net worth declined by more than 80 percent over this period – from £44,000 at the start of 1928 to less than £8,000 two years later – and, for the second time in his life, he found himself poised on the precipice of financial ruin.
大萧条时开始下注大宗商品，损失达到了80%，遭遇人生第二次巨亏。
But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.
Keynes abhorred the easy complacency of classical hardliners, and their serene assurances to the masses that society would eventually emerge from the Great Slump. In a stark rejoinder to the liquidationists selling their scorched earth policies, he reminded them that “in the long run we are all dead.” In the time of its greatest crisis, capitalism simply did not have the luxury of waiting for the economy to heal itself.
长期中我们都会死去，是凯恩斯揶揄传统经济学家们把长期说的太轻松，以至于忽视了短期的影响。比如大萧条这种情况下，经济自然会自愈，但实际是人们等不起，或者等待的代价会更为沉重。
He seemed to regard communism as more Groucho Marx than Karl Marx, dismissing it as “complicated hocus-pocus” and remarking to his students that he had read Das Kapital “as if it were a detective story, trying to find some clue to an idea in it and never succeeding.” Similarly, he had no time for fascism as a political solution – Keynes’ call to action, he informed the British Fascist leader Oswald Mosley, “was to save the country from [you], not to embrace [you].” In Keynes’ opinion, the most serious threat to capitalism came not from the aspiring revolutionaries peddling their “quack remedies,” but rather from those who most strenuously proclaimed their fealty to the existing order.”
All successful revolutions are the kicking in of a rotten door. —John Kenneth Galbraith, The Age of Uncertainty”
大萧条时期实际是人们对资本主义制度最为质疑的时刻。即便这种时刻，马克思的花招依然逃不过凯恩斯的法眼，核心就是其过于理想化的描述难以适应当下。因此对资本主义的最大威胁不是这些所谓的革命者，而是不思进取的因循守旧者。回到今天看这样的论断依然很有价值，我们在这种理想化和所谓革命之下得到的只有混乱和停滞，无论是大跃进还是文革，均是如此。相反只有回到脚踏实地的当下，才可能有所谓的进步，是其中国化、中国特色等带来了巨大的进步。放眼未来，这种理想化的东西能带来的唯有灾难。我们也必将会回到下一个立足当下的时刻，世上本没有什么资本主义、社会主义之说，马氏划的这个认为的38线终将会被丢进历史的垃圾桶，期待这一天早日到来。正如所有革命的成功，并非是其革命本身的伟大，而是更源于那个腐烂的门，成功就是能在合适的时机推开这扇并不沉重的门。
A central conclusion in The General Theory – informed by Keynes’ own experience as a speculator – was that the psychology of uncertainty impaired the efficient operation of the market. The existence of uncertainty would periodically result in bouts of underinvestment and oversaving, leading in turn to underutilization of an economy’s resources. The Keynesian solution to this state of affairs was, in essence, to boost an economy’s aggregate expenditure by increasing government spending to offset lower business and consumer activity.
Rather than abstracting money and financial markets from economic theory, Keynes saw them as a driving force. He realized that money was far more than a medium of exchange or the insubstantial shadow of real economy activities – it was “above all, a subtle device for linking the present to the future.” Keynes noted that: our desire to hold Money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the future. The possession of actual money lulls our disquietude; and the premium which we require to make us part with money is the measure of the degree of our disquietude.
“Liquidity preference” – the desire to hold cash or near-cash – is a gauge of individuals’ wariness about the future. When money moves from “industrial circulation” to “financial circulation” – when, rather than being invested in enterprise, savings instead lie fallow – slumps can occur. The flow of money can be thought of as an economy’s metabolism, and when individuals hoard their savings because of fears for the future, or when investors lack confidence to embark on new projects, the daisy chain of prosperity breaks and “enterprise will fade and die.
