实际是元旦当天读完的书，一直没有补摘要。非常有趣的80年代历史的研究，这段历史已经被极大的修改过了，研读下当时的历史，对于认识当下的中国和未来，无疑是十分有意义的。照例做些摘录。
What is today called the “China model”—extraordinarily rapid economic growth paired with enduring authoritarian political control—was not the only vision of the future China’s leaders pursued in the decades following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. They imagined and experimented with many possible “China models” in the 1980s. Yet China’s rulers have worked hard to conceal this fuller story and the pivotal choices that determined China’s development. Bringing this forbidden history back into focus is vital. One of the most momentous transformations of the twentieth century has been the subject of immense historical distortion to bolster the legitimacy of the Communist Party’s chosen path.
The pages ahead show in detail how they settled on and pursued this so-called China model, not through a master plan but incrementally, adjusting to ideas and events as they confronted them—a transformation that has reshaped both China and the rest of the world.
08金融危机后鼓吹的北京共识已经破产了。虽然改革不只有一条路可选，但现实选了一条，政治就只允许把这条说成必由之路了。路也不是什么总设计师设计出来的，是一步步走出来的。
It is now clear that China’s experience is reshaping how scholars and practitioners understand capitalism, development, and modernization in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Yet many significant aspects of China’s experience, whether the extraordinary fluidity of the 1980s or the role of ideas in shaping China’s rise, remain to be reckoned with. There was no clear-cut “state” versus “market” duality but rather a constant intermingling of developmental forces, with trial-and-error policies that arose from the grassroots as well as the “commanding heights.”
For China’s rulers today, this fuller history of the 1980s is not just “unusable” or useless; it is threatening. But Chinese history has not ended with Xi Jinping’s rise to dominance. Prospects for change—whether they come from within the party or outside of it—will one day look to the history of the 1980s to help understand what China might yet become.
发展导向胜出。80年代的历史成为今天威权统治的威胁了：那种大胆尝试、辩论的方式都不允许了。
However, it is important to recognize that no clear end point of the process was established at this famous Third Plenum. The CCP was, in a widely used phrase, “crossing the river by feeling for the stones.” The phrase “reform and opening” had not yet been coined—it would only begin to appear in 1984—and Yu Guangyuan recalled that “reform ideas were generally embryonic” at the Third Plenum. Put another way, the leadership had committed itself to modernization, but it had not yet determined what that modernization would entail or what a new Chinese “modernity” would look like.
改革和开放两个词起初并不在一起。三中全会定了现代化的目标，但究竟要实现什么样的现代化其实并不清楚。这就是真实的历史，画个大饼先，大家都感觉良好，后面再慢慢补课。这条路基本是走到了现在，之前是照猫画虎，相对容易；再往前真正面对未知的时候，如果没有机制优势，这种模式还能继续下去吗？
Another new enemy that appeared on the scene was existentialist philosophy. University students were reading widely as a dizzying array of fiction, philosophy, psychology, and poetry was translated into Chinese. On elite university campuses, no foreign thinker was more popular than Jean-Paul Sartre. One popular novel included a youthful, individual- istic character, fixated on the French philosopher, who was warned by a friend that he was “a dangerous thing to study.” On August 10, 1981, Sartre’s play Dirty Hands, the story of a disillusioned Communist who realizes that he has been deceived by the party, premiered at a Shanghai theater; it echoed the “scar literature” that appeared as Chinese writers sought to reckon with the violence and suffering of the Maoist period.Existentialist “humanism” and “individualism” seemed at odds with socialism to many CCP ideologues, who soon decided they had seen enough.
存在主义、萨特、伤痕文学居然也曾经是反动派。这方面的东西反倒未来有时间要认真读读了。
Hu Yaobang’s report at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982 positioned socialist spiritual civilization as closely linked to China’s “material civilization.” Yet significant uncertainty remained about what, positively, “socialist spiritual civilization” meant. CCP ideologues were firm that it should be “scientific,” and in early 1983, a propaganda directive circulated with Hu Qiaomu’s guidance on “popularizing science and opposing religious superstition.”30 However, Chinese society was full of signs that people were yearning for forms of individual and communal fulfillment beyond the framework of “socialist spiritual civilization.” One example was intense interest that spread nationwide in breathing techniques called qigong.