不确定性、对不确定的担心损害了市场效率和秩序，这就是通论的核心。所以要修复信心就极为重要，通过财政手段、政府干预来对冲民间信心的损失。货币的储存意愿，所谓流动性就可以成为信心的指标之一，也成为经济活动的重要指针。于是当资金从工业流向金融，从实体流出，出现脱实向虚时——经济就开始下滑了。这么来看，2015年至今的中央反对的金融空转、脱实向虚目标是有问题的，这个现象反映的是经济下滑，而针对性的措施应该更为根本，而不是治理这个现象。表象vs本质，可惜我们站错了地方。
All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”
真理的三个阶段，看起来十分疯狂，之后被激烈反对，最后被自我证明。这个规律适用于投资，真正好的项目也是这样，刚开始听起来像天方夜谭，然后大家普遍不看好，最后一鸣惊人。这个道理值得挂在墙上，提醒我们的位置。这也意味着，所谓明星项目、普遍认可的项目一定是缺乏潜力、甚至是错的。
This uncertainty gap is a blank canvas on which the investor projects his or her most fervent hopes or darkest fears. “Animal spirits” – the “spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction,” as Keynes defined them – embolden individuals and allow them to bridge the uncertainty gap inherent in any investment decision. The investor, Keynes concluded, is not the perfectly knowledgeable calculating machine of orthodox theory. Despite the assertions of efficient markets proponents, stock market behavior is not – cannot be – governed by purely rational factors. Investor psychology plays an integral role in the decision to buy, sell, or hold a stock.
动物精神就是用来跨越不确定鸿沟的，投资人因此才真正将不可能变为可能，创造了核心价值。这就是真正的企业家精神，敢于冒险的企业家精神，在所有人不敢的时候敢于前行，将不确定转为确定性。
Einstein’s bizarre theories of relativity were mirrored in the Keynesian universe, where money – like time – was sometimes more than a mere inert cipher. Keynes argued, however, that economics seemed to depart from the comforting resemblance to science in at least one key respect. In the discipline of economics, he asserted, “the atomic hypothesis that has worked so splendidly in physics breaks down,” and consequently:
We are faced at every turn with the problems of organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity – the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts, comparisons of quantity fail us, small changes produce large effects, the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied.”
相对论带来的经济学启示，资金就像时间一样。
Keynes’ realization that there was no method to the market’s madness prompted a radical change in his investment approach. Following the Great Crash, he completely inverted his investment principles, becoming an investor rather than a speculator – one who focuses on likely future performance rather than past trends, expected yield rather than disposal price, particular stocks rather than the broader index, and relying on his own judgment rather than that of the market. Simply stated, Keynes switched from market timer to value investor, seeking to profit from swings in the market rather than participating in them.
price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and to sell wisely when they advance a great deal.
true investment, which involves “forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole life.” The investor focuses on the income that a security is expected to produce, not the possible sale price of that security in the near term. Or, to employ Keynes’ terminology, the true investor is concerned more with “ultimate values” than “exchange values.”
Keynes had again become “horribly prosperous” by the time The General Theory was published. In the years between the Wall Street Crash and the end of 1936, Keynes multiplied his wealth more than sixtyfold, parlaying net assets of just under £8,000 at the end of 1929 to more than £500,000 only six years later.
从趋势/技术派转变为价值投资派，更关注企业利润而不是股价，更关注个股而不是指数，更依赖个人判断而不是市场共识，从参与价值成长中获利而不是从市场波动中获利。价格波动主要用来找买卖时点。价值投资也让凯恩斯的财富短短八年涨了16倍。
Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient, [many academics and investment professionals] went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient. The difference between these propositions is night and day. Value investors, by definition, do not accept the strong form of the efficient markets theory. There are times when the quoted price of a security departs from its underlying value, these investors believe, and it is on these occasions that the intelligent investor seeks to exploit the mispricing that results.”
市场经常是有效的 vs 市场总是有效的，之间的差别是十万八千里，如同日夜。价值投资者不接受市场有效假说。
Ussher deduced the exact date of Creation. The world, he declared, saw its first sunrise on Sunday, October 23, 4004 BC. Working from this absolute base, he could then calculate other key dates from Genesis – Adam and Eve, for example, were ejected from Paradise on Monday, November 10, 4004 BC, and Noah’s Ark finally bumped into Mount Ararat on May 5, 2348 BC, a Wednesday.”
算出了创世纪的时间——公元前4004年11月10日，高手。
Life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises. —Samuel Butler, The Note-Books of Samuel Butler”
漂亮的描述。
Value investing is, in essence, a “glass half-empty” rather than “glass half-full” approach – it focuses on downside risks rather than those on the upside. By selecting only those stocks that appear to be priced at a substantial discount to intrinsic worth, the investor seeks to ensure that there is a “floor” of underlying value that should support pricing over the longer term. The speculator, in contrast, is principally concerned not with the underlying earnings of a business but rather whether the stock can be offloaded at a higher price. As Fred Schwed observed: Speculation is an effort, probably unsuccessful, to turn a little money into a lot. Investment is an effort, which should be successful, to prevent a lot of money from becoming a little.
价值投资是半空形态，而不是半满心态——对应了俗话的“满瓶不响、半瓶晃荡”一说——更关注下行的风险，而不是上涨的潜力，意味着买点很重要。投机才会更关注卖多高的事情。投资是要大概率成功的，主要需要防范下跌的风险；投机的失败概率更大，因此更关注上涨能涨多高。
Keynes’ observation was a rather baroque restatement of the proverb “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” In the stock market arena, too, Keynes eventually adhered to this principle – “ultimate earning power,” not the vague promise of riches in some undefined future period, was fundamental in determining the worth of a stock. Warren Buffett similarly insists on “demonstrated consistent earning power” before he commits capital to a particular security. It is earnings – not market capitalization, revenue growth, or the novelty of an industry – that will ultimately determine the value of a company, and therefore its stock price.
Exactitude in the stock market arena is a fiction – because of uncertainty, no one can value a security precisely. The best response to this uncertainty, Keynes and Buffett argue, is to ensure a wide buffer exists between perceived value and quoted price.
凯恩斯的“绝对盈利能力” vs 巴菲特的“持续盈利能力”，异曲同工之妙，足见高人所见略同。
As he explained to a colleague, “The art of investing, if there is such an art, is that of taking advantage of the consequences of a mistaken opinion which is widespread.” In making this observation, Keynes echoed an insight of Frank Knight, a University of Chicago academic. Knight noted that there were two types of uncertainty – measurable probability, which he labeled “risk,” and unquantifiable ambiguity, which was true uncertainty.
“Buffett emphasizes “the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather than headwinds” – the ultimate investment opportunity presents itself, he advises, “when a great company gets into temporary trouble.”
投资，就是利用广泛传播的错误看法的结果。投资暂时遇到困难的好公司。
“Italian economist Piero Sraffa. According to one story circulating within Cambridge, Sraffa – who was in possession of a substantial family inheritance – waited patiently for “the one perfect investment.” Shortly after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Allies, he invested heavily in Japanese government bonds – and subsequently reaped a fortune in Japan’s post-War “miracle years.”
In 1974, when many pundits were proclaiming that “the Death of Equities” was imminent, Buffett acquired a large stake in The Washington Post. As Buffett explains, due to the overwhelming pessimism oppressing the market, the company was undervalued on any reasonable measure。
两个经典案例了。
Similarly, Keynes – the instinctive contrarian – was uncomfortable with an investment-by-committee approach. In an ostensibly contrite letter to a fellow member on the Eton finances committee, he explained: My central principle of investment is to go contrary to general opinion, on the ground that, if everyone agreed about its merits, the investment is inevitably too dear and therefore unattractive. Now obviously I can’t have it both ways – the whole point of the investment is that most people disagree with it. So, if others concerned don’t feel enough confidence to give me a run, it is in the nature of the case that I must retire from unequal combat.”
凯恩斯对投委会模式的不屑——好的投资经常是大多数人不同意的、和大众意见相左的，也是和集体意见不一致的。最好的还是要坚持个人意见，持续提高、持续修炼才行。这点我是深以为然。
As an early value investor, Keynes believed that “ ‘Be Quiet’ is our best motto” – short-term price fluctuations could be ignored as mere “noise” and the disciplined investor should patiently wait for the market to reassert itself as a weighing machine rather than a voting machine. The only rational response to irrational mob behavior, he determined, was to let the game players have the short term to themselves, while Keynes instead practiced a policy of “steadiness” in respect of his select portfolio of shares.