The 12th Party Congress of 1982 reaffirmed the goal of quadrupling China’s output by the year 2000. Although the congress’s work report was penned in Hu Yaobang’s name, it also echoed Chen’s statements, as- serting the primacy of the planned economy and the “subordinate and secondary” role of market mechanisms. However, in subsequent state- ments on how to achieve the quadrupling goal, Zhao particularly encouraged foreign trade, stating, “As long as it is not a dependency, a favorable exchange is still self-reliance.” Deng, meanwhile, repeatedly raised concerns about why the targets for state plans remained low and promoted more rapid growth. Deng also laid strong emphasis on “building socialism with Chinese characteristics”—an enduring term that offered a spacious, vague, and malleable assertion of the distinctiveness of China’s modernization agenda, while subtly suggesting that Chen Yun’s ideas were still too closely borrowed from the Soviet planning model. Two visions of economic modernization were taking shape, and their goals seemed irreconcilable.
十二大社会主义精神文明的提出却带出了气功热，现在看来让人苦笑不得。十二大还得坚持陈云的计划经济为主，市场经济为辅；好在开始鼓励外贸了，这点是交换。
China’s leaders had a series of broad, quantifiable objectives as they set out to modernize the economy. Deng Xiaoping wanted China to quadruple its industrial and agricultural output by the year 2000. He also promised that the Chinese people would attain a “moderately prosperous” level of wealth in which well- being was widely distributed and people could live comfortably. But he did not know how exactly to achieve these objectives, and he sometimes changed his mind during this decade. Other leaders—such as the CCP elders Chen Yun and Li Xiannian and frontline leaders General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang—competed to develop policies to achieve these goals. Indeed, the defining characteristic of economic policy making during the 1980s was contestation, not consensus.
定了目标，却不知道目标是啥的困境。实际倒反而坦然，这就是胸襟了。
These debates over the newly approved “planned commodity economy” formulation also revealed an important emerging characteristic of China’s reform process. Because of the compromises necessary to achieve a consensus on an official formulation, such phrases often contained components in seeming opposition (in this case, “planned” and “commodity”). This, in turn, created a situation in which these formulations were highly generative and required further interpretation even after receiving official endorsement, which generated continued contestation. The debates among Chinese economists often centered on developing a “best” interpretation, a process that often involved the same actors who formulated the phrase in the first place. Even once they had arrived at a “systematic idea,” the challenges of interpretation, revision, and implementation remained unresolved.
新词“计划商品经济”是种政治妥协。
The biggest disappointment was that the SEZs were not becoming the export engines that leaders had hoped for. Their growth was coming from investment and domestic production, and as of 1985, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Xiamen all exported less than half of their industrial production. The four SEZs had become a drain on limited foreign exchange, reportedly running up a trade deficit of US$900 million by importing nearly four times as much as they exported. Future premier Zhu Rongji, then SPC deputy chairman, acknowledged to a delegation visiting Beijing that Shenzhen’s development “obviously isn’t running smoothly.”
经济特区没有变成国家出口的发动机，反而是进口4倍于出口，逆差达9亿美元。这个和设计是很不相符的，深圳也有低潮。但这段历史就彻底被埋葬了。
This rising interest in futurism developed in tandem with a growing focus among China’s rulers on cybernetics, systems engineering, and forecasting as they sought to help China meet its ambitious development goals for the year 2000, which included quadrupling the gross value of industrial and agricultural output from 1980 levels. “Cybernetics is the science that studies the control laws of complex systems,” wrote Tong Tianxiang, a prominent champion of cybernetics, in People’s Daily. These techniques, he noted, could be applied to automating production, building computers and “artificial intelligence,” improving defense technology, and even to “the social system”—that is, to “improving the operation” of society itself. Soon after the 1978 National Science Conference, Qian Xuesen’s book on systems control and cybernetics, Engineering Cybernetics—originally written in the early 1950s in English, when Qian was still working in the United States—was republished in Beijing. For Qian, systems engineering sat comfortably alongside his continued commitment to Marxism, and he also partnered with experts in cybernetics from the Soviet Union, where the field enjoyed great popularity. After Mao’s death, Qian advocated the establishment of institutes at major universities, the publication of books and journals, and the creation of a Systems Engineering Society. This focus on cybernetics and systems engineering directly affected policymaking in the early 1980s. In the economic domain, officials at the State Council began to use these techniques to model prices, wages, and financial subsidies and forecast increases in energy usage as China’s economy grew, calling cybernetics “a technology that organizes and manages socialist construction.” Of course, they also continued to be widely used in the defense sector.But perhaps the most significant consequence of this scientific field was in policies regarding population control in China.
Even so, the Chinese leadership continued to invest in systems engineering and futurist projections. In 1983, Zhao approved a research out- line for a project on “China in the Year 2000,” and shortly thereafter, the CSFS held a symposium on this topic. The ideal of managing society as a large mechanical system remained profoundly alluring to the CCP. Young officials imagined having the capacity, by the PRC’s centenary in 2049, to clone people and re-create the exact scene that had filled Tiananmen Square when Mao spoke on October 1, 1949.
As a result, in early 1984 The Third Wave was temporarily banned.66 Shortly thereafter, Ma Hong spoke to a meeting of provincial officials and walked back his endorsement of what he now called the “currently popular so-called ‘Third Wave.’” Toffler’s and Naisbitt’s works “do not support and even oppose Marxism.” Ma said that he had been deeply troubled by an unacceptable comment made by a graduate student at Pe- king University. “Marxism is out of date,” the student had said, adding, “Toffler’s Third Wave is the most correct way of thinking.”
Zhao would subsequently suggest that the project be labeled the “863 Program,” reflecting the proposal’s March 1986 date.26 The New Technological Revolution, Toffler’s ideas, and Zhao’s development-focused agenda were the foundation on which the 863 Program was built—with Zhao continuing to coordinate the SSTC, CAS, and the State Planning Commission (SPC), among other government institutions, to develop and implement this strategy.
未来主义、第三次浪潮、系统论在中国的被吹捧和摔地上。国家领导人面对未来也难免失去方向，寻求虚无和未来主义，这就是真实的历史，没有什么先知，越着急就越容易走歧途。当然也不全是问题，863计划上马了，至少国家关注到了高科技领域的发展，这点是对的。
Hu’s focus on improving the party had an insidious enemy that seemed to be growing more pervasive by the day: corruption. A series of scandals battered the leadership as officials were found to be commit- ting fraud, embezzling money, and taking bribes. As a political problem, this went well beyond the ideologized attempts to “strike hard” against economic crimes earlier in the decade (see Chapter 2). Some of the most egregious cases were committed by the children of prominent leaders, such as Hu Qiaomu’s son who was arrested for fraud after reportedly embezzling 3 million yuan. Certain regions received particularly intense attention; the southern island of Hainan, for example, was the locus of a major “profiteering scandal” that led to the firing of at least three top officials and investigations reportedly involving eighty-eight of the island’s ninety-four administrative departments.
贪腐历来是市场化中不可避免的。海南的94个部门中涉贪的88个，比今天要严重的多，也许没那么严重。
On October 15,1986. the KMT Central Standing Committee lifted the ban on political parties and announced the end of decades of martial law. As in the case of the Philippines, these events were reported in Chinese state media, and Beijing’s reaction was formally positive—and in this case, of course, it was shaped by the CCP’s continuing claims to “reunifying” with Taiwan. “Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Ching-kuo] is now also pushing for political reform in Taiwan,” Zhao Ziyang’s chief of staff Bao Tong said. “We should do our reform better than he. ”。In this same period, China’s largest neighbor, the Soviet Union, was also presenting significant political reforms to the world. On February 25, 1986, at the opening of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev hailed the “new political thinking” in the spirit of democratization and transparency. This wave of changes on China’s periphery was profoundly unsettling to China’s rulers. In the Soviet Union and Taiwan, leaders had chosen to launch political reforms to save—and transform—their regimes. In the Philippines, by contrast, Marcos had refused to liberalize and lost “the people’s hearts.” Unless China could find another way forward, the choice for the CCP seemed stark: reform or perish.