价值投资者要享受静待潮起潮落、主动忽视短期波动的美德。
In contrast, the “proper social purpose” of the stock market was, as Keynes explained, “to direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms of future yield.” The price performance of a stock will influence not only the ability of the underlying company to raise capital on the equity market, but will also affect the company’s borrowing capacity, its ability to make acquisitions, and the types of strategies it seeks to implement. A fundamental tenet of discriminating capitalism is that the stock market should reward those businesses that are the most successful. Success in the capitalist system is defined in brutally reductionist terms – the ability to earn sustainable profits over time.
股市的社会意义是恰当的资源配置，提高全社会的产出。市场胜出者的判断也很简单——是否拥有持续获得利润的能力。这其实是价值投资者的基础认知了。
Portfolio diversification is essentially a defensive strategy – by spreading funds between a large number of stocks, the extent to which poorly performing shares affect overall portfolio value is reduced. Further, the greater the diversification within a stock portfolio – that is, the more representative it becomes of the market as a whole – the lesser the risk of underperforming relative to the market. This outcome is important to both orthodox theorists and the average investor. Conventional financial wisdom defines “risk” as the volatility of a portfolio relative to the broader market, and therefore asserts that a diversified portfolio must, by definition, be less “risky” than a more compact suite of stocks.”
my theory of risk is that it is better to take a substantial holding of what one believes shows evidence of not being risky rather than scatter holdings in fields where one has not the same assurance.
Keynes noted that he would prefer “one investment about which I had sufficient information to form a judgment to ten securities about which I know little or nothing.” His contention was that intelligent, informed investors will reduce their downside risk by scrutinizing only those sectors within their “circle of competence” – to use Buffett’s phrase – and then only investing in those stocks which exhibit a satisfactory margin of safety. Like Socrates, intelligent investors are wise because they recognize the bounds of their knowledge.”
组合多元化的分散配置是一种防守策略。其实是向市场投降，也是种不自信的表现。好的策略当然是超配低风险高收益的品种。在自己的能力圈内做出关键的投资决策。
Value investors like Keynes rely on their own independent analysis rather than seeking guidance from the crowd. They practice, as Keynes did, “a certain continuity of policy” – a strategy that limits trading activity to those occasions when price departs widely from underlying value.
Value investors require a dispassionate framework for investment decision-making, one that screens them from the insidious effects of animal spirits and short-termism. As Warren Buffett comments: Investing is not a game where the guy with the 160 IQ beats the guy with the 130 IQ… Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.”
价值投资这件事注定是少数人的游戏，也只能依赖自己的独立分析和决策，也需要个有效的框架来抵御无处不在的非理性。
“1938, Keynes set out the most concise summary of his stock market investment philosophy: I believe now that successful investment depends on three principles:（1）a careful selection of a few investments (or a few types of investment) having regard to their cheapness in relation to their probable actual and potential intrinsic value over a period of years ahead and in relation to alternative investments at the time;（2）a steadfast holding of these in fairly large units through thick and thin, perhaps for several years, until either they have fulfilled their promise or it is evident that they were purchased on a mistake;（3）a balanced investment position, i.e. a variety of risks in spite of individual holdings being large, and if possible opposed risks (e.g. a holding of gold shares amongst other equities, since they are likely to move in opposite directions when there are general fluctuations).
凯恩斯总结的投资原则。
”
摘录来自
Investing with Keynes
Justyn Walsh
https://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?id=0
此材料可能受版权保护。
摘录来自
Investing with Keynes
Justyn Walsh
https://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?id=0
此材料可能受版权保护。
摘录来自
Investing with Keynes
Justyn Walsh
https://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?id=0
此材料可能受版权保护。
摘录来自
Investing with Keynes
Justyn Walsh
https://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?id=0
此材料可能受版权保护。
摘录来自
Investing with Keynes
Justyn Walsh
https://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?id=0
此材料可能受版权保护。