杰出的领导人搞政治改革也要看天气。80年代政治改革的提出主要还是外部因素的推动，台湾蒋经国的整改让我党还愿意比比，老大哥苏联的尝试也似乎这正是正确的路。今天这样的机会已经几乎没有了，可能要千夫所指了。
Yet this was not the whole story. One additional decision was made on November 2, at the First Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee that immediately followed the congress. That decision was a secret protocol to keep significant power in Deng Xiaoping’s hands—an internal agreement made by Zhao and the new Politburo Standing Committee, despite the public fanfare surrounding Deng’s retirement from official positions. At this meeting, Zhao promised that the new leadership would continue to “seek the advice and help” of the elders, and “Comrade Xiaoping in particular.” But this was not simply a polite show of deference. Even when Deng did not serve on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, Zhao continued, “The status and value of Comrade Xiaoping as a decision-maker on the major problems for our party and nation did not change.”
可能是十三大最重要的决定，大事小平定。
The newspaper Guangming Daily, popular among intellectuals, declared, “Neo-authoritarianism is a ‘special express train’ to democratic politics via marketization,” albeit an express train that would take a few stops before its “democratic” destination. On March 4, Zhao described neo-authoritarianism to Deng. “The main point of this theory is that the modernization of backward countries inevi- tably passes through a phase in which it has to turn to a politics that cannot follow Western-style democracy, but instead is centered on strong, authori- tarian leaders who serve as the motivating force for change,” Zhao said. Deng responded, “That is exactly what I stand for. But it is not necessary to use that formulation.”
只可意会，不可言传的新威权主义。
With crowds filling Beijing’s central square, Deng Xiaoping’s mind turned to Poland, which he continued to follow with great concern. On April 4, 1989, Poland’s Round Table Agreement effectively dissolved the position of the Communist Party general secretary and set the stage for a large-scale electoral victory for the Solidarity coalition in the upcoming national elections. Deng was determined to prevent the CCP from meeting the same fate as its Polish counterpart.48 One senior Chinese official told Egon Krenz, the second-ranking official in East Germany, that the Chinese leaders believed that “legalizing the opposition would be the beginning of the end of socialism in China” because of the Polish experience with Solidarity, and they were prepared to take extreme measures to stop it.
风波前的波兰圆桌会议让党一夜失去执政地位惊醒了许多人，学潮不再是内部矛盾，而是敌我矛盾了，政治改革不再能继续提出了。
The notion of Deng as the “chief architect” was endorsed at a late- night meeting in Zhongnanhai on May 22, with Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, Yang Shangkun, and several other elders. “Who is the core of our party, who represents reform and development—is it Comrade Zhao Ziyang or Comrade Deng Xiaoping?” Li asked rhetorically. “Comrade Xiaoping is the chief architect of the reform and opening policies. Of course, Comrade Zhao Ziyang also did a little work, but it was the im- plementation of Comrade Xiaoping[’s designs]. . . . We must make a clear stand to safeguard Comrade Xiaoping.” On May 26, the formulation received its major propaganda debut on the front page of People’s Daily. “The chief architect of China’s reform and opening is Comrade Deng Xiaoping and not any other person,” Li Peng was quoted as saying.11 The vague phrase “not any other person” pointed to the purged Zhao.
总设计师的提出也算是邓赵之争，当然赵也没能力去争，但事情确实是赵做了许多，而不是一点点。邓来争这个头衔，正是因为没做太多。并非实至名归。
What this meant in practice is that Jiang was coming to accept market- driven growth. “The failure of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is not the failure of socialism,” he stated in his concluding remarks at the seminar. Jiang later recalled, “After spending a long time studying Western economics in 1991, I concluded that in a country with an underdeveloped economy . . . to push the economy forward, we must make use of the market economy.”This shift did not mark a refutation of the narrative of China’s modernization that had emerged via the rectifica- tion. Rather, this gave an elevated role to market-driven growth as part of a model of state-led economic development with strict political control.
苏联的失败不是社会主义的失败，这个理解是有问题的，至少是一种社会主义的失败吧。